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Preface  
This book provides a systematic analysis of the governance system of Cameroon 
within the framework of the Constitution. It scrutinises the institutional structures 
established by the Constitution and other legislative instruments and assesses the 
ways in which they shape and construct contemporary governance in Cameroon. 
The analysis is deployed through a historical exploration of constitutional 
developments and the contemporary contextual application of the Constitution. 
The book examines the operational dynamics of key institutions such as the 
executive, the legislature, the judiciary, the National Electoral Commission, the 
Constitutional Council and the National Commission on Human Rights and 
Freedoms. It explores the extent to which these institutions have been designed to 
address or influence contemporary governance challenges. It further provides an 
in-depth original analysis of more recent features in the governance landscape such 
as the Senate, the upper legislative chamber that has only been in existence since 
2013 and the even more recent Constitutional Council established in 2018. Both 
institutions were provided for in the 1996 Constitution and their role was deemed 
vital to the democratisation process underpinning the adoption of that 
Constitution. The book analyses and assesses the influence of these institutions 
on the constitutional and democratic governance of Cameroon. 
One prominent feature that permeates discourse on constitutional governance 
in post-colonial states is the recognition of minority identities. Cameroon has 
grappled with that issue in relation to the recognition of the English-speaking 
minorities – the Anglophone problem. The book provides a comprehensive 
analysis of that problem tracing its historical origins from the immediate post- 
independence constitutional history of Cameroon to more contemporary 
legislative developments. It explores alternative narratives geared at resolving 
the Anglophone problem within the framework of the Constitution. It further 
provides an original in-depth analysis of the recent 2019 legislative provisions 
establishing a special autonomy status for the minority English-speaking North- 
West and South-West Regions. 
The book draws on comparative approaches to constitutional governance in 
common law and civil law-oriented jurisdictions in Africa and Europe to highlight 
the fundamental idiosyncrasies in the understanding and the application of 
constitutional concepts in Cameroon. The book will be a valuable resource for 
scholars of public law, legal history and African politics. 
The publication of this book would not have been possible without the 
assistance of the editorial team at Routledge. I would like to thank, in particular, 
Leanne Hinves, Henry Strang, Alison Macfarlane and Neema Sangmo Lama. 
Many colleagues, friends and family supported me throughout this project. I am 
particularly grateful to my Head of School at De Montfort University, Mr Tim 
Hillier, for his encouragement when I first mentioned the prospects of writing 
this book and for his support throughout, especially in facilitating a funded 
research trip to Cameroon, which was vital in completing many chapters of this 
book. Special thanks also go to my ‘roomie’ and dear friend Dr Oludara 
Akanmidu and Dr Irene Antonopoulos, Dr Simisola Akintoye and Dr Ohio 
Omiunu for their support and encouragement. I owe a debt of gratitude to 
Professor Andrew Williams who encouraged me to write this book and always 
provided his help and advice. I am also grateful to family friends who have 
supported me in different ways, notably Mrs Beryl Shortland, Mr Robert and 
Mrs Marian Matthews, Mrs Benic Sarr and Mrs Renée Nfor. 
My family also deserves special thanks, particularly mumsy Kate Tumenta for 
holding the fort in Cameroon allowing me the psychological space to pursue this 
project, my sister and star cheerleader Mrs Marion Titanji for cheering me on 
to the finish line and my sister-in-law Dora Wotany for facilitating my research 
during my trip to Cameroon. I am immensely grateful to my husband Nelson 
and our children, Ebangha, Ngowo and Egbe Jr for providing me with the love 
and enthusiasm required to undertake a project of this nature. Immense 
gratitude also goes to mum, Etombi Tabe, for her strength and tenacity in 
enduring life with much grace even in the midst of adversity. It is to her that 
this book is dedicated.   
xx Preface 
Introduction   
In the last three decades, law, politics and governance in Cameroon have 
been characterised by change and continuity. The decade of the 1990s was a 
pivotal moment in the democratic governance and political advancement of 
Cameroon, marking a period of constitutional, legislative, political and institu-
tional change. These developments were purportedly intended, among other 
things, to introduce a paradigm shift from a colonial heritage of autocracy to 
a contextualised, progressive system of democratic governance. The climax 
of these developments was the promulgation of the 1996 Constitution. That 
Constitution marked a watershed in the constitutional and political history of 
Cameroon as it introduced features of a modern constitutional system. It made 
provision for a purportedly more balanced separation of powers system between 
the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. In that respect, a semi- 
presidential executive system was consolidated to mitigate the overconcentration 
of powers in the President, a feature of the old dispensation. The implication was 
that executive power was shared between the President and the Prime Minister 
(PM). Concerning the legislature, a Senate was introduced as the upper house of 
parliament to enhance democracy and popular representation. In relation to the 
judiciary, its historically subordinate status was elevated from an ‘authority’ to a 
‘power’, on par with the executive and the legislature. Another significant in-
novation was the creation of a constitutional jurisdiction, which is increasingly 
perceived as an essential feature in enhancing constitutional justice in a modern 
constitutional state. Further legislative instruments made provision for a national 
electoral commission, to remove the organisation of national elections from the 
hands of the executive to a separate, purportedly independent institution. In 
relation to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, a national 
human rights institution was created to enhance their protection and promotion. 
In the light of these developments, Cameroon seemed poised to become a 
modern constitutional state. 
However, that has not materialised. The country faces myriads of governance 
challenges epitomised by a failed democratic transition, structural and institu-
tional weaknesses, a persistently poor human rights record, poverty and under-
development. More recently, events in Cameroon’s two Anglophone regions 
have brought to the fore some of the consequences of a failed democratic 
transition. Cameroon has been embroiled in a violent conflict between armed 
separatists in the Anglophone regions and security forces. 
A major explanation for the failure to develop a modern constitutional state is 
the survival of an authoritarian philosophy, underpinned by a Jacobin con-
stitutional framework. That has conditioned the trajectory of governance in the 
direction of a stymied constitutional advancement and persistent, periodic di-
gression from democratic ideals. The developments in the 1990s did not trans-
form the structure of law and governance, as the structural and institutional 
innovations were instead infused with old authoritarian tenets, creating internal 
inconsistencies between change and continuity. The disjuncture between the 
establishment of new and purportedly progressive institutional structures and the 
persistence of authoritarian political ideals has prevented the development of a 
more democratic and accountable governance system. 
This book aims to provide a systematic analysis of the challenges in attaining 
constitutional and democratic governance in Cameroon. It offers a critical as-
sessment of the major structural and institutional governance mechanisms. This 
book critically examines constitutional and legislative texts on the executive, 
the legislature, the judiciary, the National Electoral Commission (ELECAM), the 
Constitutional Council (CC) and the National Commission on Human Rights 
and Freedoms (NCHRF). It assesses the practical application of the relevant laws 
regulating these institutions and how they impact on governance. Thus, it cri-
tically examines executive power within the framework of semi-presidentialism. 
It examines the fundamental role of ELECAM and related electoral commissions 
in providing a democratic electoral space. This analysis provides a crucial 
background to understanding some of the dynamics that shape the functioning of 
the legislature. The book also provides an in-depth examination of the legislature 
(the National Assembly and the Senate) and its contemporary role in developing 
legislation and exercising oversight of the government. It is the first work to assess 
the Senate since it was established in 2013. Judicial power is analysed in the light 
of its elevated status and the extent to which it is effective in exercising oversight 
of the government and safeguarding human rights. The role of the Council in 
enhancing constitutional justice and democracy is analysed. The analysis is 
original and provides novel insights into the practical functioning of the Council. 
In relation to the crisis in the Anglophone regions, the analysis includes an 
assessment of the current and proposed governance mechanisms to manage it. A 
number of crucial legislative developments occurred at the end of December 
2019 which have major implications for governance and the Anglophones’ quest 
for self-determination (the Anglophone problem). Notably, the granting of special 
autonomy status to the two Anglophone regions. This book provides the first in- 
depth and critical analysis of the new legislative texts carving out a special au-
tonomy status for the two Anglophone regions and the extent to which they 
provide lasting solutions to the Anglophone problem. 
With respect to the protection of human rights, a critical analysis of the scope 
of the relevant constitutional provisions is carried out. This analysis brings to 
light normative human rights issues which are peculiar to Cameroon. Some of 
2 Introduction 
these issues, such as individual duties and ‘claw-back’ clauses, are reflected in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. These normative issues are 
important to the extent that they have an impact on the scope of human rights in 
Cameroon. An original assessment of the NCHRF is also provided, applying best 
international standards espoused in the Paris Principle on national human rights 
institutions. 
This book adopts a three-dimensional research methodology. First, a doctrinal 
method is applied in the critical analysis of the constitutional and legislative texts. 
In doing so, a wide range of sources have been applied. These include decisions 
of the courts relating to these texts, decisions of the newly established Council, 
available literature and primary sources such as records of parliamentary pro-
ceedings and government publications. Second, a contextual method is applied 
to place the analysis in the context of the historical, constitutional and political 
evolution of the country. This includes a historical account of the decolonisation 
process from 1960 to 1961. The analysis further traces the roots of the over 
centralised governance system and the roots of the Anglophone problem. It 
explains the political context of the adoption of the 1961, 1972 and 1996 
Constitutions. It also explains the operation of the current constitutional and 
legislative provisions in the face of the current political crisis in the country. Third, 
the book applies a comparative analysis to highlight variations in institutional 
design and procedural mechanisms and how these operate in different countries 
and contexts. This provides a basis for considering alternative approaches to law 
reform and institutional design in Cameroon, taking into account the circum-
stances under which the reforms have potential to achieve the desired objectives. 
The analysis is captured in seven main chapters as synopsised here. 
Chapter 1 lays the foundation for understanding the constitutional  framework 
and the political culture underpinning governance in Cameroon. It provides a 
historical account of constitutional and political developments beginning with 
a very brief outline of German colonialism and proceeds to an account of 
the British and French colonial administration. In view of the importance of the 
colonial history to contemporary governance, attention is paid to the decoloni-
sation process. This chapter analyses the contentious issue of the reunification 
of the former British Southern Cameroons and former French Republic of 
Cameroon in 1961. The process of the reunification of Cameroon is contrasted 
with Tanzania, which is a union of the former Republic of Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar. That comparative analysis brings to light some of the insurmountable 
difficulties faced by the politicians of Southern Cameroons in negotiating sa-
tisfactory terms for reunification. The chapter also discusses the development and 
demise of federalism in Cameroon. That is another important dimension 
of Cameroon’s constitutional and political history as it is considered a catalyst 
for the Anglophone Problem. The chapter concludes with an examination of the 
process through which the 1996 Constitution was drafted and adopted by 
parliament. That Constitution was described as the document laying the foun-
dation for modern constitutionalism.1 However, as will become apparent in 
subsequent chapters, that assertion is simply a myth. 
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Chapter 2 examines executive power, which lies at the heart of governance in 
contemporary Cameroon and to a large extent shapes the outlook of institutions 
and political processes. Executive power in the Constitution operates in the 
framework of semi-presidentialism. Thus, the concept of semi-presidentialism 
provides the theoretical background against which executive power is analysed. 
The chapter provides innovative insights into the weaknesses of semi- 
presidentialism, as applied in Cameroon. As will be discussed, semi-presidentialism 
in principle has the advantage of providing an additional separation of executive 
power between the President and the PM, to mitigate the risk of overconcentration 
of powers in the President. An assessment of the powers of the President and the 
PM shows that the Constitution defines the contours of the PM’s powers so nar-
rowly as to erode the advantages of semi-presidentialism. The power imbalance 
between the President and PM has resulted in a de facto highly presidential system. 
The chapter reflects on what this portends for governance in Cameroon. The 
chapter also examines executive accountability and finds significant weaknesses in 
the accountability mechanisms, particularly with respect to the accountability of 
the President. The chapter draws on comparative examples in Africa and Europe 
to consider how some of these weaknesses can be addressed. 
Chapter 3 explores the electoral system and the legislature. In view of the 
centrality of the electoral system to democracy and governance, the chapter first 
embarks on an examination of the role of the National Electoral Commission 
and various sub-commissions and institutions that occupy the electoral land-
scape. The chapter finds considerable weaknesses in the electoral system and 
asserts that these weaknesses contribute to undermine democracy in Cameroon. 
The analysis of the electoral system provides the background for examination 
of various features of the legislature (composed of two houses – the National 
Assembly and Senate). Specifically, the chapter discusses the process of election 
of MPs and Senators and the appointment of Senators. It demonstrates how the 
weaknesses identified earlier in the electoral system operate in practice to grant 
incumbency advantages to the ruling political party, Cameroon People’s 
Democratic Movement (CPDM). Using statistical data on the representation of 
political parties in parliament since 1992, the chapter highlights how incumbency 
advantages have contributed to the continuous domination of the CPDM. 
The chapter also critically analyses the scope of the powers of the National 
Assembly, with reference to the Constitution and the National Assembly’s 
standing orders. It examines its legislative powers and its powers to exercise 
oversight of the executive. It finds that the National Assembly is endowed with 
an array of powers to perform its constitutional functions. However, some 
of the powers are severely circumscribed. In other instances, the National 
Assembly is undermined by constitutional and legislative provisions which 
provide scope for presidential interference. These weaknesses are compounded 
by the fact that the CPDM retains an overwhelming and largely disciplined 
majority in parliament. The chapter concludes that those factors make it dif-
ficult for the National Assembly to legislate effectively or to exercise effective 
oversight of the executive. 
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The chapter further offers an original and critical analysis of bicameralism in-
troduced in the 1996 Cameroon. This is done through an examination of the 
upper house of parliament (Senate) which is a recent feature in the political/leg-
islative landscape. Although provision was made for a Senate in the 1996 
Constitution, it was not until 2013 that the first Senators were appointed and 
elected. The institution has therefore only been in operation for seven years. 
The chapter examines the extent to which the Senate complements the role 
of the National Assembly and whether it expands popular representation, to 
lend greater significance to the principle of popular sovereignty2 espoused in 
the Constitution. It finds that Senate replicates the institutional deficiencies of 
the National Assembly and perpetuates the predominance of the ruling party. The 
chapter reflects on these issues and the effects of bicameralism, which 
ironically symbolise change and continuity – a new institution perpetuating a 
political culture of neopatrimonialism and presidential absolutism. 
The judiciary is discussed in Chapter 4. The judiciary is a very important 
institution, not least for its function in promoting accountable governance and 
safeguarding human rights. It is perhaps in recognition of its pivotal role that the 
Constitution elevated the judiciary’s status from an ‘authority’ to a ‘power’. 
Chapter 4 thus explores the constitutional and political implications of that 
elevated status. In particular, it critically assesses the effectiveness of the judiciary 
in promoting accountable governance and safeguarding human rights. The 
chapter first discusses the structure and jurisdiction of the courts. It then 
examines the structure of the judiciary and its relationship to the executive. The 
chapter finds that the judiciary is excessively dependent on the executive. First, it 
relies on the President who, according to the Constitution, is the guarantor of 
judicial independence. Second, the career of judges (including appointments, 
promotion and discipline) is largely dependent on the executive through me-
chanisms which are neither transparent nor objective. Third, the judiciary is 
financially dependent on the executive and accountable to it. These factors cu-
mulatively result in the absence of judicial independence. The chapter uses case 
law to demonstrate how the absence of judicial independence undermines the 
ability of the courts to exercise effective oversight of the government and to 
protect human rights. In the light of the weaknesses identified in the judiciary the 
chapter applies comparative insights from other jurisdictions such as France, 
Botswana, Ghana, South Africa and Uganda to highlight how some of the 
weaknesses can be overcome. 
The chapter also provides an in-depth examination of the complex relation-
ship between judges, prosecutors and the executive. It aims to demonstrate the 
peculiarity of the system in Cameroon which is based on the French judicial 
system. It argues that the relationship is inimical to judicial independence 
conceptually and as a matter of its practical operation in Cameroon. The chapter 
further examines the scope of the judiciary’s powers in administrative review, 
highlighting the controversial principle of actes de gouvernement’ which exempts a 
category of executive acts from judicial scrutiny. The relevant category of acts 
are important as they may have significant consequences on individual rights and 
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effective governance. The chapter argues that, due to their significance, their 
exemption from review may constitute a major weakness in the checks and 
balances system. 
Chapter 5 offers the first detailed analysis of the practical functioning of the 
Constitutional Council and its contributions to Cameroon’s democratic ad-
vancement. As mentioned earlier, this institution is another product of the de-
mocratic wind of change, introduced into the political landscape by the 1996 
Constitution. Its mission is to uphold the supremacy of the Constitution, promote 
democracy and constitutional justice. It was not until 2018 that the Council was 
established and effectively went into operation. Chapter 5 thus provides an 
original analysis of its functioning, with reference to constitutional and legislative 
provisions, its internal mechanisms and its developing case law. 
The chapter examines the method of appointment of Council members and 
compares their status to that of constitutional judges in other jurisdictions. It finds 
that the Council members lack independence, due significantly to their method 
of appointment which depends to a large extent on the President. The chapter 
further examines the jurisdiction of the Council. In particular, it examines its 
jurisdiction in constitutional review, regulating the functioning of state institu-
tions and regions and in ensuring the regularity of presidential and parliamentary 
elections. The analysis reveals a number of significant weaknesses. The chapter 
considers how some of these weaknesses can be addressed. 
In Chapter 6, the very divisive issue of the Anglophone struggle for self- 
determination is examined. The origins of that problem were discussed in 
Chapter 1. Chapter 6 extends that analysis by providing a detailed examination 
of the disparate options that have been advanced as ideal governance alternatives 
to accord the Anglophones meaningful self-determination. First, it examines the 
government’s preferred option of decentralisation. It analyses the constitutional 
origins of that option and assesses its strengths and weaknesses. In light of the 
important legislative developments that occurred in December 2019, this chapter 
provides a critical assessment of the main legislative provisions setting out the 
special status arrangements. It first analyses the political context and the pro-
cedural mechanisms preceding the promulgation of the relevant legislation. It 
then analyses the specific normative provisions. It assesses the extent to which 
they provide satisfactory responses to the Anglophone demands for respect of 
their minority status and a measure of autonomy. The chapter proceeds to offer 
an alternative approach to carving out meaningful special autonomy status, 
drawing from comparative arrangements in the Åland Island, Hong Kong, 
Aceh and Papua. 
Two other contending options are examined in detail – federalism and se-
cession. The chapter analyses the historical, legal and functional arguments 
advanced for adopting a federal system of governance. It assesses the strengths 
and weaknesses of these arguments and considers the potentials for federalism to 
provide viable solutions to the Anglophone problem. Secession is also examined 
in detail. This option has gained renewed significance more recently and ac-
counts for the current armed struggle between separatists and security forces. 
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The chapter reviews some of the legal arguments that have been advanced in 
support of secession. It analyses relevant domestic and international law and 
argues that domestic law provides no legal route for secession. International law, 
on the other hand, provides extremely limited scope for a legal mechanism 
through which secession can be achieved. The chapter also considers the pro-
spects for achieving secession through armed struggle. Drawing from the ex-
perience of violent self-determination conflicts in Eritrea and South Sudan, the 
chapter contends that armed struggle is likely to be protracted, costly and the 
outcome is highly indeterminate. 
Chapter 7 provides an overview of the protection of fundamental human 
rights and freedoms (human rights). It examines the normative basis for the 
protection of human rights, principally focusing on the constitutional provisions 
embodied in the pre-amble and discusses some basic concepts emanating from it. 
The rest of the chapter focuses on implementation mechanisms, mainly the 
NCHRF and the Department for Human Rights in the Ministry of Justice. It 
offers an original analysis of the NCHRF with reference to the Paris Principles on 
human rights institutions and assesses the extent to which the NCHRF complies 
with international standards. It contends that some of the legislative provisions 
relating to the NCHRF and its operational mechanisms fall short of the Paris 
Principles. The chapter further highlights the strides made in enhancing human 
rights and the main weaknesses that contribute to undermine the role of the 
NCHRF and the Department for Human Rights. The chapter complements 
discussions on aspects relating to the protection of human rights by the judiciary 
in Chapter 4 and the Council in Chapter 5. 
The book concludes with an outlook for the future trajectory of governance 
in Cameroon. In particular, it briefly considers the potentials for a more 
democratic and accountable governance system, engineered by a popularly 
adopted Constitution. 
Notes  
1 Augustin K Kouomegni, ‘Minister of Communication’s Introductory Note to the 
1996 Constitutional Amendment’ in Fundamental Legal Texts (vol 1, National Printing 
Press 1996).  
2 Constitution of Cameroon 1996, art 2.   
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1 A history of the constitution 
and governance in Cameroon   
Introduction 
This chapter will explore the chequered constitutional history of Cameroon 
which provides a useful foundation for understanding its contemporary con-
stitutional, political and governance institutions and cultures. It provides a sim-
plified account of the emergence of the French and British constitutional systems, 
beginning with the period of colonial administration to independence and im-
mediate post-independence. Additionally, the chapter discusses the events and 
political machinations which explain to an extent, the predominance of the 
French civilian tradition in Cameroon’s constitutional system, an aspect funda-
mental to its governance. 
Part I. Background 
The Germans were the first European powers to establish colonial administra-
tion in Cameroon from 1884 to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. 
Following their defeat in the War, an Anglo-French Condominium was set up from 
1914 to 1916 and the Germans were eventually expelled from Cameroon in 
February 1916.1 Cameroon was subsequently divided unequally between France 
and Britain with Britain gaining control of two disconnected sections of the 
territory which later became known as Northern and Southern Cameroons. In 
contrast, France gained approximately 90% of the remaining territory, which 
became known as French Cameroon. In June 1919, the Treaty of Versailles 
established a mandates system to place conquered colonies under international 
administration.2 Cameroon was brought under that system and from 1922 it was 
administered by France and Britain as a mandated territory of the League of 
Nations until 1945 when the mandates were replaced by trusteeship agreements 
under the auspices of the United Nations.3 France and Britain proceeded to 
administer their territories according to their respective policies from that point 
until independence was granted in 1960 and 1961, respectively. That explains 
how Cameroon became endowed with two dissimilar and often conflicting 
constitutional traditions that have frequently marred governance and peaceful 
coexistence of the disparate communities in Cameroon. 
Part II. Colonial governance and administration 
France and Britain adopted a civil law or common law system in their respective 
sections of the territory. The basis for that transplantation was initially Article 9 
of the League of Nations Mandate Agreement with France4 and Britain5 which 
gave these colonial powers authority to pursue administration and legislation in 
accordance with their laws contingent on modifications to accommodate local 
conditions. Subsequently, that provision was replaced by article 4 of the Trusteeship 
Agreement with France and Article 5 of the Trusteeship Agreement with Britain 
when Cameroon became a Trust Territory of the United Nations. Article 5(a) 
relating to Britain provided that Britain shall have ‘full powers of legislation, ad-
ministration and jurisdiction in the Territory’ to be administered in accordance 
with its laws subject to modifications necessitated by local conditions and subject 
to the United Nations Charter and the present Trusteeship Agreement.6 Article 4(1) 
of the Agreement relating to France was similarly worded except that it did not 
require French law to be modified to accommodate local conditions.7 The devel-
opments in both the French and British territories are considered separately later. 
A. The civil law and governance in French Cameroon 
Unlike other French colonies in Africa which were administered through the 
administrative structures of French West Africa or French Equatorial Africa, 
French Cameroon maintained a distinct and separate administrative system. 
Nevertheless, a decree of 1924 made applicable in Cameroon, laws and decrees 
promulgated in French Equatorial Africa prior to 1 January 1924,8 which 
consisted of legislation transplanted from metropolitan France. The rest of the 
colonial era witnessed further enactment of decrees specifically applicable to 
French Cameroon, complemented by the application of legislation already en-
forced in France.9 Customary law was preserved although its influence was 
considerably diminished and applied only insofar as it was not repugnant 
to public policy (ordre public) and its jurisdiction was limited to the indigenous 
populations that had not acquired French citizenship.10 
The French colonial administrative landscape consisted of a high commissioner 
at the helm and supported by regional and district administrators and an advisory 
body known as the Conseil d’Administration.11 By 1925 in a bid to incorporate in-
digenous populations into the administrative network, a Conseil de Notables composed 
of local chiefs was created in each district.12 That institution was firmly controlled 
by the French authorities who proceeded to alter the chieftaincy system by creating 
artificial chiefs amenable to colonial influences.13 The administrative system was 
complemented by a judicial system (consisting of courts with jurisdiction over 
persons of French origin and indigenes). The judiciary was considered an admin-
istrative body under the French Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of State in 
Charge of relations with Associate States.14 Their administration at the territorial 
level was overseen by the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature (CSM) and the high 
commissioner was responsible for the judicial tenure.15 
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In terms of political participation, a key policy of the French administration 
known as the indégenat, which was repressive in nature, prevented the partici-
pation of indigenes in political activity.16 The administration did not permit the 
formation of political associations until the 1930s when it approved the formation 
of Union Camerounaise (UC) and Jeunesse Camerounaise Francaise (JEUCAFRA) in 
1937 and 1938, respectively.17 However, two watersheds transformed the legal 
and political situation. 
The first was the Brazzaville Conference in 1944 held at the instance of 
General de Gaulle to improve Franco-African relations.18 Resolutions passed 
at the Conference saw inter alia, the abolition of the indégenat across French 
colonial Africa.19 A further consequence was the creation of a representative 
assembly for French Cameroon, Assemblée Représentative du Cameroun (ARCAM). 
The institution remained accountable to the French Conseil d’Etat which had 
to veto all its decisions.20 Trade unions were legalised in 1944 and from then 
on political associations proliferated.21 Nevertheless, political activity was 
restricted and the administration did not hesitate to crack down on those 
organisations that propagated nationalist views.22 One of such associations 
which came into frequent conflicts with the administration was the Union 
des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) which advocated for complete independence 
for French Cameroon and reunification with Southern (British) Cameroons.23 
The administration reacted by issuing emergency decrees which curtailed the 
activities of the UPC and its members were frequently arrested, detained and 
tortured.24 Following prolonged violent altercation with the administration, 
the UPC was banned and some of its members sought refuge in Southern 
Cameroons.25 
The second watershed was in June 1956 when the French Assembly passed 
the Loi Cadres revolutionising colonial administration in French Africa. One of 
its major objectives was to provide an institutional framework for eventually 
according autonomy to the territories. In French Cameroon, the ARCAM was 
dissolved and a new assembly, the Assemblée Législative du Cameroun (ALCAM), 
was constituted following elections in December 1956. ALCAM was accorded 
more powers over territorial affairs although France retained authority over 
such aspects as defence, civil liberties and education.26 Moreover, provision 
was made for internal self-government. Following the legislative elections in 
December 1956, Andre Marie Mbida was appointed the first Prime Minister of 
French Cameroon in 1957. Meanwhile, the exiled UPC continued to instigate 
opposition and violence from behind the scenes.27 Mbida’s regime soon fell 
into disrepute with the indigenous population due to its brutal response to the 
UPC and his reluctance to endorse a programme for eventual independence.28 
Owing to immense unpopularity, Mbida lost confidence in the Assembly and 
in anticipation of impending impeachment proceedings, resigned from office in 
February 1958. This paved the way for Vice Prime Minister Amadou Ahidjo 
to be appointed to succeed him as Prime Minister.29 The independence of 
French Cameroon and eventual reunification with British Cameroons became 
a key objective. 
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B. The common law and governance in British Cameroons 
The British Cameroons had a different colonial experience to its French coun-
terpart. It was administered as part of the neighbouring British colony of Nigeria.30 
That arrangement was prompted by financial and geographical reasons31 and 
endorsed by article 9 of the Mandate Agreement which provided inter alia that 
Britain could constitute the territory (Cameroons) into an administrative union or 
federation with its adjacent territories. Thus, the territory was divided into 
Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons. As per the British Cameroons 
Order-in-Council of 26 June 1923, Northern Cameroons was administered as part 
of Northern Nigeria, whereas Southern Cameroons was administered as part of 
the southern provinces of Nigeria and subsequently as part of the Eastern Province 
of Nigeria.32 
As with the civil law in French Cameroon, some aspects of the British common 
law system were transplanted into British Cameroons. The laws applicable in 
Southern Cameroons consisted of the common law, doctrines of equity and the 
statutes of general application which were in force in England on 01 January 
1900.33 In addition, in 1924 the Nigerian Legal System was extended to 
Southern Cameroons as a result of which some of its statutes and ordinances 
became applicable.34 Similar to the French approach, customary law was 
retained to the extent that it passed the repugnancy test.35 
As elsewhere in British colonial Africa, the system of administration applicable 
in Southern Cameroons was indirect rule. This system was characterised by the 
use of traditional authority (chiefs and fons)36 as instruments through which 
the local British administrators implemented their policies.37 At the helm of the 
territorial administration of Southern Cameroons, there was the Governor 
General of Nigeria who was responsible for governance, administration of 
justice, revenue and maintenance of law and order.38 The territory was divided 
into administrative divisions headed by a Resident, below whom were Divisional 
Officers and District Officers. The administration was represented at the local 
levels by chiefs or fons.39 The native authorities had responsibility for the efficient 
running of the administration in their jurisdiction, particularly with respect 
to the maintenance of law and order, collection of taxes and the provision of 
elementary health and education facilities.40 
In terms of political activity, the colonial administration was not adverse to the 
creation of political organisations, although Nigeria appeared more politically 
advanced than Southern Cameroons.41 Its status as part of Nigeria meant that 
Britain’s administrative focus was largely on Nigeria. Until 1940, Southern 
Cameroons had no representative in the Nigerian Legislative Council (NLC) 
which catered for Nigeria and the Cameroons.42 In 1939, a trade union orga-
nisation, the Cameroon Welfare Union (CWU) successfully petitioned the co-
lonial authorities demanding Southern Cameroons representation in the NLC.43 
Consequently, in 1942 Chief Manga Williams and the senior colonial adminis-
trative authority in Southern Cameroons were appointed as the territory’s re-
presentatives in the NLC.44 Subsequently in 1946 when Southern Cameroons 
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became a trust territory of the United Nations, a new constitution, the Richards 
Constitution, was drafted for Nigeria and the Cameroons. The Constitution 
divided Nigeria into three regions, incorporating Southern Cameroons admin-
istratively into the Eastern Region with increased representation in the Eastern 
Regional House of Assembly.45 However, it did not prevent financial and ad-
ministrative subordination of Southern Cameroons coupled with its lack of 
representation in the Central Legislative Council in Lagos. These grievances 
prompted Southern Cameroon’s politicians to continue to press for autonomous 
status.46 In 1951, a new constitution, the Macpherson Constitution made pro-
vision for increased representation at the regional level as well as representation 
at the centre. This included an increase in the representation in the Eastern 
House of Assembly, the Executive Council, the Eastern House of Representatives 
and the Council of Ministers. Despite these developments, Southern Cameroons 
persisted in seeking autonomous regional status. In 1953, the Eastern Regional 
House of Assembly was engulfed by political and constitutional crisis47 which 
precipitated the collapse of the McPherson Constitution. This also provided 
the opportunity for Southern Cameroonian politicians to make more decisive 
demands for regional status. In that respect, a conference was held in London in 
1953 during which the Colonial Secretary intimated that if elections which were 
scheduled later that year reflected a desire for regional status, then it would be 
likely that an autonomous region would be created for Southern Cameroons. 
The pro-regionalists, led by Dr EML Endeley’s Kamerun National Congress 
(KNC) eventually emerged victorious in the elections and a further constitutional 
conference was held in Lagos in 1954 during which specific arrangements 
were made for reorganising the governance structure in Southern Cameroons. 
These arrangements were given effect in the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 
under which the Southern Cameroons was granted quasi-federal status with 
a Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council.48 Endeley became Leader of 
Government Business, although Southern Cameroons continued to be linked to 
the Nigerian Federal Legislature and administration. 
Further constitutional developments occurred following yet another constitu-
tional conference in London in 1957, held to discuss the revision of the Nigerian 
Constitution. It was agreed that, the ‘quasi-federal status’ of Southern Cameroon 
would be dropped, there would be an expansion of the legislative assembly, a 
House of Chiefs would be created as an upper legislative chamber and a min-
isterial government would be established in Southern Cameroons. At the request 
of Southern Cameroons, the Colonial Secretary undertook to request a transi-
tional period of continued trusteeship for Southern Cameroons when Nigeria 
became independent in 1960. At a further constitutional conference in London 
in 1958, delegates, including the colonial secretary agreed that, the Southern 
Cameroons government which would come into effect after elections scheduled 
for 1959, would be vested with the duty to request Her Majesty’s government for 
separate regional status. The 1959 elections were subsequently won by the 
Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) and the leader, John Ngu Foncha, 
emerged as premier. The agreements from the 1958 constitutional conference 
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were thus given effect through the Southern Cameroons (Constitution) Order-in- 
Council 1960. The existing powers and functions of the Southern Cameroons’ 
government were not altered by the new Constitution. However, the powers and 
functions exercised by the Governor General and the Government of the 
Federation of Nigeria were transferred to the commissioner of Southern 
Cameroons. 
C. The decolonisation process 
I. French Cameroon 
After the resignation of Prime Minister Mbida, the new Prime Minister Ahidjo 
immediately began to work closely with the French government towards the 
independence of French Cameroon. Although no overt statements had been 
made by France to that effect, it inherently supported Ahidjo’s plans for in-
dependence and reunification, and the granting of some concessions to the 
UPC.49 On 19 October 1958, Xavier Torre the new high commissioner officially 
affirmed France’s willingness to grant independence on 1 January 1960. The 
ALCAM proceeded immediately on 24 October 1958 to adopt a resolution 
expressing Cameroon’s desire to become independent. France submitted that 
resolution to the Fourth Committee of the UN on 28 October 1958, but before 
that could be debated, objections were raised by an exiled wing of the UPC. 
They complained that ALCAM was not representative and that the Ahidjo 
government was illegitimate, repressive and a puppet of France. On account 
of these factors, they asserted that Ahidjo’s demands for independence should 
be rejected. The UN debates were suspended pending a report by a UN visiting 
Mission to Cameroon on November 1958, aimed at ascertaining the wishes of 
the people of Cameroon. 
The UPC rebellion continued to plague the Ahidjo government and as a 
measure to mitigate the hostilities, the French government promulgated an 
amnesty law on 17 February 1959. By the end of December 1958, the govern-
ment had succeeded in quelling the rebellion, particularly following the death of 
Um Nyobe, an iconic leader of the movement. On 1 January 1959, French 
Cameroon was granted autonomy by virtue of a statute which also made pro-
vision for independence on 1 January 1960.50 Additionally, effective control of 
the government of Cameroon was to be transferred from the high commissioner 
to the government of Cameroon, although the former would retain a superior 
position in the administrative hierarchy. These changes were hailed by the 
government and the ALCAM. 
The UN General Assembly resumed on 20 February 1959 after receiving the 
report of the UN Visiting Mission. The report spoke in favour of the Ahidjo 
government, commending the progress it had made towards preparing for in-
dependence. It rejected the UPC’s claims that ALCAM was not representative, 
recommending that no new elections were required prior to independence, 
against the wishes of the UPC. The UN was equally satisfied with statements and 
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assurances from the governments of Cameroon and France indicating that civil 
and political freedoms were protected in Cameroon, the Amnesty Law was 
widely implemented and the exiled UPC leaders were invited to return to 
Cameroon.51 Partly for those reasons, the UN passed resolution 1349(XIII) af-
firming the declaration of independence of French Cameroon on 01 January 
1960, concurrently terminating the Trusteeship Agreement.52 
That outcome further antagonised the UPC prompting a resumption of vio-
lence which the Ahidjo government (aided by French troops) met with severe 
repression.53 On 30 October 1959, ALCAM granted special legislative powers 
to the government to rule by ordinances and decrees. Ahidjo proceeded to de-
clare a state of emergency in various parts of the country and created ad hoc 
tribunals to summarily try dissidents for terrorism.54 The special legislative 
powers included powers to draft a new constitution.55 The draft eventually 
produced was closely modelled on the Constitution of the fifth French Republic 
and its institutions. Ahidjo’s draft constitution met with disapproval from the 
opposition, a situation which was exacerbated by the hostility and violence 
from the UPC uprising. Notwithstanding these upheavals, Ahidjo led French 
Cameroon to independence on 1 January 1960. The draft constitution was 
approved in a referendum in February 1960 and became the first constitution of 
the independent Republic of Cameroon The Republic. 
II. Southern Cameroons 
Meanwhile, politics in Southern Cameroons was quite animated, not least by the 
fact that the colonial administration announced the imminent independence of 
Nigeria for 1 October 1960. Inevitably, the future of Southern Cameroons had 
to be determined, given that it still formed part of the wider Federation of 
Nigeria. The question hinged on the manner in which Southern Cameroons 
would gain independence. In 1949, the reunification of both Northern and 
Southern Cameroons had been considered by the latter’s politicians as a po-
tential option for the future of both territories. That option was eventually 
abandoned, partly because the Northern part had followed a different colonial 
trajectory and although backwards and underdeveloped politically and eco-
nomically, appeared content to continue its existence within the Federation of 
Nigeria.56 The UN visiting Mission to Territories in West Africa in 1958 was 
convinced that a realistic approach to the future of the Cameroons under British 
administration was to treat them as distinct entities due to the different courses 
their history and development had taken and the significant differences in their 
administrative systems, their political attitudes and loyalties.57 It recommended 
that the questions to be put to the people in respect of their future aspirations 
should be determined by the UN General Assembly, the Colonial Government 
in consultation, and as far as possible, in agreement with the political parties in 
the Southern Cameroons.58 That would be a colossal endeavour given that the 
leaders of Southern Cameroons remained undecided on the issue.59 While the 
Premier’s KNDP was in favour of continued trusteeship until such a time as 
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Southern Cameroons would be ready for independence (and possibly re-
unification with the Republic of Cameroon), Endeley’s KNC in alliance with the 
Kamerun People’s Party pressed for integration with Nigeria or unification with 
the Republic of Cameroon.60 
In March 1959, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1350(XIII) 
which recommended that the British colonial authority, in pursuance of 
Article 76(b) of the UN Charter,61 and in consultation with a UN Plebiscite 
Commissioner should take steps to organise two separate plebiscites in Northern 
and Southern Cameroons to be supervised by the UN.62 It recommended further 
that the colonial authority should seek to organise the plebiscite between 
December 1959 and April 1960.63 In view of the intransigence of the political 
leaders of Southern Cameroons, the UN General Assembly hoped that the 
leaders would endeavour to reach an agreement on the question to be put to 
the electorate in the plebiscite before the next General Assembly.64 The latter 
call was not heeded even after a Plebiscite Conference was held in Mamfe in 
August 1959. Following the failure to reach a consensus, the Premier and the 
Leader of the Opposition issued a joint statement to the UN General Assembly 
to the effect that it would be wiser to defer consultation with the people and 
suggested 1962 as an alternative date for the plebiscite.65 In October 1959, the 
UN adopted Resolution 1352(XIV) by which it decided that the date for the 
plebiscite would be no later than March 196066 in effect, ignoring the request of 
the Southern Cameroons politicians. The two questions for electorates to decide 
at the plebiscite where recommended to be as follows: 
(a) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent 
Federation of Nigeria? 
(b) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent 
Republic of the Cameroons?67  
The publication of the plebiscite questions sparked protests and opposition 
from the Southern Cameroons politicians who felt betrayed. Although consensus 
had not been attained at the Mamfe Conference, it became clearer that re-
unification was the least favourite option among the delegates and had indeed 
been dropped. Instead, they favoured secession from Nigeria and independence 
as the second question.68 It is not clear how or why the UN arrived at the two 
plebiscite questions given that the Premier at the time was fervently in favour of a 
further period of trusteeship. Moreover, there seemed to have been some support 
for the independence of Southern Cameroons as a separate entity.69 It was 
obvious that the UN had very little or no support for an independent Southern 
Cameroons and would reject any such request.70 Moreover, following the 
publication of the UN commissioned Philipson Financial Report, it became 
conclusive that independence as a separate entity was an impractical option.71 
The report noted first and ironically that, the option of an independent sovereign 
state had very negligible public support and should be disregarded.72 Second, it 
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revealed not only the colonial government’s neglect of Southern Cameroons, but 
more importantly it stated clearly that the territory was financial weak and un-
stable and unable to survive independently in the modern economy.73 Those 
findings partly influenced a shift in the position of the Colonial Secretary who at 
the 1957 Constitutional Conference had intimated that he would request a 
period of continued trusteeship for Southern Cameroons after Nigeria gained 
independence.74 He had even given consideration to the fact that all possible 
alternatives would be explored including integration of Northern and Southern 
Cameroons to form a single entity.75 
It is significant to note that the Report recommended a continued period 
of trusteeship to afford Southern Cameroons the time it needed to develop and 
test its financial strengths. It recommended that such a period should not be 
too long or indeterminate but not too brief to prevent reasonable long term 
planning.76 This should have strengthened the position of the Premier who 
continued to press for a period of trusteeship, but the UN seemed adamant on 
pursuing the two alternatives contained in Resolution 1352(XIV). That situation 
was not made easier by the fact that the leaders in Southern Cameroons 
appeared to have inconsistent interpretations of the second alternative. While 
it was clear what achieving independence by joining Nigeria entailed, the po-
sition was not clear with respect to joining the Republic of Cameroon. The 
opposition leaders understood the latter option to imply that independence 
and reunification would happen sooner, whereas the Premier thought that 
there would be a further period of trusteeship, should the plebiscite result in a 
decision to join the Republic of Cameroon. The political leaders were eager to 
pursue the independence option further and also seek clarification as to the 
purport of the second question, particularly because Resolution 2013(XXVI) 
of 31 May 1960 requested that the two alternatives in the plebiscite be explained 
fully to the electorate prior to the event.77 A conference was held in London in 
November 1960 with the Colonial Secretary, the Premier and other leaders of 
the Southern Cameroons, including the opposition. The Colonial Secretary and 
the opposition agreed that a consistent interpretation of the second question 
would rule out any period of continued trusteeship.78 However, the Premier still 
insisted on that point. It was unanimously agreed that prior to meeting President 
Ahidjo of the Republic of Cameroon (to pursue reunification discussions), the 
UN should be approached to provide an authoritative interpretation.79 
It may be worth pausing at this point to consider why the UN seemed fervidly 
opposed to continued trusteeship, despite support for it from the Premier and 
buttressed by the Philipson Report. Moreover, given the uncertainties involved in 
joining the Republic of Cameroon and the reluctance to embrace Nigeria, it 
would seem propitious to afford the territory some time to arrive at a well in-
formed and considered decision. The UN was very keen for measures to be taken 
by the colonial authorities to ensure the separation of Southern Cameroons from 
Nigeria no later than 1 October 1960 and reiterated that request unremittingly.80 
At the London Conference, the Colonial Secretary made clear that the UN was 
unlikely to support a period of continued trusteeship especially in the light of the 
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fact that the questions had already been published. Besides the financial viability 
problems of the Southern Cameroons, a major concern was that continued 
trusteeship would require an amendment of the Trusteeship Agreement to permit 
its separate administration. The latter process would involve the consent of Great 
Britain as the Administering Colonial Authority and an agreement of a two-third 
majority of the General Assembly. It was uncertain that success was feasible. 
Moreover, the period of continued trusteeship was not fixed and no specific plans 
were being offered by the Premier as to what would happen at the end of the 
trusteeship. In addition, the African Bloc at the UN, led by Ghana’s Kwame 
Nkrumah, a renowned Pan-Africanist, fiercely opposed the creation of micro-
states and instead entreated Southern Cameroons to unite with Ahidjo’s 
Cameroon.81 While these are plausible explanations to account for the reluctance 
of the UN, were they sufficient to prevent considering that option? Was the UN 
simply reluctant to make that request to Great Britain or was the latter unwilling 
to continue its administration of Cameroon for financial reasons? Be that as it 
may, the answers to these questions remain a moot point. It is irrefutable that, 
the failure to give serious consideration to that alternative has had significant 
implications for the historical and contemporary development of Cameroon. 
Southern Cameroonians were forced to choose between two alternatives, neither 
of which they zealously embraced. They were thus denied the opportunity to 
exercise their right to self-determination in a way that they desired. 
Prior to approaching the UN to clarify the interpretation of the second option 
as per the decision of the London Conference, the Premier met for the fourth 
time with President Ahidjo in December 1960.82 These meetings had been en-
couraged by the UN as a way of accelerating discussions between the two leaders 
to ascertain the terms on which they proposed to reunite, should the plebiscite 
decision sway in that direction.83 Following the December 1960 meeting, the 
Premier and President Ahidjo issued a joint statement effectively, endorsing the 
interpretation of the Colonial Secretary at the London Conference and declaring 
that it was no longer necessary to approach the UN for an interpretation and the 
options could be explained to the electorate. That was given effect through 
Southern Cameroons Notice No. 36 by which the interpretations and explana-
tions of the questions were printed and widely disseminated in the Southern 
Cameroons in January 1961.84 
On 11 February 1961, the Southern Cameroons electorates voted over-
whelmingly to join the Republic of Cameroon by a majority of 233,571 (70.49% of 
the votes) as against 97.741 (29.5%) in favour of joining Nigeria.85 Meanwhile, in a 
separate plebiscite held in Northern Cameroons, the electorates voted in favour of 
joining Nigeria by a majority of 146,296 (59.97%) votes as against 97,659 (40.03%) 
votes in favour of joining the Republic of Cameroon.86 These results were en-
dorsed by the UN in its Resolution 1608(XV)87 in which it decided to terminate 
the Trusteeship Agreement for both Northern and Southern Cameroons, re-
spectively, from 1 June 1960 and 1 October 1961, upon Northern Cameroons 
joining Nigeria as a separate province of the Northern Region and Southern 
Cameroons joining the independent Republic of Cameroon.88 
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Part III. Post-independence constitutional 
developments 
A. Federalism and the coexistence of French and  
British constitutional traditions 
Prior to reunification of the two Cameroonian territories in October 1961, it was 
expected that their representatives would address the issue of a constitution 
governing the entire union.89 This was a complex task given that both territories 
had over forty years of divergent colonial experiences and it was important to 
achieve internal coherence without excessive disruption of existing subsystems. 
The formula agreed at the London Conference provided inter alia that specific 
arrangements for the governance framework between Southern Cameroons and 
the Republic of Cameroon would be worked out at a conference consisting of 
representative delegations of equal status from both entities.90 Significantly, it 
also required the participation of the United Nations and the United Kingdom.91 
That formula was endorsed by the representatives of the governing party of 
Southern Cameroons led by Foncha, the Premier and that of the government of 
the Republic of Cameroon led by Ahidjo at their meeting in December 1960. 
In July 1961, a constitutional conference was held in Foumban with the aim 
of drafting a constitution – or at least so it seemed to the Southern Cameroons 
delegation.92 Although some discussions on the issue had taken place between 
Premier Foncha and President Ahidjo, where the former expressed the desire 
for a loose federation, the specific details would be ironed out in a number of 
constitutional conferences following their experience of constitutional con-
ferences with Nigeria. The Foumban Conference was thought to be one of such 
platforms where those details would be ironed out. At the conference, the pro-
posals from the delegation representing the Southern Cameroons reflected a 
desire to adhere to their British colonial heritage.93 According to Frank Stark, 
Foncha was concerned with the cultural autonomy of Southern Cameroons and 
was apprehensive of French domination, a fact which was reflected in his speech 
at Foumban.94 His delegation advocated for a loose federation, a ceremonial 
executive head of state with limited powers and the requirement to act with 
the consent of his ministers (who in turn would be responsible to parliament), 
the vesting of considerable legislative powers to state legislatures on the under-
standing that some of those powers would be transferred to the central gov-
ernment after a transitional period. Other proposals included specifically 
entrenched provisions for constitutional amendments, specific provisions for the 
protection of fundamental rights, especially minority rights, vesting ordinary 
courts with jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of laws, retention of the 
House of Chiefs and the separate legal systems.95 This was in fact the results of 
an agreement among the Southern Cameroons delegation at a conference in 
Bamenda in June 1961 on the understanding that it would form the basis for 
imminent negotiations with the Republic of Cameroon. However, their coun-
terparts from the Republic had different ideas regarding the federation. With the 
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exception of the last two proposals, the others were rejected by President Ahidjo 
who sought to consolidate his existing centralised executive powers.96 Ahidjo 
rejected the proposals for a loose federation on the basis that it would make the 
government unstable.97 It is also alleged that, he was influenced by the innate 
fear of secession of the Southern Cameroons.98 
Ahidjo’s success in suppressing the Southern Cameroons proposals has been 
attributed to a number of factors.99 First, he did not conceal the fact that both 
Southern Cameroons and the Republic were entering into the negotiations as 
unequal powers.100 On the one hand, The Republic was an independent so-
vereign state ten times the geographical size of its counterpart, whereas Southern 
Cameroons was a territory with no independent international status.101 Second, 
Ahidjo’s delegation came prepared with a draft constitution, whereas the 
Southern Cameroons delegation only had outlines and disagreed among its de-
legates as to their objectives and underlying concepts in relation to the federa-
tion.102 Third, the Southern Cameroons delegation had little time to produce its 
own proposals on the basis of what had been presented by the Ahidjo delega-
tion.103 The position of Southern Cameroons was further undermined by the fact 
that neither the British colonial authority nor representatives of the UN were 
present at this discussion. An uneasy compromise was reached between Southern 
Cameroons and the Republic. It would seem that the Southern Cameroons 
delegations capitulated mainly because they were under the illusion that further 
discussions would be held with a view to drafting a definitive document.104 That 
never occurred. 
The Foumban conference was followed by a meeting of the governing 
delegation of the Southern Cameroons led by Premier Foncha and President 
Ahidjo in Yaoundé in August 1961. The meeting culminated in the adoption of 
the Federal Constitution of 1961 by the National Assembly of the Republic of 
Cameroon (which became the East Cameroon Parliament). The Southern 
Cameroons House of Assembly did not adopt the Constitution, raising a fun-
damental question regarding its legitimacy.105 Moreover, there was no act or 
treaty of union – no legal instrument effecting the union between Southern 
Cameroons and the Republic and defining the terms of that union. This can be 
contrasted with the process through which the United Republic of Tanzania 
came into existence. Tanzania is the product of a union between former 
Tanganyika which gained independence on 9 December 1962 and Zanzibar 
which gained independence on 10 December 1963. The union was effected by 
means of the Acts of Union of 1964,106 section 4 of which specifically provided 
that the two entities shall be united into one sovereign republic by the name of 
the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The name was later changed 
to the United Republic of Tanzania with the approval of both entities.107 The 
process of union was the culmination of Articles of Union agreed by the par-
liaments of both Tanganyika and Zanzibar.108 Similarly, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain was established by the Acts of Union of 1 May 1707 passed by the 
English and Scottish parliaments. In Cameroon, as already noted, there was no 
act of union and the Federal Constitution was adopted by the parliament of the 
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Republic of Cameroon, to the exclusion of the Southern Cameroons House 
of Assembly. This process raised significant constitutional questions on the 
legitimacy of the union and the resulting Constitution due to the absence of an 
act of union and the fact that the Constitution was not endorsed by the elected 
representatives of West Cameroon. 
The Federal Constitution created a Federal Republic consisting of two fed-
erated states of East and West Cameroon representing respectively the former 
Republic of Cameroon and Southern Cameroons.109 It is significant to note that 
the 1961 Constitution was not a newly drafted Constitution. It was an amended 
version of the 1960 Constitution of The Republic of Cameroon with adaptations 
to accommodate the Federation.110 The domination of West Cameroon was 
evident in article 59 which provided that ‘La Constitution ainsi révisée sera 
publiée en franςais et en anglais, le texte franςais faisant fois’.111 This was clearly 
indicative of the status of the Anglophone minority and the English language 
within the newly federated republic.112 The British colonial legacy was only 
preserved to the extent that the Constitution provided for the recognition and 
continued application of legislation formerly enforced in the two territories, 
provided they were not inconsistent with the provisions of the Federal 
Constitution.113 However, at the federal level, the institutions that dominated 
were those introduced by the 1960 Constitution of the Republic with its very 
centralised Gaullist framework, which concentrated powers in the executive and 
accorded restricted powers to the legislature and the judiciary. 
Despite the federal nature of the state, Ahidjo by decree created six ad-
ministrative regions, with West Cameroon as one of the regions.114 One of 
the most controversial issue regarding this arrangement was that federal in-
spectors were appointed to represent the federal government in all aspects of 
civil life and in judicial matters and to supervise the enforcement of federal 
laws and regulations, to maintain order according to the laws and regulations 
in force with the assistance of the forces of law and order. In West Cameroon, 
the federal inspector was a francophone and considered himself equal to the 
Prime Minister.115 This inevitably led to conflict of powers between the 
Prime Minister and the federal inspector. This arrangement effectively cur-
tailed the powers of the Prime Minister and vested them in the inspector who 
was accountable to President Ahidjo.116 This was a further method by which 
Ahidjo sort to undermine the federal character of the country and to entrench 
his centralised authority. 
Economically, West Cameroon also entered the union in a very disadvantaged 
position. Due to years of neglect by the British colonial administration, West 
Cameroon was far less developed than East Cameroon. Substantial income 
generated from the export of cash crops such as rubber, banana, palm oil and tea 
dropped considerably with the introduction of the Franc CFA as federal currency 
and also following West Cameroon losing preferential trading within the 
Commonwealth.117 Its economic subordination was further exacerbated by the 
arrangements for revenue sharing which was at a considerable disadvantage to 
West Cameroon.118 All revenue from the federated states went to the central 
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government before eventually being returned in the form of subsidies usually 
insufficient to meet local needs. The revenue sharing arrangements and general 
lack of financial autonomy served to increase the subordination of West 
Cameroon.119 
Contrary to some theories of federalism which often attribute it to a constitu-
tional arrangement between independent political entities,120 the Cameroonian fed-
eration was not the result of constitutional arrangements or bargains between 
independent states. In fact, as noted earlier, the union emerged from an agreement 
between an independent state and another entity still in the process of determining 
its international status. In the case of Zanzibar and Tanganyika, perhaps the ability 
to negotiate a mutually agreed formula for their union, hinged significantly on 
the fact that they were both independent entities. Interestingly, Zanzibar had only 
been independent for a brief period of four months before the union became 
effective. Perhaps a brief period of independence for Southern Cameroons 
(which Foncha unsuccessfully fought for) might have made all the difference. 
Nevertheless, at the time off entering into the union, West Cameroon, then 
Southern Cameroons was still a UN Trust Territory in the process of determining 
the nature of its rupture from colonial domination. That inevitably had an impact 
on the bargaining power of its representatives and the extent to which they were 
able to leverage president Ahidjo for protection of their minority status. As Stark 
notes with respect to the position of Southern Cameroons, ‘[n]ot only would its 
small size and population stand against equality in such a relationship, but the two 
parts of the federation … would be unequal in terms of sovereignty at the be-
ginning of the relationship’.121 There was nevertheless a need to determine the 
basis of a union of the two entities. 
Thus, the formation of federalism in Cameroon can be explained by the need 
to ‘bring together’ two distinct entities with different cultures and historical ex-
periences within a harmonious union without dissolving these cultural cleavages. 
That was the principal concern of the Anglophones on account of their minority 
status. In fact, following discussions between cabinet representatives from the 
two territories on 25 November 1959, the Southern Cameroonians are reported 
to have indicated that, unification ‘might take the form of a loose federation 
with the aim of preserving the individuality of the Southern Cameroons state’.122 
This desire for the recognition of diversity was reflected in a speech by president 
Ahidjo who acknowledged that Southern Cameroonians joining the union had 
different linguistic, administrative and political cultures and a distinct modus 
vivendi.123 He reiterated that it was therefore not for the majority to impose their 
customs and practices. It has been argued however that, the lack of balance 
within the federation at its inception is indicative of a hidden agenda to subsume 
the cultural heritage of West Cameroon. Ahidjo himself hinted at a long term 
objective ‘to move as far as possible towards real homogeneity’.124 There 
was never a genuine intention of the Ahidjo government to integrate West 
Cameroon on an equal basis with East Cameroon, instead, as described by 
Joseph Ebune, there was a ‘Falsehood of Federalism in West Cameroon’ due to 
the asymmetrical nature of the federal arrangements.125 
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B. The Glorious Revolution of May Twentieth and the demise 
of the Westminster model 
After the adoption of the Federal Constitution, there was an indication from the 
Ahidjo leadership of the intention to consider the creation of a unified party in 
Cameroon.126 That vision was subsequently strengthened by continuing political 
instability occasioned principally by the opposition UPC party attempting to 
challenge Ahidjo’s authoritarian regime. Moreover, single party dictatorships 
were becoming rife across sub-Saharan Africa, justified by the need to reinforce 
national unity and to promote the ‘African Tradition’.127 In Cameroon, the 
arrest of some UPC members in 1962 gave a firm indication that the future of 
political opposition was bleak.128 Moreover, the administration created artificial 
obstacles to the participation of the opposition in daily political activities. 
Registration offices were closed to opposition candidates wishing to register their 
candidacy for local elections.129 On other occasions, party meetings or rallies 
were dispersed by security officers.130 Constrained by these difficulties, some 
members of the UPC and other opposition parties deserted to join the ruling 
party, the UC.131 By 1965, all political parties in East Cameroon had been 
integrated into the UC.132 
Meanwhile, the West Cameroonian political parties were embroiled in poli-
tical wrangling, aware of where power actually resided in the Federation, they 
tried in their different respects to gain Ahidjo’s favour.133 Ahidjo used these 
differences to highlight the need to reach a consensus by forming a unified party. 
In June 1966, the West Cameroonian politicians were to heed Ahidjo’s firm 
demand for the dissolution of political parties in that state.134 In August 1966, 
the regime succeeded in bringing all political parties at the federal level 
under one umbrella organisation dubbed the Cameroon National Union (CNU) 
thereby ensuring the demise of political pluralism in Cameroon.135 Ahidjo’s 
rationale for the formation of a single dominant party was the underdeveloped 
nature of the country and he was careful to emphasise that the measure was 
only temporary.136 However, that as it later emerged was a move to ensure the 
centralisation of political parties in order to pave the way for a unitary state.137 
In May 1972, Ahidjo surprised the Federal Assembly with his intention to hold 
a popular referendum aimed at abolishing the Federation.138 He argued that 
federalism was too costly and incompatible with the development of a young 
country like Cameroon and it promoted regionalism. A referendum was orga-
nised on 20 May 1972 to determine the fate of the federation. Following an 
overwhelming vote in favour of a unitary system, the federation was abolished. By 
organising the referendum, Ahidjo ignored the saving provision in article 47(1) of 
the Constitution which provided that ‘Any proposal for the revision of the present 
constitution which impairs the unity and integrity of the federation shall be in-
admissible’. This provision was inserted to assure West Cameroonian authorities 
that the Federation, the basis of the union, will not be altered.139 In fact, article 
47(3) further provided a mechanism for any alteration of the federation, should it 
become imperative. The provision required that a revision should be approved by 
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a simple majority of the federal assembly provided that the majority included a 
majority of the representatives in the assembly of the two federated states. It therefore 
implied that a referendum was not contemplated as a means of dissolving the 
federation. It has been asserted that the choice of a referendum was Ahidjo’s 
means to ensure that the proposal was not rejected by the West Cameroon 
Assembly and given the dictatorial nature of his regime, the public was likely to 
vote in favour of a unitary state.140 It may also be the case that the people were 
presented with no choice but to vote in favour of a unitary state as the referendum 
question was framed in the language of economic progress, stability and devel-
opment. A vote against a unitary state may have been interpreted as a refusal 
to support the country’s development.  
A unitary Constitution was thus adopted in June 1972.141 That Constitution 
divided Cameroon administratively into provinces with the name of the country 
changed from the Federal Republic to the United Republic of Cameroon.142 
The word ‘United’ was very significant, as it acknowledged the fact that the 
country was composed of a union of two distinct entities. Besides the abolition 
of state institutions, the 1972 Constitution preserved much of the underlying 
centralised themes of the Federal Constitution and its Gaullist institutions. In 
particular, it increased the centralised authority of the president, abolished the 
position of the vice president, the West Cameroon House of Assembly and 
inevitably its House of Chiefs and subordinated the judiciary to the executive. 
The 1972 referendum, or what became known as the ‘Glorious Revolution 
of May Twentieth’,143 brought an end to the last vestiges of the Westminster 
colonial legacy in Cameroon. 
Although the federal system was not entirely favourable to West Cameroon, 
sentiments of subordination did not emerge immediately or at least were not 
overtly expressed. The repressive nature of the Ahidjo regime did not provide 
the space for that to happen. However, the 1972 referendum and the abolition 
of the federal form of the state represented for Anglophones a betrayal of the 
basis of the union in 1961.144 It served to further alienate an already aggrieved 
people and paved the way for Anglophones to openly challenge their perceived 
marginalisation. That move became a catalyst for what is known as the 
‘Anglophone problem’. 
C. The return to multi-party democracy 
With the suppression of multi-party politics in Cameroon, Ahidjo’s CNU 
remained at the centre of politics. However, in 1982, reportedly for health 
reasons he unexpectedly resigned from power automatically conferring pre-
sidential power on the then Prime Minister Paul Biya.145 The first congress 
of the ruling CNU held under the Biya administration took place in Bamenda 
in 1985 and saw a change in the name of the CNU to the Cameroon People’s 
Democratic Movement (CPDM). President Biya perpetuated the author-
itarian regime established under his predecessor strengthened even further 
after April 1984 following an abortive coup d’état orchestrated by supporters 
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of Ahidjo.146 Biya’s presidency was a pivotal point for the strengthening of 
Anglophone nationalism. Following a constitutional amendment in February 
1984, the name of the country was changed from the United Republic of 
Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon and the second star which had 
represented West Cameroon was eliminated from the national flag.147 
According to the government, the amendments were prompted by the desire 
to consolidate national unity and democracy, to give ‘de jure and de facto 
recognition to Cameroon’s fundamental option of national unity’ and to 
adopt a less ambiguous and more prestigious name which ‘stresses the one 
and indivisible nature of the nation’.148 
Despite the government’s explanations, the amendments had an alternative 
significance for the Anglophones. First, it eliminated any illusions that 
Cameroon was a result of two separate entities that had come together in a 
union, further betraying the basis for the 1961 agreement. Second, the new 
name was the original name adopted by French Cameroon when it gained 
independence from France in 1960. Reverting to that name, was a denial of 
the existence of the former West Cameroon as a distinct entity.149 There was 
a sustained attempt by the Biya government to standardise the education 
systems and in particular to transform the Cameroon General Certificate of 
Education Examination (GCE), a relic of British colonialism, to be in line 
with the French Baccalaureate. This was fiercely resisted by the Anglophones 
who sort to retain their distinct education system. Following periods of violent 
altercations and repression of the Anglophone protesters by security forces, 
the government finally succumbed to pressure by creating the GCE Board 
which gave independent management of the exams to Anglophone educators. 
Unlike the Ahidjo government which had a semblance of regional balance 
in political and administrative appointments, the Biya government embarked 
on the appointment of predominantly Francophones to key government 
positions and also overtly favouring members of his ethnic group.150 Biya’s 
ideal of a unitary state was at variance with the recognition of the Anglophone 
minority and helped to provide a conducive environment for the nurturing 
of Anglophone sentiments of marginalisation. In 1985, the prominent 
Anglophone lawyer and paramount chief Gorji Dinka was arrested and tried 
for treason when he advocated for secession of the Anglophone regions to 
form the Ambazonia Republic.151 
The regime remained repressive and intolerant to opposition and criticism. 
Nevertheless, the political environment witnessed gradual changes through 
increasing domestic demands for political liberalisation.152 This course was 
championed by the Anglophone minority that witnessed sustained margin-
alisation in socio-economic development and insufficient representation in public 
administration.153 The wave of political change sweeping through sub-Saharan 
Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s helped to fuel political and legal de-
velopments in Cameroon.154 The regime resisted calls for democratisation and 
responded to such demands with repression.155 In February 1990, a group of 
Anglophone elites organised meetings to discuss the declining economic and 
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political conditions in Cameroon and the possibility of forming a political 
party.156 They were arrested, tried and convicted for holding clandestine 
meetings, for promoting secession and for insulting the President.157 This 
sparked further tension as it became clear that the regime was not ready for a 
democratic transition.158 The government argued that the country was not ready 
for multiparty democracy as it would promote ethnic division and instability.159 
The government’s response only increased the political tension and in May 1990 
the opposition party Social Democratic Front (SDF) was formed.160 During 
its official launching, security forces responded with repressive force killing 
six participants, mainly children.161 The opposition responded by forming a 
coalition which organised nation-wide civil disobedience campaigns to paralyse 
governmental institutions.162 The Anglophone movement received a further 
boost when former vice President Foncha, one of the main architects of the 
federation and vice chair of the ruling CPDM party tendered his resignation, 
lamenting the treatment of Anglophones.163 
The government attempted to ease the political tensions by making some 
reforms through the enactment of what became known as the Liberty Laws, 
some of which authorised political participation in Cameroon.164 A con-
sequence was the proliferation of opposition parties, pressure groups, civil 
society organisations and independent press organisations.165 Some of these 
included the Southern Cameroons Peoples Organisation (SCAPO), Free 
West Cameroon Movement (FWCM), the Ambazonia Movement and the 
Cameroon Anglophone Movement which became very instrumental in 
Anglophone nationalism in 1993 and 1994. The new liberty laws, however, 
operated within the framework of the 1972 unitary Constitution which was 
hostile to genuine democratic advancement.166 The opposition continued to 
request a sovereign national conference which the President had rejected as 
having no purpose in Cameroon.167 However, in October 1991, a Tripartite 
Conference was organised by the government to bring together representative 
of the opposition, the ruling CPDM and government officials in an attempt 
to resolve the political crisis.168 It resulted in the Yaoundé Declaration which 
was essentially a concession to which the opposition agreed to end the civil 
disobedience campaigns while the government acceded to making democratic 
and constitutional reforms.169 The government failed to keep its side of the 
agreement particularly by failing to provide for an independent electoral system 
prior to presidential election in 1992. The incumbent President Biya won the 
elections which were reportedly marred by gross irregularities and electoral 
rigging.170 In response, supporters of the SDF whose candidate was alleged to 
have been the actual winner staged massive demonstrations in the North-West 
region.171 A state of emergency was declared in that region and resulted in 
massive violations of human rights by security forces.172 The leader of the SDF 
was placed under house arrest.173 
Although the government continued to resist genuine democratic reforms, 
international donors such as the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank pressured repressive regimes such as that of Cameroon to increase the pace 
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of democratic reforms.174 The government subsequently gave into those de-
mands, and to demands for a constitutional review. The President appointed 
eleven members to a Technical Committee on Constitutional Matters (TCCM), 
initially established during the Tripartite Conference.175 The TCCM was 
composed of seven Francophones and four Anglophones and chaired by Joseph 
Owona, then Secretary General at the presidency and member of the central 
committee of the ruling CPDM.176 It set to work on a constitutional revision 
contrary to the terms of the Yaoundé Declaration which had agreed on the 
drafting of a new constitution.177 Meanwhile, an All Anglophone Conference 
(AAC I) was convened in April 1993 to adopt a common Anglophone stance and 
to make proposals to the TCCM.178 The standing committee established by the 
AAC I submitted a draft constitution to the TCCM, proposing among other 
things, recognition of the principles of liberal democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, a return to federalism, reinstatement of the 
House of Chiefs, a presidential system with more stringent features of separation 
of powers, checks and balances, judicial independence and judicial review re-
miniscent of the Southern Cameroons Constitution.179 A number of opposition 
parties, including the SDF, National Union for Democracy and Progress 
(NUDP) and Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU) also submitted proposals 
echoing those of the AAC. The SDF and NUDP went further to propose the 
establishment of a bicameral legislature comprising a House of Assembly and 
Senate, and that all presidential appointments be confirmed by Senate.180 
However, the TCCM did not meet to discuss the proposals and amidst 
pressure from the government, it rejected those proposals prompting the resig-
nation of its Anglophone members.181 This purported rejection of the 
Anglophone initiative prompted the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM) 
which was affiliated to the AAC to declare the so called ‘zero option’ which 
implied that the only option was an outright secession of the Anglophone regions. 
This proposal gained support in the second AAC (AAC II) held in 1994. The 
AAC II resulted in the Bamenda Declaration which among other things agreed 
on secession if the government failed to engage in meaningful constitutional 
negotiations or persisted in its refusal to do so.182 The Anglophone Council 
was to become a constituent assembly should independence be declared for 
Anglophone Cameroon. The Anglophone Council, the elected governing body 
of the AAC was subsequently transformed into the Southern Cameroons 
National Council (SCNC) with its youth wing, the Southern Cameroons Youth 
League (SCY). The SCNC has since been at the forefront of the demand for 
independence and secession of Anglophone Cameroon. 
In November 1994, a new TCCM was appointed with different terms of re-
ference, vis, to study a presidential proposal for the revision of the Constitution.183 
The proposals were then submitted to parliament in the November 1995 par-
liamentary session,184 and subsequently enacted as the 1996 Constitution.185 
That Constitution completely ignored the proposals of the AAC and preserved 
much of the underlying centralised theme of the 1972 Constitution. The 1996 
Constitution is the current Constitution of Cameroon and although not an 
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entirely new document, the amendments are substantial and perhaps account for 
why it was described as ushering in a new era for the separation of powers, 
democratic governance and human rights.186 It is purported to harness political 
liberalism introduced through the liberty laws, even though genuine political 
participation is yet to be really achieved. 
Conclusion 
Contemporary Cameroon is undoubtedly haunted by its chequered history. 
There is useful debate to be had in respect of the factors that could account 
for the many legal, political and governance issues bedevilling its development. 
As mentioned previously, the very nature of its colonial administration speaks 
volumes as to the genuine intentions of the colonial masters to equip their sections 
of the territory for eventual self-determination. In the case of British Southern 
Cameroons in particular, its attachment to Nigeria, though not unreasonable, 
necessarily implied its development was sacrificed for administrative convenience. 
However, an argument could be made that a substantial focus on its development 
would have potentially put that section of the territory in a resilient position, 
more equipped to take on the challenges of a modern society. Be that as it may, 
Cameroon’s animated colonial history accounts significantly, for its constitutional 
and political development, or the lack thereof and its multifarious governance 
problems discussed in subsequent chapters. However, the 1996 Constitution 
should arguably be a defining point for the liberalisation of Cameroon given that 
it introduces essential elements of a constitutional democracy. Yet, the country 
continues to face considerable governance challenges which have hampered its 
development and contributed to a stalled democratic process. 
Notes  
1 Neville Rubin, Cameroon: An African Federation (Pall Mall 1971) 42. See also Emmanuel 
Chiabi, The Making of Modern Cameroon: A History of Substate Nationalism and Disparate 
Union, 1914–1961 (University Press of America 1997) 9–10; Victor J Ngoh, Southern 
Cameroons, 1922–1961: A Constitutional History (Ashgate 2001) 1–2. See also 
Laura-Stella Enonchong, ‘The Problem of Systemic Violation of Civil and Political 
Rights in Cameroon: Towards a Contextualised Conception of Constitutionalism’ 
(PhD Thesis, University of Warwick 2013) 59–60.  
2 Yale Law School, ‘The Avalon Project. Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy: 
The Versailles Treaty, 28 June 1919’ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/partxv.asp 
(accessed 31 October 2012). See also Rubin (n 1) 42; Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1) 2.  
3 Cameroon under French Trusteeship Agreement as Approved by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, and Cameroon under United Kingdom Trusteeship 
Agreement as Approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, reproduced 
in Rubin (n 1) 203–213, Appendices III and IV, respectively. See also Ngoh, Southern 
Cameroons (n 1) 2.  
4 Mandate for the Administration of Part of the Former German Territory of the 
Cameroons Conferred upon the Government of the French Republic, Confirmed 
and Defined by the Council of the League of Nations. London, 20 July 1922. 
Reproduced in Rubin (n 1) Appendix 1, 196–198. 
History of constitution 27 
5 British Mandate for the Cameroons, 20 July 1922. Reproduced in Rubin (n 1) 
Appendix II, 199–203.  
6 Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Cameroons under British 
Administration (UNGA Approved on 13 December 1946) 118 UNTS 135.  
7 Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Cameroons under French 
Administration (UNGA Approved on 13 December 1946) 119 UNTS 135.  
8 Decree of 22 May 1924, art 10 cited in Jeswald W Salacuse, Legal Systems of Africa Series: 
French Speaking Africa (Africa South of the Sahara) (vol 1, The Michie Company 1969) 29.  
9 Salacuse, Legal Systems of Africa Series (n 8) 31; Enonchong, ‘The Problem of Systemic 
Violation’ (n 1) 60–65.  
10 Afrique Équatoriale Française: Decree of 16 August 1912, art 36.  
11 Rubin (n 1) 50; David Gardinier, Cameroon: United Nations Challenge to French Policy 
(Oxford University Press 1963) 15; Victor T Le Vine, The Cameroons: From Mandate 
to Independence (University of California Press 1964) 94.  
12 Le Vine, The Cameroons: From Mandate (n 11) 92–94.  
13 Rubin (n 1) 50.  
14 Carlson Anyangwe, The Cameroonian Judicial System (CEPER 1987) 102–103.  
15 ibid 102–103, 112.  
16 It has been described as ‘the most resented facet’ of French discriminatory policies 
in French Cameroon. See Rubin (n 1) 51.  
17 Le Vine, The Cameroons: From Mandate (n 11) 117.  
18 Edward Mortimer, France and the Africans: 1944–1960 (Faber and Faber Ltd 1961) 49; 
Robert Collins, African History: Western African History (Markus Wiener Publishers 
1997) 117–120. See also Rubin (n 1) 52–53.  
19 French Government Decree of 8 December 1945 and 20 February 1946. See 
Le Vine, The Cameroons: From Mandate (n 11) 110.  
20 Rubin (n 1) 54.  
21 ibid 61. See also Le Vine, The Cameroons: From Mandate (n 11) 142–144.  
22 Richard Joseph, Radical Nationalism in Cameroon: Social Origins of the UPC Rebellion 
(Oxford University Press 1977) 32.  
23 Willard Johnson, The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society 
(Princeton University Press 1970) 136–140; Rubin (n 1) 63–64.  
24 Le Vine, The Cameroons: From Mandate (n 11) 156.  
25 ibid 153–160. See also Rubin (n 1) 66–69; Johnson (n 23) 128.  
26 Rubin (n 1) 55; Le Vine, The Cameroons: From Mandate (n 11) 156.  
27 Le Vine, The Cameroons: From Mandate (n 11) 163–166.  
28 Rubin (n 1) 55; Le Vine, The Cameroons: From Mandate (n 11) 157, 162–166.  
29 Le Vine, The Cameroons: From Mandate (n 11) 166; Martin Atangana, The End of French 
Rule in Cameroon (University Press of America 2010).  
30 Cameroons under British Administration Order-in-Council No. 1621, 1923, art 3.  
31 Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1) 4–5; Enonchong, ‘The Problem of Systemic Violation’ 
(n 1) 66–72.  
32 Mufor Atanga, The Anglophone Cameroon Predicament (Langaa RPCIG 2011) 42.  
33 Southern Cameroons High Court Law 1955 (hereafter, SCHCL), s 11.  
34 British Cameroons Ordinance No. 5 of 1924; Rubin (n 1) 73. See Anthony N Allott, 
Judicial and Legal Systems in Africa (Butterworths 1962) 76–78.  
35 SCHCL 1955, s 27(1). The caveat to the application of customary law was that it was 
not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience, nor incompatible with 
any law being enforced. Today, customary law has a very limited application.  
36 ‘Fon’ is the terminology used to describe traditional leaders (chiefs) in the North-West 
Region of Cameroon. See Enonchong, ‘The Problem of Systemic Violation’ (n 1) 68.  
37 Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1) 6.  
38 Nigeria Protectorate Order-in-Council 1922, art 4. See also Anyangwe (n 14) 57. 
28 History of constitution 
39 Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1) 7. See also Bongfen Chem-Langhee, ‘The Origins 
of the Southern Cameroons House of Chiefs’ (1983) 16(4) The International Journal of 
African Historical Studies 653, 655–656.  
40 Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1).  
41 Nicholas Ofiaja, Stability and Instability in Politics: The Case of Nigeria and Cameroon 
(Vantage Press 1979) 50, 53; Le Vine, The Cameroons: From Mandate (n 11) 199.  
42 Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1) 10; Enonchong, ‘The Problem of Systemic Violation’ 
(n 1) 71–72.  
43 Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1) 12.  
44 ibid.  
45 Atanga, The Anglophone Cameroon Predicament (n 32) 42; Charles Fombad, Constitutional 
Law in Cameroon (Wolters Kluwer 2012) 25.  
46 Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1) 61.  
47 Eastern Region, Nigeria (Commission of Inquiry) HC Deb, 24 July 1956, vol 557, 
cc215-21.  
48 The Lyttleton Constitution of 1954. See also Nigerian Constitution, HL Deb 
10 February 1954, vol 185, cols 795–797; Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1) 87–88.  
49 Atangana, The End of French Rule in Cameroon (n 29) 85.  
50 See French Government Order No. 58-1357 of 31 December 1958. It went into 
effect on 1 January 1959.  
51 UN General Assembly Resolution 1349(XIII), 13 March 1959, paras 2–6.  
52 UN General Assembly Resolution 1349(XIII), 13 March 1959, para 10(1).  
53 Atangana (n 29) 98.  
54 ibid.  
55 By virtue of Law No. 59-56 of 31 October 1959; Atangana (n 29) 101.  
56 Eme Awa, Federal Government in Nigeria (University of California Press 1964) 58.  
57 United Nations Trusteeship Council, ‘Report of the United Nations Commissioner 
for the Supervision of the Plebiscites in the Southern and Northern Parts of the 
Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration’ (3 April 1961) UN Doc. 
T/1556, 9. Hereafter, Plebiscite Report.  
58 Plebiscite Report, 11.  
59 Southern Cameroons: Constitution, HC Deb 11 June 1959, vol 606, cols 1153, 1154. 
See also Piet Konings and Francis Nyamnjoh, Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A Study 
of the Politics of Recognition (BRILL 2003) 22–36; Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1) 122–132.  
60 Plebiscite Report, 14. See also Konings and Nyamnjoh (n 59) 22–36; Ngoh, Southern 
Cameroons (n 1) 122–132.  
67 ibid, para 2.  
61 According to which one of the purposes of the trusteeship system was ‘to promote the 
political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the 
trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or in-
dependence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory 
and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may 
be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement’.  
62 UN General Assembly Resolution 1350(XIII), 13 March 1959, para 1.  
63 ibid, para 3.  
64 UN General Assembly Resolution 1350(XIII), 13 March 1959, para 5.  
65 See Foncha, John [Premier of the Southern Cameroons] and Dr EML Endeley. 
Agreed Statement. UN Doc A/C.4/414, GAOR, 14th Session, 199, Annexes, 
Agenda Item 41.  
66 UN General Assembly Resolution 1352(XIV), 16 October 1959, para 5.  
68 Nicodemus Awasom, ‘The Reunification Question in Cameroon History: Was the 
Bride an Enthusiastic or a Reluctant One?’ (2000) 47(2) Africa Today 90, 109–111.  
69 Awasom, ‘The Reunification Question’ (n 68) 109–111; Atanga (n 32) 46–47. 
History of constitution 29 
70 Atanga (n 32) 47.  
71 Sydney Philipson, Financial and Administrative Consequences to the Southern Cameroons of Separation 
from the Federation of Nigeria, 1959 (Government Printer 1959) 8–10; Plebiscite Report, 32.  
72 Philipson Report (n 71) para 3(d).  
73 ibid, paras 12 and 49(1).  
74 Southern Cameroons: Constitution, HC Deb 11 June 1959 vol, 606, cols 1153, 1154. 
See also Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1) 34, 83–84; Johnson (n 23) 100, 104–107.  
75 United Kingdom and Nigeria (Ministerial Discussions), HC Deb 19 May 1960, 
vol 623, cols 1494–1498.  
76 Philipson Report (n 71) para 49(1).  
77 Future of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom 
Administration, Resolution 2013(XXVI) of 31 May 1960, para 3.  
78 Plebiscite Report, 39.  
79 Plebiscite Report, 40. See also Southern Cameroons: Future, HC Deb 09 April 1959, 
vol 603, cols 32-3W; United Kingdom and Nigeria (Ministerial Discussions), HC 
Deb 19 May 1960, vol 623, cols 1494–1498.  
80 See, for instance, Resolution 1352(XIV) para 4, Resolution 1608(XV) of 21 April 
1961 paras 4(b) and 5.  
81 Awasom, ‘The Reunification Question’ (n 68) 109; Atanga (n 32) 46–47.  
82 Plebiscite Report, 39–44.  
83 ibid.  
84 Southern Cameroons Gazette No. 4, vol 7 of January 1961. The UN appointed 
Plebiscite Commissioner noted that although the electorate understood that the 
two options were to join Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroon, it was uncertain 
whether they understood the actual implications of the two options. Plebiscite 
Report, 44.  
85 Plebiscite Report, 140.  
86 Plebiscite Report, 246.  
87 Resolution 1608(XV), para 2(a)(b).  
88 Resolution 1608(XV), para 4(a)(b).  
89 HC Deb, 1 August 1961, vol 645, cols 1332–1351.  
90 Plebiscite Report, 146.  
91 ibid.  
92 Johnson (n 23) 183; Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1) 156–163.  
93 Rubin (n 1) 11–114; Johnson (n 23) 171–172.  
94 Frank Stark, ‘Federalism in Cameroon: The Shadow and the Reality’ (1976) 3(10) 
Canadian Journal of African Studies 423, 431–434.  
95 Rubin (n 1).  
96 ibid. See also Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1) 159–164.  
97 Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1) 160.  
98 ibid.  
99 ibid 159–164; Stark, ‘Federalism in Cameroon’ (n 94) 427. See also Rubin (n 1) 
113–114; Johnson (n 23) 184.  
100 ibid.  
101 Though Southern Cameroons had been separated from Nigeria, it still remained 
a trust territory of the UN. See Ahmadou Ahidjo, Contribution to National Construction 
(Presence Afriςaine 1964) 23. See also Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1) 160; Ndiva 
Kofele-Kale, ‘Ethnicity, Regionalism and Political Power: A Post-mortem of Ahidjo’s 
Cameroon’ in M ichael Schatzerberg and William Zartman (eds) The Political Economy 
of Cameroon (Praeger 1986) 63.  
102 Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1) 163; Rubin (n 1) 114; Namata N Mbile, Cameroon 
Political Story: Memories of an Authentic Eyewitness (Presprint 1999) 165–195. 
30 History of constitution 
103 Prior to the Foumban encounter, Ahidjo had sent his proposals to Premier Foncha in 
order for his delegates to familiarise themselves with the Republic’s proposal and pro-
duce their counter proposals. It is alleged that Foncha concealed this document from his 
delegates and as a result they were only presented with it on the first day of the Foumban 
Conference. See Rubin (n 1) 114; Ngoh, Southern Cameroons (n 1) 163; Mbile (n 102) 
165–195.  
104 Atanga (n 32) 50–60.  
105 The legitimacy of that constitution has defined some of the arguments relating 
to the Anglophone problem in Cameroon. This issue will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
106 Acts of Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, 25 April 1964, Act No. 22 of 1964 
(Cap. 557 of the Laws).  
107 This was done on 29 October 1964 through the United Republic (Declaration of 
Name) Act of 1964, Act No. 61 of 1964 (Cap. 578 of the Laws).  
108 Markku Suksi, Substate Governance Through Territorial Autonomy: A Comparative Study in 
Constitutional Law of Powers, Procedures and Institutions (Springer 2011) 188–210.  
109 Federal Constitution, 1961 (hereafter, Fed. Const.) art 1. According to the British 
Under-Secretary for Colonies, a federation was the best possible option to promote 
unity while preserving the separate identity of the two territories. See HC Deb, 
1 August 1961, vol 645, cols 1332–1351.  
110 Article 59 of the Federal Constitution made that clear by providing that ‘Les présent 
dispositions, qui portent révision de la Constitution de la République adoptée le 
21 Février 1960 par le peuple camerounais …’.  
111 Translated as ‘The revised constitution shall be published in French and in English, 
the French version being authentic’ (official translation). 
112 The issue of the possible subordination of the Southern Cameroons was sig-
nificantly discussed in the UK. House of Commons where some members of 
Parliament raised concerns about reports from the Republic of Cameroon in-
dicating a certain perception that Southern Cameroons would be colonised by 
them. In fact, Honourable Mr Thompson (Dundee, East) repeated a phrase ‘Le 
premier Octobre on va saisir le Cameroun du Sud’ which had become a familiar 
slogan in the Republic. (On 1 October, we will take control of Southern 
Cameroons – author’s translation). HC Deb, 1 August 1961, vol 645, cols 
1332–1351.  
113 Fed. Const, art 46.  
114 Decree No. 61-DF-15 of 20 December 1961.  
115 Stark, ‘Federalism in Cameroon’ (n 94) 432.  
116 ibid.  
117 Jacques Benjamin, Les Camerounais Occidentaux. La Minorite´ Dans un Etat Bicommunautaire 
(Montreal University Press 1972) 197.  
118 ibid  
119 Stark, ‘Federalism in Cameroon’ (n 94) 432.  
120 Daniel Weinstock, ‘Towards a Normative Theory of Federalism’ (2001) 53(167) 
International Social Science Journal 75.  
121 Stark (n 94) 427.  
122 Stark (n 94) 428.  
123 Benjamin, ‘Les Camerounais Occidentaux’ (n 117) xvi.  
124 Benjamin, ‘Les Camerounais Occidentaux’ (n 117) xvi; Stark (n 94) 434, 437. This long-term 
objective was affirmed recently by President Paul Biya at the November 2019 
Paris Peace Summit. See Amos Fofung, ‘Cameroon: From Biya, A Mea Culpa on 
the Anglophone Crisis in Paris’ (Pan African Vision, 14 November 2019) https:// 
panafricanvisions.com/2019/11/cameroon-from-biya-a-mea-culpa-on-the-anglophone- 
crisis-in-paris/ accessed 30 November 2019. 
History of constitution 31 
125 Joseph Ebune, ‘The Dilemma of the Federal System in West Cameroon, 
1961–1972’ (2016) 7(2) Journal of Scientific Research and Studies 133, 135. See generally 
Stark (n 94).  
126 Rubin (n 1) 143–144; Jean Francois Bayart, ‘The Birth of the Ahidjo Regime’ in 
Richard Joseph (ed) Gaullist Africa: Cameroon under Ahmadou Ahidjo (Fourth Dimension 
Publishers 1978) 60–61.  
127 Johnson (n 23) 280; Rubin (n 1) 144.  
128 Johnson (n 23) 254. See also Bayart, ‘The Birth of the Ahidjo Regime’ (n 126) 62.  
129 Johnson (n 23) 254–255.  
130 Bayart, ‘The Birth of the Ahidjo Regime’ (n 126) 61. See also Gardinier (n 11) 125 
esp. note 15.  
131 Le Vine, The Cameroons: From Mandate (n 11) 221–224; Johnson (n 23) 254–255; 
Bayart, ‘The Birth of the Ahidjo Regime’ (n 126) 62.  
132 ibid.  
133 Johnson (n 23) 257–258.  
134 Johnson (n 23) 284–285; Rubin (n 1) 152; Bayart, ‘The Neutralisation of Anglophone 
Cameroon’ in Richard Joseph (ed) Gaullist Africa: Cameroon under Ahmadou Ahidjo 
(Fourth Dimension Publishers 1978) 87.  
135 Johnson (n 23) 285; Rubin (n 1) 153; Bayart, ‘The Neutralisation of Anglophone 
Cameroon’ (n 134) 87.  
136 Bayart, ‘The Birth of the Ahidjo Regime’ (n 126) 61.  
137 Johnson (n 23) 280.  
138 Bayart, ‘The Structure of Political Power’ in Richard Joseph (ed) Gaullist Africa: 
Cameroon under Ahmadou Ahidjo (Fourth Dimension Publishers 1978) 89; Atanga 
(n 32) 76.  
139 Piet Konings, ‘The Anglophone Struggle for Federalism in Cameroon’ in Lidija 
Basta and Jibrin Ibrahim (eds) Federalism and Decentralisation in Africa: The Multicultural 
Challenge (Institute of Federalism 1999) 303.  
140 Konings, ‘The Anglophone Struggle for Federalism’ (n 139) 303.  
141 Decree No. 72/270 of 2 June Promulgating the Constitution of the United Republic 
of Cameroon, 1972 Constitution (Unitary Constitution).  
142 Unitary Constitution, art 1. In 1984, this appellation was changed to the Republic 
of Cameroon. See art 1 as amended by Law No. 84/1 of 4 February 1984.  
143 Stark (n 94) 423.  
144 This is discussed further in Chapter 6.  
145 Victor Ngoh, ‘Biya and the Transition to Democracy’ in John Mbaku and 
Joseph Takougang (eds) The Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya 
(Africa World Press Inc. 2004) 427.  
146 Charles Fombad and Jonie Fonyam, ‘The Social Democratic Front, the Opposition 
and Political Transition in Cameroon’ in Mbaku and Takougang (eds) The Leadership 
Challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya (Africa World Press Inc. 2004) 462; Piet 
Konings, The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa: State and Civil Society in Cameroon 
(Langaa Research/African Studies Centre 2011) 30.  
147 Unitary Constitution, art 1. As amended by Law No. 84/1 of 4 February 1984.  
148 El Hadj Hayatou, ‘Secretary General of the National Assembly’s Explanatory Note 
on the February 1984 Amendment of the Constitution of Cameroon’ (1985) 1(143) 
Inter-Parliamentary Union Bulletin 4.  
149 Konings, ‘Anglophone Struggle’ (n 139) 306.  
150 ibid.  
151 ibid.  
152 Ngoh, ‘Biya and the Transition to Democracy’ (n 145) 434–437; Konings, The Politics 
of Neoliberal Reforms (n 146) 35–36.  
153 ibid. See also Konings, ‘The Anglophone Struggle’ (n 139) 305–307. 
32 History of constitution 
154 Konings, The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms (n 146) 35–37.  
155 Ngoh, ‘Biya and the Transition to Democracy’ (n 145) 434; Fombad and Fonyam ‘The 
Social Democratic Front’ (n 146) 462; Konings, ‘The Anglophone Struggle’ (n 139) 306.  
156 Ngoh, ‘Biya and the Transition to Democracy’ (n 145) 433; Fombad and Fonyam 
(n 146) 462.  
157 ibid. See also Joseph Takougang and Milton Krieger, An African State and Society in the 
1990s: Cameroon’s Political Crossroads (Westview Press 1998) 105.  
158 ibid.  
159 Ngoh, ‘Biya and the Transition to Democracy’ (n 145) 434.  
160 ibid 435–436; Fombad and Fonyam (n 146) 463; Konings, The Anglophone 
Struggle’ (n 139) 307; Takougang and Krieger, An African State and Society (n 157) 107.  
161 ibid.  
162 Ngoh, ‘Biya and the Transition to Democracy’ (n 145) 437.  
163 Konings, ‘The Anglophone Struggle’ (n 139) 307.  
164 Law No. 90/052 on the Freedom of Social Communication (FSC); Law No. 90/053 
on Freedom of Association; Law No. 90/055 on Public Meetings, Processions and 
Parades; Law No. 90/056 on Political Parties, all promulgated on 19 December 1990.  
165 Ngoh, ‘Biya and the Transition to Democracy’ (n 145) 437; Fombad and Fonyam 
(n 146) 464–465; Konings, ‘The Anglophone Struggle’ (n 139) 308.  
166 Ngoh, ‘Biya and the Transition to Democracy’ (n 145) 437.  
167 Konings, The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa (n 146) 39–40.  
168 Ngoh, ‘Biya and the Transition to Democracy’ (n 145) 440.  
169 ibid.  
170 Ngoh, ‘Biya and the Transition to Democracy’ (n 145) 441–442; Fombad and 
Fonyam (n 146) 470; Konings, ‘The Anglophone Struggle’ (n 139) 308.  
171 ibid.  
172 ibid.  
173 ibid.  
174 Ngoh, ‘Biya and the Transition to Democracy’ (n 145) 432; Konings, The Politics of 
Neoliberal Reforms (n 146) 356–357.  
175 Ngoh, ‘Biya and the Transition to Democracy’ (n 145) 442.  
176 Ngoh, ‘Biya and the Transition to Democracy’ (n 145) 442; Takougang and Krieger 
(n 157) 183.  
177 ibid.  
178 Konings, ‘The Anglophone Struggle’ (n 139) 310–311.  
179 ibid 311– 315.  
180 Takougang and Krieger (n 157) 184–189.  
181 Konings, ‘The Anglophone Struggle’ (n 139) 316; Takougang and Krieger (n 157) 183.  
182 Konings, ‘The Anglophone Struggle’ (n 139) 316.  
183 Konings, ‘The Anglophone Struggle’ (n 139) 316; Takougang and Krieger (n 157) 
183, 190.  
184 Takougang and Krieger (n 157) 190.  
185 Law No. 96/06 of 18 January 1996 to amend the Constitution of 2 June 1972.  
186 Augustin K Kouomegni, ‘Minister of Communication’s Introductory Note to 
the 1996 Constitutional Amendment’ Fundamental Legal Texts (vol 1, National 
Printing Press 1996). Except otherwise indicated, all references to the Constitution, 
henceforth, relate to the 1996 Constitution.  
References 
Ahidjo A, Contribution to National Construction (Presence Afriςaine 1964). 
Allott A, Judicial and Legal Systems in Africa (Butterworths 1962). 
History of constitution 33 
Anyangwe C, The Cameroonian Judicial System (CEPER 1987). 
Atanga M, The Anglophone Cameroon Predicament (Langaa RPCIG 2011). 
Atangana M, The End of French Rule in Cameroon (University Press of America 2010). 
Awa E, Federal Government in Nigeria (University of California Press 1964). 
Awasom NF, ‘The Reunification Question in Cameroon History: Was the Bride an 
Enthusiastic or a Reluctant One?’ (2000) 47(2) Africa Today 90. 
Bayart JF, ‘The Birth of the Ahidjo Regime’ in Richard Joseph (ed) Gaullist Africa: Cameroon 
under Ahmadou Ahidjo (Fourth Dimension Publishers 1978). 
Bayart JF ‘The Neutralisation of Anglophone Cameroon’ in Richard Joseph (ed) Gaullist 
Africa: Cameroon under Ahmadou Ahidjo (Fourth Dimension Publishers 1978). 
Bayart JF ‘The Structure of Political Power’ in Richard Joseph (ed) Gaullist Africa: Cameroon 
under Ahmadou Ahidjo (Fourth Dimension Publishers 1978). 
Benjamin J, Les Camerounais Occidentaux. La Minorite´ Dans un Etat Bicommunautaire (Montreal 
University Press 1972). 
Chem-Langhee B, ‘The Origins of the Southern Cameroons House of Chiefs’ (1983) 16(4) 
The International Journal of African Historical Studies 653. 
Chiabi E, The Making of Modern Cameroon: A History of Substate Nationalism and Disparate Union, 
1914-1961 (University Press of America 1997). 
Collins R, African History: Western African History (Markus Wiener Publishers 1997). 
Ebune J, ‘The Dilemma of the Federal System in West Cameroon, 1961–1972’ (2016) 7(2) 
Journal of Scientific Research and Studies 133. 
Enonchong L, ‘The Problem of Systemic Violation of Civil and Political Rights in Cameroon: 
Towards a Contextualised Conception of Constitutionalism’ (PhD Thesis, University of 
Warwick 2013). 
Fofung A, ‘Cameroon: From Biya, A Mea Culpa on the Anglophone Crisis in Paris’ (Pan 
African Vision, 14 November 2019) https://panafricanvisions.com/2019/11/cameroon- 
from-biya-a-mea-culpa-on-the-anglophone-crisis-in-paris/ accessed 30November2019. 
Fombad C, Constitutional Law in Cameroon (Wolters Kluwer 2012). 
Fombad C and Fonyam J, ‘The Social Democratic Front, the Opposition and 
Political Transition in Cameroon’ in John Mbaku and Joseph Takougang (eds) 
The Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya (Africa World Press 
Inc. 2004). 
Gardinier D, Cameroon: United Nations Challenge to French Policy (Oxford University Press 1963). 
Hadj HE, ‘Secretary General of the National Assembly’s Explanatory Note on the 
February 1984 Amendment of the Constitution of Cameroon’ (1985) 1(143) Inter- 
Parliamentary Union Bulletin 4. 
Johnson W, The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society (Princeton 
University Press 1970). 
Joseph R, Radical Nationalism in Cameroon: Social Origins of the UPC Rebellion (Oxford 
University Press 1977). 
Kofele-Kale N, ‘Ethnicity, Regionalism and Political Power: A Post-Mortem of Ahidjo’s 
Cameroon’ in Michael Schatzerberg and William Zartman (eds) The Political Economy of 
Cameroon (Praeger 1986).   
Konings P, ‘The Anglophone Struggle for Federalism in Cameroon’ in Lidija Basta 
and Jibrin Ibrahim (eds) Federalism and Decentralisation in Africa: The Multicultural Challenge 
(Institute of Federalism 1999). 
Konings P, The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa: State and Civil Society in Cameroon 
(Langaa Research/African Studies Centre 2011). 
34 History of constitution 
Konings P and Nyamnjoh F, Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A Study of the Politics of 
Recognition (BRILL 2003). 
Kouomegni AK, ‘Minister of Communication’s Introductory Note to the 1996 
Constitutional Amendment’ Fundamental Legal Texts (vol 1, National Printing Press 1996). 
Le Vine VT, The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence (University of California Press 1964). 
Mbile NN, Cameroon Political Story: Memories of an Authentic Eyewitness (Presprint 1999). 
Mortimer E, France and the Africans: 1944–1960 (Faber and Faber Ltd 1961). 
Ngoh VJ, Southern Cameroons, 1922–1961: A Constitutional History (Ashgate 2001). 
Ngoh VJ ‘Biya and the Transition to Democracy’ in John Mbaku and Joseph Takougang 
(eds) The Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya (Africa World Press 
Inc. 2004). 
Ofiaja N, Stability and Instability in Politics: The Case of Nigeria and Cameroon (Vantage 
Press 1979). 
Philipson S, Financial and Administrative Consequences to the Southern Cameroons of Separation from 
the Federation of Nigeria, 1959 (Government Printer 1959). 
Rubin N, Cameroon: An African Federation (Pall Mall 1971). 
Salacuse JW, Legal Systems of Africa Series: French Speaking Africa (Africa South of the Sahara) 
(vol 1, The Michie Company 1969). 
Stark F, ‘Federalism in Cameroon: The Shadow and the Reality’ (1976) 3(10) Canadian 
Journal of African Studies 423. 
Suksi M, Substate Governance Through Territorial Autonomy: A Comparative Study in Constitutional 
Law of Powers, Procedures and Institutions (Springer 2011). 
Takougang J and Krieger M, An African State and Society in the 1990s: Cameroon’s Political 
Crossroads (Westview Press 1998) 
Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Cameroons under British Administration 
(UNGA Approved on 13 December 1946) 118 UNTS 135. 
Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Cameroons under French Administration 
(UNGA Approved on 13 December 1946) 119 UNTS 135. 
United Nations Trusteeship Council, ‘Report of the United Nations Commissioner for the 
Supervision of the Plebiscites in the Southern and Northern Parts of the Cameroons under United 
Kingdom Administration’ (3 April 1961) UN Doc. T/1556. 
Foncha, John [Premier of the Southern Cameroons] and Dr EML Endeley. Agreed 
Statement. UN Doc A/C.4/414, GAOR, 14th Session, 199, Annexes, Agenda Item 41. 
Weinstock D, ‘Towards a Normative Theory of Federalism’ (2001) 53(167) International 
Social Science Journal 75. 
Yale Law School, ‘The Avalon Project. Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy: The 
Versailles Treaty, 28 June 1919’ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/partxv.asp (accessed 
31 October 2012).  
History of constitution 35 
2 Executive power in the context 
of semi-presidentialism   
Introduction 
It is worth noting that, under the 1996 Constitution, executive power operates 
in the context of semi-presidentialism, which is meant to reduce the over-
concentration of executive authority in one institution. This was perhaps ne-
cessary as both the Federal Constitution of 1961 and the Unitary Constitution 
of 1972 granted wide powers to the President with insufficient restraint me-
chanisms, giving rise to a form of presidential absolutism. The 1996 Constitution 
purported to reverse that position by creating a more equitable balance of 
powers between executive, legislative and judicial power and also by entrenching 
additional separation of executive power between the President and the PM. 
This chapter explores various roles constitutionally assigned to the executive 
and how different institutions act individually and collectively as the executive 
arm of state. In particular, it examines the powers of the President, the PM and 
the role of the government. It also examines the accountability structures and 
identifies emerging trends and weaknesses in the system. It further analyses 
the extent to which power has been effectively distributed between the President 
and the PM to determine whether executive power-sharing under the 1996 
Constitution is more apparent than real. 
Part I. Semi-presidentialism and the structure  
of the executive 
A. Structure of the executive 
The Constitution deals primarily with executive power in Part II, whereas 
executive and legislative relations are dealt with in Part IV. The executive 
branch is made up of the President, who is Head of State, the PM who is head 
of government, and the government. Their relationship is hierarchical with 
the President at the apex of that hierarchy, followed by the PM who is 
appointed by the President. The government has over thirty ministries each 
of which is headed by a minister, a minister delegate or a minister of state 
appointed by the President. Other members of government may include 
secretaries of state. In order to understand better the nature of executive 
power sharing in Cameroon, the concept of semi-presidentialism is explained 
in the subsequent section.  
B. Semi-presidentialism and executive power 
What is semi-presidentialism and why should we be interested in it? ‘Semi- 
presidentialism’ is a term for a political system that combines a presidential system 
(for instance, the USA) with a parliamentary system (for instance, the UK). 
According to Maurice Duverger, who first coined the term, the distinguishing 
features of semi-presidential systems are a popularly elected president vested 
with ‘quite considerable powers’ and a cabinet led by a PM who is responsible to 
the legislature.1 Although Duverger failed to describe what constitutes ‘quite 
considerable powers’, recent scholarship has identified three distinctive powers 
as falling within that category. They include power to dismiss the PM and the 
cabinet, presidential veto power and power to dissolve the legislature.2 
One of the main benefits of semi-presidentialism is that it can be described as 
an additional separation of powers because of the division of executive power 
between the president and PM.3 An advantage of that additional separation 
is the potential of mitigating the over concentration of powers in a single ex-
ecutive head possibly affording the opportunity for a more equitable balance of 
power between the executive and other governmental authorities. However, 
not all semi-presidential regimes exhibit a factual additional separation of 
powers. That is particularly the case with highly presidential semi-presidential 
regimes.4 This sub-type is characterised by a very powerful president and a 
ceremonial PM, a variant which exhibits an over-concentration of executive 
powers in a president similar to some purely presidential systems.5 In addition, 
highly presidential sub-types face the problem of dual accountability of the 
PM6 who can be dismissed by the president and also censured by parliament. 
However, the president is neither accountable to the PM nor parliament and 
in fact can make use of his special powers to dissolve parliament.7 
Cameroon’s semi-presidential system reflects the highly presidential sub-type. As 
will be demonstrated later, the President is vested with considerable powers over 
the government, the civil service, the judiciary,8 the legislature and authority to 
regulate the state of emergency. The exercise of those powers has also been fa-
cilitated in practice by the fact that the President’s party retains an overwhelming 
and largely disciplined majority in parliament.9 In view of those circumstances, it 
may perhaps be more accurate to describe the regime as presidential. 
Part II. The President 
A. Election 
The conditions for the election of the President of the Republic are laid 
down in the Constitution and the Electoral Code.10 The President is elected 
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for a period of seven years by universal suffrage and is eligible for re-election 
indefinitely.11 He is elected in a single round by the majority of the votes 
cast,12 irrespective of the margins.13 In terms of eligibility, candidates for the 
position must fulfil a number of conditions. They must be Cameroonians by 
birth, they must enjoy their civic and political rights and must have attained 
the age of 35 by the date of election.14 There is an additional residency 
requirement that a candidate must have resided in Cameroon for an unin-
terrupted period of a minimum of twelve months and mandatorily registered 
onto an electoral register.15 The law permits candidates to be nominated by 
a political party or to run independently,16 perhaps indicating that the office 
is open to any eligible Cameroonian. However, the obstacles inherent in 
independent nominations are insurmountable in the context of Cameroon. 
A potential independent candidate can only be nominated on the condition 
of obtaining 300 signatures from ‘dignitaries’ from all administrative re-
gions, with thirty signatures from each of the ten regions of Cameroon.17 
One of the problems with that requirement is the practicality of obtaining 
the required signatures, due to the nature of the ‘dignitaries’ to be solicited 
for that purpose. The relevant dignitaries include Members of Parliament 
(MP) or Trades Chambers, Regional Councillors, Municipal Councillors or 
First-Class Chiefs.18 MPs are usually representatives of political parties and 
are unlikely to support an independent candidate in preference for their 
own candidate, except perhaps in the unlikely event that no candidate from 
their party is running for the office of the president. Moreover, an in-
dependent candidate may find it difficult to obtain signatures from First- 
Class Chiefs or representative from Trade Chambers due to the fact that 
these group of people often are presidential appointees and hold office at 
the pleasure of the President. Therefore, it is unlikely that they would 
support an independent candidate if that action would jeopardise their 
position. As a result, a potential candidate has a better chance of being 
nominated by a political party. 
The law provides curiously that: 
All persons who, by their own doing, have placed themselves in a situation of 
dependence on or connivance with a foreign person, organisation or power 
or foreign State shall not be eligible.19  
It is not clear what this provision is intended to address, particularly given its 
vagueness. For instance, what would be considered ‘a situation of dependence’ or 
what constitutes ‘connivance’ and for what purpose? It appears to be a potent 
weapon in the hands of the state, to deal with potential challenge to the in-
cumbent government in terms of a candidate who either enjoys international 
support or appears to do so. They may be accused of ‘connivance’. Similarly, the 
head of a domestic civil society organisation who receives aid from international 
partners or foreign governments may be accused of placing themselves ‘in a 
situation of dependence’ if they decided to run for office. 
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The laws regulating presidential elections appear to make it open for eligible 
candidates to be put forward. In spite of that, the history of elections in 
Cameroon makes the openness questionable as the incumbent government 
applies its incumbency advantages to the detriment of other candidates. For 
instance, the current provisions of article 6(2) was introduced through a con-
troversial constitutional amendment in 2008, amending the original article 6(2) 
that had imposed a term limit of two terms. Given the upheavals in the 1990s 
and the demand to strengthen democracy in Cameroon, the term limit provision 
was one of the provisions that assuaged the political tension at the time. In fact, 
the provision was first introduced in the draft constitution prepared by the 
Tripartite Conference. Its amendment was seen as a betrayal of the democra-
tisation process.20 It was expected that the incumbent President Biya, who has 
been in office since 1982, would eventually leave power at the end of his two 
terms. His proposal to remove term limits sparked political disturbances across 
the country. The government in characteristic style responded with repression,21 
while the compliant legislature dominated by the ruling party intractably adopted 
the controversial amendment. According to Paul Ayah who at the time was MP 
for the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), a number of 
his colleagues, like himself were unimpressed by this amendment but dared not 
oppose it.22 In fact, he alleged that, on the day of the parliamentary vote, there 
were more security officers in parliament than there were MPs and that situation 
was sufficiently intimidating.23 Partly due to the perks springing from incum-
bency advantages, presidential elections in particular are often deemed pre-
dictable.24 The most recent presidential election held in October 2018 was no 
different. President Biya who was expected to retain power won the election by a 
landslide majority of 71%. While the results were widely contested due primarily 
to gross electoral irregularities, the results were confirmed and proclaimed by the 
Constitutional Council. Maurice Kamto, the candidate for the Movement for the 
Renaissance of Cameroon (MRC) who is widely believed to have won the 
election proclaimed himself winner and organised several campaigns throughout 
Cameroon.25 This was not well received by the authorities. He was arrested with 
numerous supporters and spent nine months in jail. The backlash which often 
follows presidential elections are symptomatic of the fact that, while the rules on 
eligibility allow multiple presidential candidates to run for office, the political 
landscape does not provide scope for organising credible elections. 
B. Competencies and powers 
The Constitution grants the President considerable powers generally and 
powers over specific aspects of governance, unambiguously affirming his su-
premacy. Thus, generally the President represents the state in all acts of public 
life26; defines national policy27; ensures respect for the Constitution28; and 
‘through his arbitration’ ensures the proper functioning of public authorities29; 
promulgates laws30; guarantees the independence, territorial integrity and 
continuity of the polity31; and ensures the internal and external security of 
Executive power and semi-presidentialism 39 
the state.32 Those powers create a paternalistic image of the President, 
reinforcing a perception that his authority is imperative for the survival of 
the country. The following subsections will demonstrate the pervasiveness 
of presidential powers and how these have been firmly established by the 
Constitution. 
I. Appointment of the PM, the cabinet and other state officials 
The President is vested with powers to appoint the PM and ‘on the proposal of 
the latter, appoint the other members of government’.33 In practice, however, 
ministerial appointments are made concurrently with the appointment of a 
PM.34 In which case, it is possible to infer that he is not always consulted in the 
selection of his Cabinet. The Constitution provides further that their duties shall 
be defined by the President who can also terminate their appointment.35 That 
position gives a prima facie case of Cabinet’s accountability to the President 
rather than the PM who is head of government. 
With respect to other military and civil service responsibilities, the president’s 
influence is significant in that he is head of the armed forces36 and is responsible 
for setting up and organising administrative services,37 and appointments to 
civil, military and para-public institutions.38 These powers, in addition to those 
discussed in the previous subsection, place the state almost entirely in the hands 
of the President.39 The excessive dependence of state and para-public institutions 
is one of the problems associated with inefficient governance in Cameroon. As 
decision-making powers depend significantly on the President, considerable de-
lays occur where he is unable to act. In the specific context of the current 
regime, there is a reported problem of inertia which has been attributed to the 
frequent absence of President Biya, particularly resulting from prolonged private 
visits abroad.40 These absences have meant that key decisions which need to be 
taken are put on hold for the length of time that the President is absent, causing 
delays in the implementation of government policies and the making of 
expeditious decisions when emergencies arise.41 
The power of appointment to civil, military and para-public institutions also 
provides a formidable basis for a patronage system for the reward of key 
figures that support the regime.42 Due partly to the underdeveloped nature of the 
economy, spurred by scarcity of resources, there is competition for resources and 
key positions in the government and public services.43 The select few officials 
appointed to various positions are keen to remain in them to secure their poli-
tical, economic and social status.44 Individually or collectively, some have ex-
panded their support networks by granting favours to members of the public in 
order to elicit popular support for the regime.45 An example here is the former 
Anglophone PM Peter Musonge who was appointed in 1996. In a speech de-
livered to an audience in Buea,46 capital of the South-West region, he called on 
the Anglophone community to unanimously support President Biya as a mark 
of appreciation for appointing an Anglophone to that office and also to receive 
further favours from the government.47 The Governor of that region at the time 
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(Peter Oben) endorsed South-westerners and ‘immigrants’ to support the CPDM 
party for similar reasons.48 In addition to the benefits of patronage, there is also 
the fear of reprisal. 
Appointments are generally viewed with cynicism by the public – as a reward 
for loyal supporters of the government and failure to uphold that support may 
result in dismissal, in view of the fact that the President often has the sole power 
of appointment and removal from office. Thus, appointments may be used 
to elicit and secure support for the President. Prior to the controversial 1992 
presidential election, the Minster of Territorial Administration at the time 
summoned all regional governors, tasking them with the duty to ensure that 
President Biya won at least 60% of the votes in each region.49 A failure to attain 
the threshold would result in sanctions for the governors as it would be deemed 
a betrayal of the President.50 These allegations were confirmed by the National 
Democratic Institute. An excerpt of their report is worth reproducing. 
The NDI has received direct testimony to the effect that, prior to the 
election, high level government officials were told that their performance 
would be rated on the number of votes President Biya garnered in their 
respective areas. They were given a goal of 60% and told that this figure 
should be achieved by whatever means was necessary.51  
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the results suffered from a serious lack of 
credibility as a result of reported electoral malpractices.52 
II. Legislative powers 
Although Parliament is the primary legislative organ, its areas of competence 
have been specifically delineated and some legislative authority has been ac-
corded to the President. This approach follows typically that of France where the 
President is vested with some legislative and regulatory powers. In Cameroon, 
the President is authorised to exercise statutory authority53 and to issue rules and 
regulations in the areas which do not fall under parliament’s competence.54 
Moreover, parliament may empower the President to legislate by way of ordi-
nance for a limited period and for given purposes, in those areas which are 
reserved for parliament.55 Ordinances promulgated under that provision enter 
into force on the day of their publication and remain applicable as long as 
parliament has not refused to ratify them.56 
A significant problem with the legislative powers of the President is their ex-
tensive scope as there is no indication of what the ‘given purposes’ may be and 
every aspect that does not come within parliament’s competence is the respon-
sibility of the President. Arguably, the Constitution cannot contemplate all the 
possible circumstances under which delegated legislation may be necessary. Yet 
in the particular context of Cameroon where the President formulates govern-
ment policy, has a disciplined parliamentary majority and substantial control of 
its party, it is unlikely that without specific criteria guiding the delegation of 
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legislative powers, they may not be used to promote unpopular policies like 
those that have potential to inhibit democracy and the exercise of human 
rights.57Although delegation of legislative power is not unusual, exercise of such 
powers should be circumscribed by the provision of clear limits on their ex-
ercise.58 In Germany for instance, the legislature is required to provide clear 
guidelines for the content of regulations.59 Caroline Morris and Ryan Malone 
assert that the ability of the executive to utilise delegated powers to implement its 
policy preferences without parliamentary oversight is particularly inimical to the 
exercise of human rights.60 This is partly due to the fact that the government 
may seek to maintain its hold on power and if that objective can be achieved 
through policy facilitated by delegation, then individual liberties which conflict 
with those policies may be undermined as a result of their implementation.61 
In the case of Cameroon, both the residual and delegated powers of the 
President serve to further alter the balance of power to the latter’s advantage. 
It further reinforces the perception of an authoritarian President, given the 
enormity of its powers even within the legislative or regulatory sphere thereby 
undermining the benefits of semi-presidentialism. 
III. Dissolution powers 
The position of the executive is further strengthened by presidential powers to 
dissolve the legislature. The Constitution provides that: 
The President of the Republic may, if necessary and after consultation with 
the Government, the Bureaux of the National Assembly and the Senate, 
dissolve the National Assembly …62  
There are at least three problems that can be identified with that provision 
with regard to checks and balances.63 First, dissolution powers are not cir-
cumscribed. The President merely consults the relevant institutions rather than 
acquire their assent. It is doubtful that any objection on their part would be 
complied with.64 Dissolution can be a latent weapon to control a legislature 
that would otherwise exercise effective oversight of the executive.65 That was 
the case in Niger in 2009 when President Mamadou Tanja dissolved parlia-
ment following a failed attempt to amend constitutional provisions which 
prevented him from running for a third term.66 In light of the fact that that 
dissolution powers can have drastic effects when used, it is important that some 
form of checks and balances are put in place to regulate their use.67 In 
Namibian, for instance, the provision vesting the president with dissolution 
power is more specific than the Cameroonian provision and limits the discre-
tion of the President. He may dissolve parliament ‘on the advice of Cabinet if 
the Government is unable to govern effectively’.68 Moreover, it creates a form 
of constraint which may diminish incentives to resort to its use. If parliament 
were to be dissolved, the President will equally be subjected to re-election at the 
same time that a new parliament is elected.69 This may prove detrimental 
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where he has lost popularity and the threat of losing elections may inhibit any 
aspiration to dissolve parliament for unconstitutional reasons. 
The second aspect which makes the Cameroonian position problematic is the 
vagueness of the Constitution as to the circumstances that should trigger dis-
solution. Responsibility to determine the circumstances has been left entirely 
with the President. This provides scope for arbitrary use by the President as 
any circumstance which he deems ‘necessary’ can provide the basis for the use 
of dissolution powers. Moreover, it provides scope for the President to deflect 
criticisms onto the legislature for unpopular laws. Although such laws would 
most probably have been initiated by the executive and in particular the 
President, the intricacies of parliamentary processes are not common knowledge 
to the public. If the public were to demonstrate opposition to unpopular laws, 
the President could seize the opportunity to deflect criticism onto parliament and 
use that as a pretext to dissolve it. 
The third problem associated with that provision is that a decision to dissolve 
parliament is unlikely to be subject to judicial review.70 Such a decision falls 
within the spectrum of activities known as ‘acts of the government’. ‘Acts of the 
government’ originates from the French doctrine of actes de gouvernement according 
to which a category of acts undertaken by the executive cannot be reviewed by 
any court.71 This leaves parliament in a considerably weakened position where it 
can be dissolved at the whim of the President without any form of oversight. 
Arguably, due to the current disciplined parliamentary majority, it may not be in 
the interest of the President to use that power. However, its availability can have 
a pre-emptive effect on parliamentary initiative.72 
IV. Power to extend or abridge the parliamentary term 
Besides power to dissolve the National Assembly, the President can similarly 
alter the parliamentary term by abridgement or extension. The Constitution 
provides that: 
In case of serious crisis, the President of the Republic may, after consultation 
with the President of the Constitutional Council and Bureau of the National 
Assembly, decide by a law, to extend or abridge its term of office.73  
Where parliament is extended or abridged as per article 15(4), the election of 
a new assembly shall take place between forty and sixty days following the expiry 
of the extended or abridged period. 
Unlike the dissolution power discussed previously, the present constitutional 
provision makes an abridgment or extension contingent upon the occurrence of 
a serious crisis. Although ‘serious crisis’ may be sufficiently vague to afford a 
perilously broad interpretation, it certainly differs from the dissolution power 
which depends on ‘a matter of necessity’ to be determined by the President. 
Moreover, an abridgment or extension is to be decided by a law passed by 
parliament. Thus, if properly implemented, there is some prospect in assuming 
Executive power and semi-presidentialism 43 
that a parliamentary term would be extended or abridged in order to address 
a serious crisis which could undermine effective governance or be otherwise 
perilous to the entire nation. Abridging the parliamentary term may be necessary 
in this inherited French constitutional model where there is always a possibility 
of an uneasy coalition arising from the different presidential and parliamentary 
terms.74 Although abridging parliament may be incompatible with some basic 
tenets of representative democracy, it may well be necessary as has been the 
case in France, for the President to use that power to regain his parliamentary 
majority.75 
Nevertheless, the provision on abridgment and extension must be interpreted 
with caution as the absence of a clear definition of ‘serious crisis’76 may provide 
scope for ambiguities which could be used by the President to unjustifiably 
extend or abridge the parliamentary term to his advantage. Although an act of 
parliament is required to validate the process, as discussed earlier, this is not 
particularly reassuring due to the characteristic loyalty of the current majority 
in parliament. It is unlikely that parliament will take a firm stance against any 
potential executive pretence of the existence of a serious crisis. 
In fact, in practice, the power has been used not under the circumstances 
contemplated, but rather to conceal poor governance and to foster the execu-
tive’s cavalier attitude towards the general governance of the country, the 
electorate and the Constitution. For instance, the parliamentary term was ex-
tended three times between August 2012 and July 2013.77 The executive’s 
rationale for this move was to allow the government to prepare a new electoral 
roll and to introduce a biometric electoral card system.78 Although that in itself is 
commendable in terms of enhancing the transparency of the electoral process, 
the government was well aware of the fact that the parliamentary term was to 
elapse on 21 August 2012 and should have taken the necessary steps to prepare 
for elections. As has become characteristic of the governance system, the gov-
ernment waited till the last minute to begin serious preparations to reorganise the 
electoral system despite persistent calls from the opposition and the international 
community.79 Parliament was initially extended for six months. During delib-
erations for the initial extension, some members of the parliamentary opposition 
noted that the six-month period was insufficient to fully reorganise the electoral 
system and to prepare for elections.80 While the government was adamant, the 
opposition was vindicated as the government later tabled two further bills with 
the effect that the parliamentary term was extended twice following the initial six 
months. Such inconsistency from the executive created uncertainty and partially 
undermined the effective deployment of parliamentary functions. 
Besides the apparent incompetence of the government to organise in time 
for elections, there were also doubts as to the constitutionality of the two 
further extensions in light of the constitutional requirement that elections 
should be conducted between forty and sixty days following an extension. 
More recently, the parliamentary term which was meant to end in 2018 
was extended twice. Initially, according to the bill adopted by the National 
Assembly, the mandate was extended for a year until 29 October 2019.81 
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In July 2019, the National Assembly adopted another bill extending the term 
further to end on 29 December 2019. The next elections were scheduled to 
take place on 9 February 2020.82 The government justified the extensions 
by referring to the logistical difficulty of managing presidential, legislative, 
and municipal elections concurrently which were all scheduled to take place in 
2018.83 In view of the constitutional term of the respective institutions, the 
election dates should not have come as a surprise and the government should 
have taken measures well in advance to ensure constitutional term limits were 
adhered to. In addition, it is not clear why parliamentary elections were not 
held in 2019 as per the first extension. Thus, while the power to extend or 
abridge the parliamentary term can be useful to resolve serious crises, it may 
also be abused for self-serving purposes or as in the circumstances described 
previously, to conceal the government’s ineptitude. 
V. Emergency powers 
The Constitution confers powers on the President to declare by decree, a state 
of emergency where circumstances so warrant and to declare a state of siege 
in the event of a serious threat to the nation’s territorial integrity or to its 
existence, its independence or institutions.84 With regard to the state of siege, 
the Constitution appears to reflect the severity contemplated by international 
law as it permits a declaration when the nation’s territorial integrity, existence 
and independence are under serious threat. The emergency regime is elabo-
rated in a regulatory instrument which deals with its scope. It defines a state of 
emergency as: 
[A]n occurrence which, by its nature and gravity, is considered a national 
disaster, or a series of disturbances undermining public order or the security 
of the state, or a foreign invasion.85  
On the face of it, the provision appears to contemplate circumstances which 
may transcend ordinary disasters or public disturbances, to the extent that they 
affect the security of the state. However, besides ‘foreign invasion’, a missing 
element which is a fundamental consideration is that of a ‘threat to the life of 
a nation’ which is overshadowed by the lesser conditions provided. Perhaps 
the more significant issue though, is that in both cases (state of emergency and 
siege), the determination of the circumstances under contemplation is in the 
subjective opinion of the President who is under no obligation to consult any 
other institution. He is simply required to inform the nation of his decision.86 
This is, indeed, a threat to constitutionalism as the President is empowered to 
act without regard to the other institutions that would otherwise provide ob-
jective appreciation of the perceived circumstances. In the absence of parlia-
mentary oversight and more stringent conditions to determine emergency 
situations, it is probable that emergency powers could be invoked for purely 
political reasons to suit the personal whim of the President.87 The situation is 
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even more precarious in the light of the fact that he is vested with powers to 
‘take any measures as he may deem necessary’.88 Again, it is subjective and the 
President has no obligation to consult any institution with regard to measures 
undertaken or measures contemplated to ensure they are strictly necessary in 
the circumstance.89 
The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the emergency law vests 
administrative and security officers with wide powers which are susceptible to 
abuse. Section 5(6) permits the detention of persons without charge for seven 
days by the Prefect, fifteen days by the Governor and two months (renewable 
once) by the Minister of Territorial Administration. These are lengthy periods 
for which the law provides little safeguards by way of justifying their necessity. A 
victim may be subjected to detention for up to, or longer than four months, even 
beyond the subsistence of the emergency. The law imposes a time limit of three 
months for a state of emergency to last although it can be renewed once for an 
additional period of three months.90 
In the absence of legislative oversight, the only alternative is judicial re-
view. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the mechanisms for judicial 
review are ineffective. Worthy of note here is that ordinary citizens whose 
rights are likely to be affected by the emergency regulation do not have access 
to constitutional review to challenge the constitutionality of laws.91 Moreover, 
under the doctrine of actes de gouvernement, it is unlikely that a presidential 
decree promulgating a state of emergency would be subject to review. With 
regard to review of administrative acts, previously, there were physical, 
economic and procedural difficulties associated with access to the Supreme 
Court which, until March 2012, had exclusive jurisdiction in that respect. But 
more fundamentally, the judiciary lacks independence and therefore unlikely 
to provide sufficient restraint on authorities exercising power under an 
emergency regime.92 
Although since the 1996 constitutional amendments, emergency powers 
have not been used. As opposed to the Ahidjo regime which thrived under a 
perpetual state of emergency, the Biya regime has declared a state of emer-
gency twice only (in 1984 to deal with the coup d’etat and in 1992 following the 
declaration of results of the presidential elections of that year).93 The infamous 
case of Wakai v The People94 which originated from the 1992 declaration of 
presidential election results demonstrated the practical weaknesses in the 
system, particularly in the light of the massive violations of human rights by 
administrative authorities and the difficulties faced by the courts in effectively 
securing justice for the victims.95 
Although emergency powers have not been used under the 1996 Constitution, 
the regime is structured in such a way that it appears to be the proverbial ‘loaded 
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible 
claim of an urgent need’.96 It falls far short of international standards especially 
as formulated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights97 
(which Cameroon has ratified) and requires reform to ensure at least that there 
are stringent oversight mechanisms in place. 
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VI. National defence and the military 
The national defence of the country is the responsibility of the President.98 In 
that respect, he is the head of the armed forces99 and vested with powers to 
appoint to military posts.100 The institution that oversees national defence is 
the Ministry of Defence which ironically is not an independent institution. It 
is institutionally attached to the Presidency of the Republic and headed by a 
Minister Delegate in Charge of Defence.101 The duties of the Minister include 
studying and implementation of the defence policy, coordination and control 
of the forces of law and order and the organisation and operation of the 
military tribunal.102 The minister is responsible to the President and receives 
instructions from him. 
The institutional dependence of the Ministry of Defence on the President is 
another mechanism by which presidential power is consolidated in Cameroon. 
The current arrangements are an attempt to keep a close eye on the military to 
pre-empt attempts at subversion, which has been rife in Africa where un-
constitutional change of government was achieved through military coups. In 
Cameroon more particularly, after the abortive coup in 1984, the Ministry was 
brought under the aegis of the Presidency of the Republic and the President 
keeps very tight control of it.103 
The military and security officers are a key fabric in the governance network 
as they have played an indispensable role in reinforcing an authoritarian re-
gime.104 In the last few decades, the Biya regime has increasingly come under 
criticism, providing a pretext for resort to repressive force in order to maintain 
power.105 Following the failed coup attempt in 1984, the President has con-
sistently appointed senior members of the military from his ethnic group to 
secure loyalty to the regime.106 The military and security forces are said to be 
treated more favourably than the rest of the civil service. In the 1990s, for 
instance, when the salaries of public servants were gradually reduced by ap-
proximately 50% as part of measures taken under the Structural Adjustment 
Programme,107 the police and armed forces remained unaffected and con-
tinued to be endowed with various fringe benefits as reward for their loyalty.108 
According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung, the military is constantly monitored by the 
presidency to detect signs of discontent.109 Security forces have been repeatedly 
deployed to crack down on opposition and other civilian groups as a means of 
preventing any perceived threat to the regime. During the fateful 2008 riots, 
security forces did not hesitate to violently crack down on protesters opposing 
the increasing cost of living and proposed amendments to the Constitution to 
eliminate presidential term limits. More recently, the Rapid Intervention Unit 
(well known by its French acronym, BIR) which has gained notoriety due to its 
use of brute force have been constantly deployed to the North-West and South- 
West regions to ‘maintain public order’ in the crisis stricken areas. Despite 
reports of egregious human rights abuses and other atrocities committed by the 
BIR, the government has not condemned them. Instead, they continue to 
be deployed to these areas. In view of the challenge to the regime posed by the 
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events in the North-West and South-West, the deployment of repressive forces 
to ‘maintain public order’ seemed inevitable. 
VII. Foreign affairs 
As with most aspects of the Cameroonian governance system, the President is 
overall responsible for Cameroon’s external relations.110 Thus, as head of state, 
he represents Cameroon abroad, accredits ambassadors and envoys extra-
ordinary to foreign powers, while ambassadors and envoys extraordinary of 
foreign powers are accredited to him.111 His influence in foreign affairs is 
further gleaned from his responsibility to conclude international treaties and 
agreements, although he may require authorisation from parliament where the 
subject of the agreement or treaty falls within the legislative competence of 
parliament.112 
C. Accountability 
An essential feature of a good governance system is accountability. In Cameroon, 
this point becomes particularly relevant in view of the vast array of presidential 
powers discussed earlier. Taking into account the wide scope of the powers, 
a robust system of checks and balances is necessary to enhance their effective 
exercise and, in particular, to pre-empt potential abuse. In the light of the 
government’s assertion that the Constitution ushers in an era of checks and 
balances, how far does the Constitution reflect the need to limit presidential 
powers? The following subsections attempt to respond to that question by 
examining the constitutional provisions on immunity and impeachment. 
I. Immunity from prosecution 
Immunity from prosecution is an important principle of public law and may be 
supported by the supposition that it can promote the consistent functioning of 
public power and continuity of the state.113 It is supposedly for the benefit of the 
public that immunity is granted to public officials such as presidents to enable 
the discharge of their duties without unnecessary distractions or impediments 
emanating from law suits.114 While that may be the case, there is also the ne-
cessity to consider presidential accountability. Presidential immunity provisions 
are a common feature of various regime types, be they presidential or semi- 
presidential115 and even in parliamentary systems some senior executive officials 
and parliamentarians enjoy a certain level of immunity. Yet, it should not be the 
case that immunity provisions are drafted to ensure absolute immunity from 
prosecution. That does not augur well for accountability and indeed goes against 
a basic tenet of the rule of law – that no one is above the law.116 
In Cameroon, prior to 2008, there was no constitutional provision ostensibly 
dealing with presidential immunity.117 Therefore, in theory it may have been 
possible for prosecution to be initiated in domestic courts. That position was 
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altered in 2008 following a constitutional amendment.118 Article 53(3) of the 
Constitution provides that: 
Acts committed by the President of the Republic in pursuance of Articles 5, 
8, 9 and 10 above shall be covered by immunity and he shall not be 
accountable for them after the exercise of his functions.119  
There are at least two major aspects of this provision which can be deemed 
inconsistent with the need for accountability. 
First, there is uncertainty as to the scope of the President’s immunity. The 
provision simply states that the relevant acts are covered by immunity. It is not 
clear that these acts are limited to criminal or civil or both. Given that the 
amendment followed a string of amendments that had the effect of further 
consolidating the presidency of the incumbent,120 the inference can be drawn 
that article 53(3) intended to cover both civil and criminal acts in which the 
President may be implicated in pursuance of his constitutional duties. 
Second, presidential immunity covers the period after the expiration of his 
term of office. This is a case of absolute immunity which has the potential to turn 
an already authoritarian regime into outright dictatorship. In the absence of any 
form of accountability during and after the expiration of his term, the President is 
left with free reign to use his powers excessively. 
The Cameroonian position seems to reflect that of France where traditionally 
the head of state is reputed to be inviolable.121 Yet in France, the President can 
be prosecuted after the expiration of his tenure.122 That position has been 
reaffirmed by the French Conseil Constitutionnel123 and the Cour de Cassassion,124 
respectively, which ruled that a serving president could not (except for high 
treason) be charged, prosecuted or forced to testify in court proceedings for the 
duration of his term. But that it did not preclude any criminal proceedings 
against him once his term expired.125 
In the African context, as is the case in Cameroon, presidential immunity 
appears to be gaining prominence as an inducement for long-term presidents to 
relinquish power.126 Some members of the parliamentary opposition in Cameroon 
seemed to have been influenced by that argument and did not object to the 
government’s proposal to introduce an immunity clause in the Constitution on 
that basis.127 They, however, acknowledged that immunity functions well in a 
situation of checks and balances and therefore did not constitute a recipe for 
constitutional dictatorship.128 That is, however, not the situation in Cameroon. 
II. Impeachment 
Impeachment can provide a useful means of enforcing accountability, if well 
conceived. Its very existence and the probability of its use can act as a source of 
pressure to induce a president to respect the rule of law.129 In Cameroon, the 
current provision on impeachment is an amended version of article 53 (amended 
in 2008) which vested the Court of Impeachment with jurisdiction to try the 
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President for high treason. It provided further that the organisation, composition, 
conditions of reference and the applicable procedure before that Court shall be 
laid down by a subsequent legislation. That legislation is still being awaited. 
The new article 53 provides that: 
The Court of Impeachment shall have jurisdiction, in respect of acts 
committed in the exercise of their functions to try: 
-The President of the Republic for high treason; …130 
The President of the Republic shall be indicted only by the National 
Assembly and the Senate deciding through an identical vote by open ballot 
and by a four fifth majority of their members.131  
The Constitution is silent on the meaning of high treason and there is no 
jurisprudence from which an interpretation can be deduced. Although it may 
be unrealistic to require an exhaustive list of circumstances constituting high 
treason, it is important that as a mechanism for accountability, particularly 
of a President who exercises such broad powers, there should be some 
carefully defined guidelines.132 Lack of clarity can provide scope for subjective 
interpretations to enhance the personal objectives of the interpreters.133 
Further, the procedure contemplated by subsection (2) requires the National 
Assembly and Senate to indict the President through an identical vote of a 
four-fifth majority of each House. That is a difficult majority to achieve in any 
democracy and particularly in Cameroon where currently the ruling party com-
mands an overwhelming and disciplined majority. The parliamentary opposition 
unsuccessfully objected to that amendment when the bill was presented in par-
liament arguing that it averted any possibility of impeaching the President.134 
Moreover, the votes are required to be in open ballot implying that there is no 
confidentiality. For such an extreme mechanism which can precipitate regime 
change, dispensing with confidentiality potentially compromises the process as 
MPs particularly from the ruling party are likely to be reluctant to expose 
themselves as the ‘renegades’ of their party. Considering the patronage networks 
that exist within these institutions, concurring to a motion to impeach the 
President can expose an MP to possible loss of favours from the system and even 
more drastic consequences. The requirement of ‘transparency’ in the voting 
system is perhaps deliberate and intended to compromise the impeachment 
process by deterring any prospective vote in favour of the President’s impeach-
ment. Opposition MPs specifically requested an amendment to the government 
bill with respect to the open ballot, to be replaced with secret ballots. They 
argued that it had the potential to influence the independence of MPs.135 
The inadequacy of the impeachment system is compounded by the fact that 
the Court of Impeachment is yet to be established since it first appeared in the 
1972 Constitution and was re-enacted in the 1996 Constitution. Article 53(4) 
states that the organisation, composition and the conditions under which matters 
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shall be referred to, as well as the procedure applicable before the Court shall 
be laid down by law. When this law will be enacted is a matter of speculation. 
Part III. The PM and the government 
After various phases of abolition, the position of PM was reinstated in 1991 
following a constitutional amendment.136 As noted earlier, the PM is the head 
of government and is appointed by the President. 
A. Powers of the PM 
Although the office of the PM was consolidated under the 1996 Constitution and 
seen as an additional separation of powers, it should be noted that it is a largely 
ceremonial position. As head of government, he is responsible for directing 
government action137 and despite being vested with some executive responsi-
bilities, his powers are largely dependent on the President. 
I. Formation of government 
As the PM is the head of government, it would be expected that he has the 
authority to form his government. However, presidential influence is also clearly 
entrenched here. Thus, the President appoints the other members of govern-
ment, on the proposal of the PM.138 In practice however, ministerial appoint-
ments are sometimes made concurrently with the appointment of a PM.139 In 
which case, it is possible to infer that he is not always consulted in the selection 
of his cabinet. Although he may appoint to civil posts, his powers are subject 
to presidential prerogatives with respect to appointments.140 He is nevertheless 
responsible for directing all the government services required for the accom-
plishment of his duties,141 although here again this is dependent on delegation 
of powers by the President.142 
II. Policy implementation 
As head of government, the PM is responsible for implementing government 
policy as defined by the President of the Republic.143 This is a rather strange 
formulation as the PM who is head of government, has no say in defining 
national policy.144 This is another aspect which demonstrates the predominance 
of the President, in a supposedly semi-presidential system. Additionally, the 
Council of Ministers which discusses the implementation of government policy is 
convened and presided by the President.145 It has been argued that the for-
mulation which regards the PM as head of government belies the vacuity of that 
institution because the President has been constitutionally established as the 
actual head of government and the nerve-centre of national politics.146 The PM 
‘implements’ policies defined by the President rather than defining the policy 
as the head of government in conjunction with the cabinet. 
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III. Regulatory powers 
The PM can exercise statutory authority147 in the form of decrees and orders.148 
In terms of hierarchy of domestic norms, statutory instruments issued by the 
PM assume a subordinate position to acts of parliament and are subject to the 
principle of legality. The regulatory authority of the PM is primarily used to 
ensure the application of acts of parliament or presidential decrees, in the context 
of the PM’s responsibility for law enforcement.149 The PM can also issue 
circulars which are binding on the individuals or state officials concerned. For 
instance in 2018, following reports received from the presidency regarding 
the financial accountability of state officials undertaking official state business 
abroad, the PM issued a circular compelling compliance with specific conditions 
and procedures.150 
B. Structure and role of government 
The structure of the government is represented as follows151:  
– The PM, head of government  
– Vice Prime Ministers, where applicable  
– Ministers of state, where applicable  
– Ministers  
– Ministers in Charge of Missions  
– Ministers without portfolio, where applicable  
– Ministers delegate  
– Secretaries of state 
There is a hierarchical relationship between the members of government, with 
the PM at the apex and the secretaries of state at the lower end.152 Despite 
that relationship, curiously, the Ministers in Charge of Missions and Ministers 
without portfolio are directly responsible to the President, while Ministers 
Delegate are responsible to the President, the PM or Ministers when required 
to discharge specific and permanent duties.153 The number of ministries in 
Cameroon is in a state of flux as the President continuously restructures the 
government by dividing the functions of individual ministries into several dif-
ferent ministries. An example is the former Ministry of Education which has 
undergone various permutations and currently, there are four separate ministries 
dealing with education.154 More recently, the former Ministry of Territorial 
Administration and Decentralisation has morphed into two separate minis-
tries.155 These reorganisations are undertaken by the President, often without 
credible explanation as to the purpose. It is widely believed that the strategy is 
necessary to maintain the patronage network of the regime as it subsists partly 
on the basis of rewarding its supporters.156 Irrespective of the questionable 
arrangements, the government has a role to play in directing the nation, for 
instance, through policy implementation. 
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C. Accountability 
The government is accountable to the President and parliament.157 The 
President can terminate the functions of the PM and Ministers.158 
Parliament controls government action through oral and written questions.159 
In theory, government can also be held accountable through a motion of censure 
or a vote of no confidence,160 after which the PM would be expected to tender 
the resignation of the government to the President.161 In terms of achieving 
a balance and separation of powers, those arrangements are problematic for at 
least two reasons. 
First, although the PM is head of government, policy is dictated by the 
President but it will be the PM and the Cabinet that would be censured if 
parliament were to call into question the confidence of the government. The dual 
accountability of the PM makes that institution practically of little significance 
in terms of separation of powers. Considering that the PM and Cabinet are 
subservient to the President, it is in their interest to ensure that government 
policy (as defined by the President) is fully implemented. That position allows the 
President to deflect criticism and censure onto the PM and the Cabinet. Such a 
situation has been evident during the Anglophone crisis which has resulted in 
many deaths and displacement of populations in the North-West and South- 
West regions.162 The crisis began in October 2016 and one year later had 
transformed into an armed conflict between the military and armed groups 
fighting for secession of those regions. It was the President’s decision to address 
the crisis by using a military solution which has proved to be unsuccessful.163 
Despite several calls for dialogue, there was no response from the regime until 
September 2019 when the President announced that a major national dialogue 
would be organised between 30 September and 4 October 2019. The dialogue 
was fraught with a number of conceptual, organisational and political in-
adequacies. Although it was the President’s policy objective, it was implemented 
by the PM and his Cabinet. Due to the inadequacies mentioned previously, 
the PM and the relevant cabinet ministers received wide criticisms. 
The formulation that allows the President to determine government policy 
also allows the latter to act unilaterally even in circumstances where con-
sultation would be the most appropriate approach. For instance, in October 
2019 on the occasion of the Sixth Replenishment Conference of the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria hosted in France,164 President 
Biya pledged an amount of 3 billion CFA to support the Fund.165 While 
Cameroon’s contribution is commendable as its populations suffer from 
these diseases, it is curious to note that the pledge was made unilaterally by the 
President. In a well-functioning democracy, a decision of that magnitude 
should ideally be discussed among the relevant government institutions in 
the context of the most appropriate government policy and a proposal put 
before parliament to ensure accountability and also that a decision is arrived at 
democratically and in consideration of the existing budgetary allocations. 
According to Joseph Kankeu, the subordination of the PM and the government 
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has been entrenched by the Constitution which has merely developed the 
prime ministry as an institution with an instrumental role rather than one that 
develops and implements government policies.166 Kankeu and Solomon Bilong 
assert that the PM’s role is that of concretising and implementing unpopular 
policy preferences of the President.167 In which case, it might be more accurate 
to speak of the executive as composed of the President who is both head of 
state and head of government. 
Second, the provision on motions of censure and vote of no confidence as 
measures to achieve government’s accountability is not effective in practice. The 
PM can be subsequently reappointed by the President even after a motion of 
censure leads to his resignation.168 This implies that parliamentary oversight is 
rather ineffective if it can be overridden by the reappointment of the PM. More 
particularly, under the current government, it is unlikely that a motion of censure 
has a chance to succeed as the ruling CPDM controls a highly disciplined 
majority in parliament that is unlikely to censure the government. According to 
Paul Ayah,169 in practice, the constraints have made it impossible for parliament 
to hold the government to account.170 He argues that CPDM parliamentarians 
are reluctant to vote against their party as that may constitute grounds for 
disciplinary action.171 
Another factor which may explain the reluctance of CPDM members to vote 
against party initiatives (even if they disagree with such initiatives) is the pa-
tronage advantage that comes with belonging to the ruling party.172 The CPDM 
party affords the best opportunity for patronage and according to the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung candidate selection is based on 100% loyalty to presidential policy.173 
Besides the ineffective accountability through parliament, members of gov-
ernment can be criminally liable for acts committed in the exercise of their 
functions, for conspiracy against the security of the state.174 In which case, they 
would be tried by the Court of Impeachment described earlier.175 
D. Accountability through good governance and  
anti-corruption strategies 
One of the most endemic problems that continue to undermine governance 
in Cameroon is corruption. Cameroon has frequently been at the top of the 
International Corruption index and corruption is said to pervade key institutions 
like the police and the judiciary.176 Due partly to pressure from international 
donors, the government has adopted some measures to enhance good govern-
ance and to gradually eliminate corruption. How far these initiatives have been 
successful remains uncertain. Nevertheless, it would appear that under the in-
itiative of President Biya, corruption which for many years appeared to be a 
norm in society, is beginning to invoke the ire of the law and the society in 
general. In this section, the discussion will focus on the National Anti-Corruption 
Commission (CONAC) and the law on the declaration of assets. Although 
judicial institutions are involved in the accountability mechanism, they are 
discussed separately in Chapter 4. 
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I. Declaration of assets 
The starting point for transparency and good governance in the management of 
public finance in Cameroon is article 66 of the Constitution which makes it 
mandatory for senior executive officials such as the President, the PM, Ministers 
and other members of government to declare their assets and properties at the 
beginning and at the end of their tenure of office. The constitutional provision 
has been supplemented by a law on the declaration of assets which replicates 
the list of officials under a duty to declare their assets.177 
The law establishes a Commission responsible for receiving, exploring and 
preserving declarations.178 One of its strengths in enhancing accountability is its 
powers to raise questions and even report to the appropriate prosecuting and 
investigating authorities, questionable ownership of property where its origin 
cannot be accounted for179 or where an official’s means are not commensurate 
with the properties or assets declared.180 Where the origin cannot be clearly 
established especially with regard to earnings, the state may confiscate all or part 
of the property in question.181 Worthy of note is the fact that, officials are obliged 
to declare properties or assets for which the registered owners are spouses or 
minor children, regardless of the location of the property (whether within 
Cameroon or abroad).182 This is commendable in that, it limits the potential for 
state officials to syphon state funds into private accounts of family members. 
The sanctions for failure to comply with the requirement of declaration include 
dismissal and suspension from office.183 
The Law on the Declaration of Assets provides a foundation for building 
transparency and accountability in governance and the financial affairs of 
executive officials. This has become increasingly necessary in view of the wide-
spread misuse of public funds by state officials vested with the responsibility to 
manage these funds on behalf of tax payers. Despite the aforementioned analysis, 
the potentials of the law are undermined by the lack of implementation.184 This 
is due largely to the fact that, like most aspects of governance in Cameroon as 
seen previously, it is dependent on the President of the Republic. For instance, 
the President is responsible for appointing directly or indirectly, five of the 
Commission’s nine members185 and the progress reports are to be forwarded 
to the President.186 The law is not clear on what action should be taken by 
the President once the report has been received. This is rather ironical as the 
President is one of the officials mandated to declare his assets. It makes the 
issue of independence of the institution questionable. In addition, the law pro-
vides that the President ‘shall, as and when necessary, define the conditions of 
implementation of this law’ by decree.187 This therefore makes implementation 
subject to the will of the President. 
II. The CONAC 
The CONAC was established by presidential decree in March 2006 and went 
into operation a year later.188 The role of that institution is to contribute to the 
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fight against corruption through, inter alia, the monitoring and evaluation of the 
effective implementation of the government’s anti-corruption programme.189 In 
that respect, it is vested with powers to investigate complaints and denunciation 
of acts of corruption, to oversee the execution of public projects, to evaluate the 
conditions for the award of public contracts, to identify the causes of corruption 
and to propose to the competent authorities, solutions to eliminate corruption 
in all public and para-public institutions.190 With respect to its investigative 
powers, CONAC can request the production of documents from any state or 
para-public institution. The institutions are obliged to cooperate, failure of which 
may attract sanctions and a specific report to the President of the Republic.191 
Despite that provision, CONAC still faces instances of lack of cooperation from 
state institutions, an aspect which undermines its efficiency.192 
The investigations of CONAC may lead to criminal proceedings during which 
CONAC may be represented in court.193 This is perhaps the greatest means by 
which CONAC can contribute to the accountability of state officials. However, 
prosecution is not automatic as a finding of facts relating to allegations of cor-
ruption must be reported to the President of the Republic.194 It may also appeal 
to the Minister of Justice who in turn informs the relevant employer of the 
suspect in any investigation.195 The implication is that CONAC has no powers 
to independently initiate judicial action. It must rely on the President or the 
Minister of Justice. This is quite limiting as CONAC has no means of guaran-
teeing completion of its work by ensuring that where necessary, investigations 
result in prosecution. It has been argued that CONAC can be a more effective 
institution if vested with powers to independently initiate judicial proceedings.196 
According to the decree establishing CONAC, it is an independent body,197 
yet it is highly dependent on the President of the Republic. For instance, key 
officials of CONAC such as its president, vice president and members of the 
coordination committee are appointed by the President of the Republic.198 
Moreover, its annual programme must be approved by the President,199 the 
institution reports to him200 and submits its annual reports to him (although 
these are made public).201 
The subservience of CONAC has been identified as a major weakness of 
the institution and is considered as a means by which the presidency attains 
complete control of the institution.202 For instance, despite its successes in 
facilitating the prosecution of high-level bureaucrats and former ministers ac-
cused of embezzlement through the Operation Sparrow Hawk anti-corruption 
programme, this is often perceived as a political tool to stifle opponents of the 
regime or ambitious bureaucrats.203 Therefore, as an accountability mechanism, 
CONAC’s influence or effectiveness is considerably limited. 
Conclusion 
The consolidation of semi-presidentialism in the 1996 Constitution appears not 
to have made a practical difference to an equitable separation of executive power 
between the PM and the President. Rather, as the chapter has demonstrated, any 
56 Executive power and semi-presidentialism 
evolution of executive power has served to strengthen presidential power even 
more and to weaken accountability mechanisms. Thus, the President continues 
to wield considerable powers and dominate executive authority, while account-
ability mechanisms are bedevilled with significant inadequacies. In fact, every 
relevant accountability institution or mechanism is dependent on the President. 
It would appear that a system of personal rule or what has been recently de-
scribed as ‘Biyaïsme’ has developed to the extent that all aspects of political, 
social and economic life are under ‘presidential siege’.204 According to Jean 
Claude Kamdem, the head of state is not simply the head of the executive, he is 
‘the power’.205 
It follows that the transition to democracy and constitutional governance in 
the 1990s played very little in practice to alter presidential absolutism. This was 
inevitable in light of the fact that, as was seen in Chapter 1, the authoritarian 
1972 Constitution had merely undergone cosmetic changes. More powers have 
been accorded to the President. Every aspect of governance depends on that 
institution and in view of the current fact of the President’s frequent physical 
absences from the country, decision-making has inevitably stalled. Cameroon’s 
variant of semi-presidentialism has therefore failed to accrue the benefits of that 
system and accounts for some of the governance challenges faced by the country. 
Until those institutional and normative weaknesses identified previously are 
addressed, it is likely that the challenges will continue to overburden the country.   
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3 The electoral system and  
the legislature   
Introduction 
The 1996 Constitution introduced a bicameral parliament, consisting of the 
National Assembly and the Senate.1 Despite that constitutional development, 
legislative power continued to be exercised solely by the National Assembly until 
2013 when the first senators were appointed and elected. The period of the 1990s 
was also significant with respect to the momentous shift in the political landscape to 
embrace multiparty politics. Thus, the single-party parliament represented by the 
Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) was soon open to other 
political parties such as the Social Democratic Front, which for a considerable 
period remained the most influential opposition party. Neither multipartism nor 
bicameralism have led to any meaningful democratic advancement. One of the 
greatest challenges that have repressed democratic development inheres in the 
continued existence of political structures, such as the electoral system, that were 
established in the framework of a one-party system. Intuitively, while the number 
of political parties has grown exponentially, the dynamics of representation within 
parliament has varied only marginally. A related obstacle is the predominance 
of the executive within the electoral system and parliament itself. With this 
entrenched structural inhibits, legislative power cannot be meaningfully exercised. 
To compound the structural problems, there are social issues such as the 
political culture which is suffused with clientelism. The combined effect is a 
parliament which finds itself incapable of influencing executive policy, per-
forming oversight of the executive or representing the popular will, despite its 
apparently wide ranging constitutional powers. 
This chapter will attempt to develop the issues raised previously and provide a 
better appreciation of legislative power by examining the electoral system, the 
structure of the legislature, its powers and functions and the accountability of 
Members of Parliament (MP) and Senators. 
Part I. The electoral system 
The issue of devising a credible and efficient electoral system is one that pre-
occupies most jurisdictions in the world, not least Cameroon where historically 
the electoral system has consisted of a myriad of institutions with conflicting 
duties and a myriad of legislative texts often obscure and largely unknown to the 
electorate. An attempt to deal with some of these issues was made in 2000 when 
the National Elections Observatory (NEO) was created.2 It soon proved to be 
ineffective in addressing the historical problems undermining the credibility of 
the electoral system due significantly to its lack of institutional independence.3 
It was subsequently replaced by Elections Cameroon (ELECAM) in 2008. In 
addition to the creation of ELECAM, an electoral code was adopted in 2012 
which largely consolidated the disparate legislative texts regulating elections.4 
That approach implied that a completely new regime was not adopted to meet 
with the changing dynamics of the society or to reflect that commitment to 
democratic advancement. Instead, the old dispensation was perpetuated in the 
form of a new code. This section provides an overview of the electoral system 
and its institutions as regulated by the Electoral Code. That discussion is deemed 
relevant as it provides the contextual background to understand the election 
process, parliamentary dynamics and the political culture of legislators. 
A. Structure of the National Electoral Commission 
(ELECAM) 
Structurally, ELECAM is composed of the Electoral Board (EB) and the General 
Directorate of Elections (GDE).5 The EB is the governing body of ELECAM and 
is composed of eighteen members6 appointed by the President of the Republic.7 
The EB is headed by a chairperson and a vice chairperson who both assume 
the role of chair and vice chair of ELECAM.8 ELECAM is represented locally by 
branches at the regional, divisional and council levels.9 
The issue of the membership of ELECAM has often sparked controversy due 
in part to their method of appointment and the apparent lack of independence. 
Although the law indicates that there should be consultation with the National 
Assembly and civil society organisations, there is little evidence that such a 
process is actually carried out by the President prior to appointment or that any 
such consultation would result in robust scrutiny of the nominees. As a measure 
of safeguarding their independence, the law provides that their duties are in-
compatible with inter alia, duties as member of government or the central 
administrative services and membership of a political party.10 Yet it has be-
come customary that senior members of ELECAM tend to be either key figures 
in the government or central administrative services (appointed by the 
President) or members of the ruling CPDM party whose chairman is the 
President of the Republic. These features lend credence to accusations of 
lack of independence and presidential control or usurpation of the democratic 
process. This reputation was earned at its inception when its first twelve 
members were appointed in 2008,11 ten of whom were members of the ruling 
CPDM party.12 Although an attempt has been made to vary its membership, 
key figures of the central administration and the ruling CPDM party continue 
to make up its membership.13 
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I. Role and powers of ELECAM 
ELECAM is prima facie responsible for the organisation, management and su-
pervision of all election and referendum operations.14 This is done principally 
through the EB and the DGE. These duties are summarised below. 
A. THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL (AS PER SECTION 26(1)) 
Pre-election  
– Organising or supervising the training of electoral personnel  
– Drawing up, updating and publishing of the electoral register  
– Issuing and distributing voter cards  
– Distributing ballot samples to candidates and political parties  
– Preparing and executing draft budgets of elections  
– Receiving and forwarding to the EB candidacy papers for all elections 
Election period  
– Coordinating the work of approved observers  
– Coordinating all bodies responsible for election operations 
Post-election  
– Documentation of materials emanating from the elections  
– Coordinating the forwarding of election reports from polling stations to the EB 
B. EB (AS PER SECTIONS 10 AND 11) 
Pre-election  
– Scrutinise candidacy papers and publish the final list of candidates for elections  
– Publication and notification of the list of members of local polling 
commissions to the relevant persons or institutions  
– Control the preparation of election materials and documents 
Election period  
– Hear and determine claims and petitions regarding pre-election and election 
operations (subject to the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Council and 
appropriate courts or authorities) 
Post-election  
– Forward election reports to the Constitutional Council or other relevant 
bodies. 
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It should be noted that ELECAM (through its DGE and EB) works 
in conjunction with other sub-commissions to ensure the organisation and 
management of the election process. As will become apparent later, the roles 
may sometimes be duplicated making the existence of multiple institutions 
in the electoral process questionable. 
B. Sub-commissions 
There are five sub-commissions in the electoral system – Electoral Register 
Revision Commission (ERRC), Voter Card Issuance and Distribution 
Commission (VCIDC), Local Polling Commissions (LPC), Divisional 
Supervisory Commissions (DSC)15 and the National Commission for the 
Final Counting of Votes (NCFCV). Their membership and role in the 
electoral system is represented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Jurisdiction, membership and role of sub-commissions       
Institution 
Territorial 
jurisdiction  Membership  Responsibilities  
ERRC,  
ss 52, 52 
Local council Chair (representative  
of ELECAM), a 
representative of the 
administration, mayor 
or deputy mayor or 
municipal councillor, 
representative of each 
authorised political 
party in that local 
council 
Revision of electoral 




Local council Chair (representative  
of ELECAM), a 
representative of the 
administration, mayor 
or deputy mayor or 
municipal councillor, 
representative of each 
authorised political 
party in that local 
council 
Supervising the issuance 
and distribution of 
voter cards ( jointly  
with ELECAM) 
LPC, ss 54, 
61, 62 
Nationwide Chair appointed by 
ELECAM, 
representative of the 
administration, 
representative of each 
political party or 
election candidate    
– Vote counting 
– Rule on any difficulties 
relating to the 
organisation and 
conduct of the poll  
and vote counting  
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Institution 
Territorial 
jurisdiction  Membership  Responsibilities  
– Prepare a report on  
all polling operations 
which should be signed  
by the Chairperson and 
members present and 
forwarded to the 






Chair (president of the 
High Court),a three 
representatives of the 
administration, three 
representatives of 
ELECAM and a 
representative of each 
political party or 
election candidate    
– Supervise operations for 
drawing up, keeping 
and revising electoral 
registers and examine 
all claims relating 
thereto. 
– Supervise distribution  
of voter cards 
– Centralise and check 
returning operations 
carried out by LPCs  
and documents relating 
thereto and request 
regularisations by LPCs  




National Chair (member of the 
Constitutional 
Council), two judicial 
officers, five 




representative of each 
political party or 
election candidate.    
– Carry out the final 
counting of votes 
– Correct any clerical  
errors in the counting  
of votes 
– Draw up a report  
on all its operations 
– Forward report and 
appended documents  
to the Constitutional 
Council within five  
days    
Note 
a For senatorial elections, the chair is the president of the Court of Appeal.  
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I. Other electoral commissions 
From the table, it can be seen that the pre-election role of ELECAM is largely 
duplicated by the sub-commissions. Moreover, ELECAM’s role in the man-
agement and supervision of the election process is not quite clear and is obscured 
by its presence in all other sub-commissions involved in the election process. 
While its presence in the sub-commissions may be seen as a means by which it 
fulfils its mandate, it is not immediately clear that this approach actually enables 
it to do so. 
Another observation that can be made is that there are quite many and 
apparently superfluous sub-commissions involved in the election process. The 
duties performed by these sub-commissions could be carried out by ELECAM. 
The creation of multiple sub-commissions does little to ameliorate historical 
problems relating to the electoral system. The current approach perpetuates 
the obscure system which facilitated the occurrence of irregularities under-
mining the credibility of elections. This assertion can be supported by a 
number of observations relating to the structure of various institutions and the 
processes involved. 
Structurally, the composition of the sub-commissions leaves a lot to be desired. 
There is a heavy presence of the administration and presidential appointees in 
key commissions such as the DSC and the NCFCV. For instance, the chair-
person of the DSC is a presidential appointee and so are the representatives of 
ELECAM.16 The three representatives of the administration are appointed by 
the Senior Divisional Officer, who is a presidential appointee.17 Similarly, the 
chairperson of the NCFCV, a member of the Constitutional Council, is a pre-
sidential appointee, including the two judicial officers and five representatives 
from ELECAM. Again, there are five representatives from the administration 
appointed by the Minister of Territorial Administration, a presidential ap-
pointee. It was noted earlier in the ‘Introduction’ section the ruling CPDM 
partisan composition of ELECAM. Besides the issue of the significant presence 
of presidential appointees, there is a disproportionate representation of the 
opposition in the sub-commissions, especially in the NCFCV which has thirteen 
apparent presidential appointees as opposed to one representative from each 
candidate in the elections. 
In terms of the process, some sub-commissions have been ascribed roles which 
may provide the opportunity for electoral malpractices. The danger is potentially 
within the DSC and the NCFCV. Once the votes have been counted and results 
proclaimed at the LPC, the latter generates a report which is signed by all 
members present18 and forwarded to the local branch of ELECAM.19 ELECAM 
in turn forwards it to the DSC within 48 hours of the close of polling operations20 
and it forms the basis of the deliberations of the DSC.21 Although members of 
the LPC are given a copy of the report which they would have signed,22 the 
only authentic copy is the original which is retained by the local branch of 
ELECAM.23 Thus, in case of a dispute, a candidate in the election may not be 
able to rely on their own copy to dispute any subsequent disparities. Interestingly, 
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the DSC is authorised to ‘correct’, ‘rectify’ or ‘adjust’ corresponding reports in 
case of miscalculations and to explain that in its final report.24 It is not clear why 
the DSC has to undertake further returning operations given that the results 
would have been proclaimed already at the stage of the LPC, particularly in the 
light of the fact that there is a further stage at which the votes would be tallied. 
The operations of the DSC at this stage appear superfluous and provide the 
opportunity for unwarranted or bogus ‘correction’ or ‘adjustments’. 
Once the DSC has completed its operations, it writes a report which is for-
warded (together with documents from the LPC) to the NCFCV.25 The NCFCV 
is a crucial institution in the election process as it has the responsibility to 
carry out the ‘final counting of votes’ on the basis of the reports and documents 
received from the DSC.26 Like the latter, the NCFCV can ‘correct any clerical 
errors in the counting of votes’.27 
C. The Constitutional Council 
The Constitutional Council (Council) may be considered to be at the apex of 
the electoral system. It has the mandate to proclaim the results of elections28 
and to hear and determine disputes arising therefrom.29 Election petitions 
made to the Council must be submitted within 72 hours of the close of polls30 
and its rulings are final.31 This poses a significant problem in respect of peti-
tions relating to irregularities from final counting of votes. As mentioned pre-
viously, generally, it takes more than 72 hours for the final results of the election 
to be known. The reports from LPC are submitted to the NCFCV within 
72 hours of the close of polls32 and the latter in turn submits its own report to 
the Council, after tallying the votes within five days.33 It is at this stage that 
some irregularities such as disparities with figures from the polling station and 
those from the various sub-commissions could become apparent. This is way 
beyond 72 hours implying that at this point, any candidate would be divested 
of the right to challenge the election results irrespective of the nature of 
the irregularity revealed. It is submitted that the provision on time limit is 
inherently detrimental to the democratic process as it precludes recourse to 
challenge unfair or irregular electoral practices. This is exacerbated by the fact 
that the decisions of the Council are not subject to appeal. A more democratic 
process would vest ordinary courts or special electoral tribunals with jurisdic-
tions in electoral disputes allowing for a process where there is a final reviewing 
body such as the Council. 
A further problem which can be seen as an obstacle to the transparency and 
independence of the Council’s processes is the fact that the chair of the NCFCV 
is a member of the Council, which later sits to deliberate the report from the 
NCFCV.34 Thus, not only is the chairperson scrutinising their own report, their 
presence in the Council may effectively deter an objective scrutiny by other 
members of the Council. There is no legal requirement that the chair of the 
NCFCV should recuse themselves from the deliberations of the Council. In 
addition, the composition of the Council is also rendered questionable by the 
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heavy presence of presidential appointees who are loyal to the President and the 
ruling CPDM party.35 
The entire electoral process and system appears to be one that is designed 
to consolidate incumbency advantages, inimical to a credible democratic process. 
It is therefore unsurprising that since the supposed democratic transition in the 
1990s, the CPDM has dominated party politics, winning an overwhelming 
majority of seats in the National Assembly and since 2013, the Senate inclusive. 
The opacity of the electoral process and its domination by officials loyal to the 
government and the ruling CPDM makes it more likely than not that the CPDM 
will continue to dominate politics in Cameroon.36 As will be demonstrated in the 
course of this chapter, the consequences of the inadequacies in the system are far 
reaching, particularly with respect to parliament’s ability to act as a credible 
accountability and representative institution. It is against this background that 
the next section examines the election of members of parliament. 
Part II. Election of members of parliament 
Elections to both houses of parliament differs, warranting a separate discussion. 
A. National Assembly 
The National Assembly is composed of 180 MPs collectively representing 
the electoral constituencies in Cameroon.37 Each administrative division in 
the country is a constituency,38 although some electoral constituencies could 
be warded by decree of the President of the Republic on the ground of 
their ‘peculiar circumstances’.39 In terms of representation, it is ironical that 
additional constituencies could be created for such a nebulous reason by the 
President. The law provides no indication of what these ‘peculiar circum-
stances’ may be. Moreover, the number of MPs representing each constituency 
is determined unilaterally by presidential decree.40 This is potentially a tool 
that can be applied to reduce representation in opposition strongholds.41 It has 
been demonstrated that during the parliamentary elections in 1997, 16 special 
constituencies were created by presidential decree. The distribution of seats in 
the special constituencies was disproportionate in areas where the opposition 
would have otherwise enjoyed a majority.42 In other areas, the creation of 
special constituencies was intended to make seats available to the ruling party 
in opposition strongholds. For instance, in the 1997 parliamentary elections, a 
special constituency was created in Balikumbat whose candidate (the fon) was 
member of the ruling CPDM. This constituency was carved in the North-West 
where the CPDM had no seats, but electoral manipulations ensured that the 
CPDM won that seat, providing its sole parliamentary representation in the 
North-West region.43 
In terms of eligibility, candidacy is open to any Cameroonian citizen of at least 
twenty three years of age, irrespective of gender, who enjoys their civic rights, 
and literate in French and English and enrolled on the electoral register.44 
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In addition, foreign persons who have obtained Cameroonian nationality are 
eligible ten years after the acquisition of Cameroonian nationality.45 Ineligible 
Cameroonians include serving members of the defence and security forces,46 
persons who have placed themselves in a position of dependency on a foreign 
organisation or sate, or a person acting as a security agent of the foreign state.47 
MPs are elected for a term of five years by universal suffrage and direct and 
secret ballot, through a mixed system of majoritarian and proportional re-
presentation.48 In constituencies that have only one seat, voting is for a single 
candidate and the first past the post system is applied where the candidate 
attracting the majority of votes wins the seat.49 In case of a tie, the eldest 
candidate wins the seat.50 It is a controversial provision due to the inherent 
unfairness and discriminatory approach because a younger candidate attracting 
an equal number of votes is prejudiced simply due to their age. In con-
stituencies that apply the list system, the list obtaining an absolute majority of 
votes wins all the available seats.51 Where no list obtains an absolute majority, 
the highest list is allocated half of the seats. A tie between two or more lists, 
results in the number of seats being allocated to the list with the highest average 
age.52 The remaining seats are then allocated to the lists through the appli-
cation of proportional representation to the list with the highest votes.53 A list 
obtaining less than 5% of the votes is ineligible for allocation of a seat.54 Once 
elected, their term of office commences on the second Tuesday following the 
proclamation of election results, when the National Assembly meets as of right 
in ordinary session.55 
B. The Senate 
The eligibility criteria for senatorial elections is similar to that of MPs except 
that the minimum age is forty years and the candidate must be habitually re-
sident in the region concerned.56 With respect to composition, it has one hun-
dred senators representing electoral constituencies and each of the ten regions 
of Cameroon is an electoral constituency.57 Each region is represented by ten 
senators, seven of which are elected whereas three are appointed by presidential 
decree, in both instances to serve for a term of five years.58 
Unlike MPs, senators are elected indirectly by an electoral college com-
prising regional and municipal councillors.59 Election is by a list system and a 
mixed single ballot comprising a majority and proportionate representation 
system.60 Political parties taking part in the elections must present a list of seven 
candidates reflecting the gender and sociological components of the region.61 A 
list obtaining an absolute majority of the votes is allocated all the seven seats.62 
However, where there is no absolute majority, the list obtaining a relative ma-
jority shall be awarded four of the seven seats and in case of a tie, the four seats 
are shared equally between the relevant lists.63 Where necessary, the remaining 
seat is awarded to the list with the highest average age.64 The three other seats 
are distributed proportionately among all the lists, including those that obtained 
a relative majority under the proportional representation system.65 In case of a 
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tie in the number of votes obtained where the last seat needs to be allocated, that 
seat is allocated to the eldest candidate. Here again, it can be noted that the age 
factor is being used to prejudice other lists or candidates who may be equally 
entitled to the seat. 
With respect to the presidential appointees, it is worth noting that their 
appointment is made within ten days of the proclamation of senatorial election 
results.66 At this stage, the President would have a clear indication of the level 
of representation of the ruling party and may well use this discretionary power 
to influence the representative capacity of the ruling party. It is rather ironical 
that besides the general eligibility criteria, the law provides no specific criteria 
which should guide the choice of appointees. More significantly, this power is 
exercised unilaterally without a requirement to confer or confirm with any 
other institution. As such, nothing deters the President from solely appointing 
representatives or supporters of the ruling party. In fact, the first cohort of 
thirty senators appointed in 2013 was predominantly members of the CPDM.67 
Although a very small number of representatives of opposition parties and 
traditional rulers were also appointed, they were notable supporters or allies 
of the ruling CPDM.68 Most of the appointees had their mandate renewed in 
2018 when their initial term ended.69 One of the controversies surrounding 
such a discretionary power is the potential for abuse as it can be used by 
the President to subvert an elected opposition majority in the Senate or to 
consolidate the ruling majority to ensure a very firm control of the Senate. 
Understandably, in any political system, the ruling party would favour control 
of any of its houses of parliament. 
One of the problems with the approach in Cameroon is that a system of 
appointment of representatives to sit with elected representatives does not augur 
well for a fragile democracy where the same representatives lack independence. 
In addition, the inadequacies of the electoral process as described earlier com-
bine to ensure that the CPDM dominates both houses of parliament. Tables 3.2 
and 3.3 depict the trend of electoral outcomes in Cameroon since the transition 
to multiparty democracy in the 1990s. 
As shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, the CPDM has won the majority of seats in 
every election contested since the transition to multiparty democracy in 1990. 
This makes both the National Assembly and Senate overwhelmingly dominated 
by the CPDM. There was an opportunity in 1992 for the opposition to form a 
formidable alliance to outnumber the CPDM, considering that their cumulative 
number of seats put them at 51.1%. However, that was upset by the MDR 
entering into a suspect coalition with the CPDM, eliminating the potential for 
meaningful parliamentary reforms. In practice, there is a high level of party 
discipline within the CPDM and MPs or Senators are very loyal to the party. 
This is due in significant part to the need to preserve the benefits attached 
to their office.70 The inevitable consequence is the inability of parliament to 
perform effective oversight of the government acquiring the reputation of a 
complacent institution that rubber-stamp government policies as defined by 
the President.71 
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Part III. Structure of the legislature 
A. The National Assembly 
The National Assembly meets three times a year in ordinary sessions in March, June 
and November when convened by its Bureau and after consultation with the President 
of the Republic.72 It can also be convened to hold extraordinary sessions with a fixed 
agenda at the request of the President of the Republic or one-third of its members.73 
In terms of its organisational structure, it consists of a Bureau and a Chairmen’s 
Conference which are the governing bodies of the institution. These are 
Table 3.2 Results of legislative elections          
Number of seats 
Parties Electoral period  
1992 1997 2002 2007 2013 2020  
CPDM 88 116 149 153 148 152 
SDF 0 43 22 16 18 5 
NUDP 68 13 1 6 5 7 
UPC 18 1 3 – 3 – 
CDU – 5 5 4 4 4 
MDR 6 1 1 1 1 2 
Others – 1 1 – 1 10 
Total 180 180 180 180 180 180   
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, http://archive.ipu.org/parline/reports/2053_E.htm; Inter- 
Parliamentary Union, ‘Cameroon: National Assembly’ https://data.ipu.org/node/31/elec-
tions?chamber_id=13357; Election Guide: Democracy Assistance and Election News: http://www. 
electionguide.org/elections/?inst=Assembly&cont=Cameroon&yr=2008. 
Notes 
Abbreviations: CDU, Cameroon Democratic Union; MDR, Movement for the Defence of the Republic; 
NUDP, National Union for Democracy and Progress; UPC, Union of the Peoples of Cameroon.   
Table 3.3 Results of senatorial elections      
Number of seats 
Parties Electoral period  
2013 2018  
CPDM 56 63 
SDF 14  7 
Total 70 70   
Source: http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2054_13.htm; 
http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2054_E.htm.  
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complemented by internal groups such as Party Groups, the General Committees, 
Ad Hoc Committees, Special Committees and Committees of Inquiry. 
The Bureau is elected at the beginning of each legislative year. The Bureau is 
empowered to preside over the proceedings of the National Assembly and organise all 
its services.74 It is additionally responsible for the drafting of minutes by the secre-
taries, drawing up of the list of speakers, evaluating, auditing and controlling the 
services of the National Assembly.75 The Bureau is composed of a president, a senior 
vice president, five vice presidents, four questors, twelve secretaries and a secretary 
general, who is also a legal and parliamentary adviser of the National Assembly.76 
The Chairmen’s Conference is responsible for drawing up the agenda of the 
National Assembly,77 ruling on the admissibility of bills, referring bills to the 
relevant parliamentary committees78 and setting the dates for plenary sitting. It is 
composed of members of the Bureau, chairpersons of the nine General 
Committees and presidents of Parliamentary Groups. A member of government 
shall participate in their deliberations.79 
The Standing Orders provide that MPs may organise themselves into Parliamentary 
Groups according to political parties and each group may not exceed fifteen mem-
bers.80 However, MPs who do not belong to any parliamentary groups may form an 
alliance with a group of their choice, although approval is required from the bureau of 
that group.81 The groups form the basis for membership of the General Committees.82 
There are nine General Committees and these are bodies through which the 
National Assembly carries out the substantive study of bills, the debates and the final 
drafting of bills.83 The committees are as follows: the Committee on Constitutional 
laws, Human Rights and Freedoms, Justice, Legislation and Standing Orders and 
Administration; Finance and Budget; Foreign Affairs; National Defence and 
Security; Economic Affairs, Planning and Regional Development; Education, 
Vocational Training and Youths; Cultural, Social and Family Affairs; Production 
and Trade and the Committee on Resolutions and Petitions.84 The General 
Committees are convened at the request of the Secretary General of the National 
Assembly to consider substantive aspects of bills referred by the Chairmen’s 
Conference.85 Only members of the Committee may vote on issues relating to that 
Committee, although its debates are open to members of other committees and to 
members of government (when the bill is relevant to their ministries).86 
The Committees of Inquiry are set up with specific terms of reference,87 for 
instance, to inquire into various issues, either internal issues of the National 
Assembly or external issues relating to public institutions, such as when ex-
ercising oversight of the government.88 In the latter instance, the Committee is 
expected to report its findings to the National Assembly.89 Members of the 
Committee are bound by secrecy and any defiance of the applicable rule will 
invoke sanctions pursuant to the applicable official secrecy legislation.90 
B. The Senate 
The two houses of parliament appear to have been conceived on an identical 
configuration. According to the Standing Orders of the Senate, that institution 
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holds three ordinary sessions in March, June and November, respectively.91 The 
opening date for the sessions shall be fixed by the Bureau of Senate after con-
sultation with the President of the Republic. Extraordinary sessions can also be 
organised for a maximum period of 15 days at the request of the President of 
the Republic or one-third of Senators.92 
In terms of its structure, Senate consists of a Bureau, a Chairmen’s 
Conference, Parliamentary Groups and General Committees. Additionally, 
Special Committees and Joint Committees may be set up when the need arises. 
The Bureau is made up of a president, a senior vice president, four vice 
presidents, three questors, eight secretaries and the secretary general who is ex 
officio member.93 The Bureau is responsible for, inter alia, presiding over the 
proceedings of the Senate and to organise all its services and represent it in all 
public ceremonies.94 Through the questors, the Bureau oversees the adminis-
trative and financial services of the Senate,95 whereas the secretaries supervise 
the drafting of minutes, list of speakers and the internal voting process.96 
The Chairmen’s Conference is composed of presidents of Parliamentary 
Groups, chairpersons of General Committees and members of the Senate 
Bureau.97 The duties of the Chairmen’s Conference include drawing up the 
agenda of Senate,98 ruling on the admissibility of bills referring them to 
the relevant parliamentary committees,99 proposing the organisation of debates 
to the Senate100 and setting the dates for plenary sittings. 
As is the case with the National Assembly, Senators may organise into 
Parliamentary Groups according to their political parties, although in this case, 
the group size is a minimum of ten members.101 Senators who do not belong to 
any group may form an alliance with a group of their choice with the consent of 
the Bureau of that group.102 Group membership forms the basis for membership 
in the General Committees.103 
There are nine General Committees in the Senate104 corresponding with 
those of the National Assembly.105 The committees may only sit during parlia-
mentary sessions with the exception of the Finance and Budget Committee 
which may sit as and when necessary.106 The reason for the exceptional dis-
pensation is not stated in the law but one may assume that due to the particularly 
significant nature of its duties and the potentially evolving nature of a country’s 
economy and finance, it would be necessary for the committee to meet should 
there be relevant changes in the financial and economic policy or situation of 
the country. This is the more so with respect to the finance laws which may 
be amended in the course of the financial year. The General Committees are 
convened at the request of the Secretary General of the Senate to consider 
substantive aspects of bills referred by the Chairmen’s Conference.107 Although a 
specific committee is allocated the duty to carry out the substantive study of a 
matter referred to it by the Chairmen’s Conference, other committees may re-
quest to provide an opinion.108 In which case, such an opinion would be sub-
sequently submitted to the main committee carrying out the substantive study.109 
Only members of the Committee may vote on issues relating to that Committee, 
although its debates are open to members of other Committees and to members 
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of government (when the bill relates to matters falling within the competence of 
their ministry).110 
In relation to Special Committees, these are set up for ‘specific purposes, 
particularly of major national interest’. What that entails is not stated in the law 
but it may be inferred from the wording of the law that these would be created 
as and when the need arises.111 Membership of such committees would usually 
be determined by the resolution which precedes the setting up of the special 
committee.112 
The Joint Committees are Committees from both houses of parliament which 
may meet on the premises of either house.113 They may be convened by their 
eldest members or in relation to a specific matter and they determine their 
composition.114 The rules of procedure are those generally applicable to com-
mittees, although in the event of a conflict in the rules of the two houses, the rule 
of the house hosting the committee shall take precedence.115 
C. The relationship between the National Assembly  
and Senate 
The Senate has sometimes been perceived with suspicion, as an institution in-
troduced to dominate the National Assembly.116 That perception might be in-
fluenced partly by the fact that 30% of senators are presidential appointees, 
indicative of the predominance of the executive in that institution. Although 
executive interference may arguably be discerned in practice, the supremacy of 
the Senate over the National Assembly is not overtly reflected in constitutional 
provisions or implicitly inferred from the roles attributed to both houses. In fact, 
in terms of their spheres of competence in relation to legislation, each house is 
not confined to legislating on specific thematic or territorial areas as would be 
found in countries such as Kenya, in which case, presumably, the Senate could 
be used to bypass the National Assembly.117 Although in terms of representation 
they cover different geographical spheres,118 the Constitution states that par-
liament (consisting of both houses) shall legislate and control government action 
and both houses shall meet on the same dates.119 They can meet in congress at 
the request of the President of the Republic, to be addressed by him or to receive 
a message from him, to receive the oath of members of the Constitutional 
Council or to decide on a draft or proposed constitutional amendment.120 
In those instances, the Bureau of the National Assembly shall preside over the 
meeting. It can be seen that although there are opportunities to work together 
in congress, there is no explicit substantive hierarchy in favour of the Senate. In 
fact, one may argue to the contrary considering that the National Assembly’s 
Bureau is given the task to preside over meetings in congress. 
With respect to their role in the legislative process, the position is that, gov-
ernment bills and private members’ bills are submitted to the Bureau of both 
houses at the same time to be studied by their relevant committees prior to 
debates in the plenary sessions.121 When a bill has been passed by the National 
Assembly, it is forwarded to the Senate for consideration.122 Within ten days of 
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receiving the bill (or five days for a bill declared urgent by the government),123 
Senate may alternatively, adopt the bill, make amendments to it or fail to adopt 
the entire bill or parts of it. The procedure is simple where Senate adopts the bill 
as it is merely forwarded to the Speaker of the National Assembly who in turn 
forwards it, within 48 hours, to the President of the Republic for promulga-
tion.124 Where amendments are made by Senate, the bill is forwarded to the 
National Assembly for a second reading. It is worth noting that amendments 
to the text would only be admissible if approved by a simple majority of 
Senators.125 In contrast, where Senate fails to adopt all or parts of the bill the 
procedure is more complex. First, such an objection requires an absolute ma-
jority of Senators for it to be valid.126 Once that is determined, the Speaker of 
the Senate will return the bill to the National Assembly for a second reading. The 
National Assembly may in turn adopt the bill but only on the basis of an absolute 
majority of MPs voting in favour.127 This demonstrates that a rejection from 
Senate is not definitive and does not completely prevent the adoption of a bill 
by the National Assembly. This aspect puts in doubt the supremacy argument. 
What is clear is that when Senate adopts, amends or fails to adopt a bill, it is 
exercising some review function and in that sense may be perceived as a house 
with the power to scrutinise legislation emanating from the National Assembly. 
Thus, one can accommodate the view that the Constitution creates an appellate 
hierarchy in the enactment of laws, which places the Senate at the top of that 
hierarchy as opposed to the National Assembly. Nevertheless, that view may be 
diluted by what ensues from the failure of the National Assembly to attain an 
absolute majority, following Senate’s rejection of a bill. 
Where the National Assembly fails to obtain an absolute majority, this calls 
for intervention by the President of the Republic. The latter may convene a 
joint commission composed of an equal number of members of both houses, 
to propose an alternative formulation of the specific provisions objected to by 
Senate.128 The alternative draft is submitted by the President, to the two houses 
for approval where amendments may be made but may only be admissible on 
the endorsement of the President.129 Here again, it can be seen that the approval 
of the alternative formulation is a collegiate matter rather than one that puts 
Senate at the helm of the approval process. Doubts as to the supremacy of Senate 
is further reinforced by the procedure in the event of a failure to reach a joint 
alternative or where both houses fail to adopt a joint alternative draft. In both 
cases, the President of the Republic may either request the National Assembly 
to reach a definitive conclusion or declare the bill null and void.130 
A pertinent observation that can be made here is that it is the National 
Assembly that is required in the latter case to reach a definitive conclusion and 
not the Senate. This is commendable in terms of the majoritarian argument. 
Senate is composed of a mixture of elected and appointed representatives and 
therefore it cannot be said to be fully democratic. This is in contrast with the 
National Assembly where all MPs are elected and therefore that house may 
be considered more fully democratic as in theory, it represents the will of the 
electorate. From that perspective, it would be more rational for the National 
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Assembly to have a definitive say in the enactment of laws. What emanates 
from the aforementioned discussion is the fact that there is an appellate hierarchy 
in terms of the enactment of laws and a procedure which requires some level 
of collegiality. 
An important question worth considering is the rationale for the intervention 
of the President of the Republic, in view of the role of the Constitutional 
Council in resolving disputes between institutions. Perhaps this can be ex-
plained by the typically presidential nature of the political system by virtue of 
which the President is largely in control of every aspect of the political life and 
the institutions. This can be contrasted with the position in Kenya where an 
impasse between the houses of parliament is mediated by a mediation com-
mittee consisting of an equal number of members of each house appointed by 
the speakers of each house.131 Therefore, it is the houses of parliament, through 
their respective speakers, that attempt to deal with the impasse and not the 
president of the republic. Moreover, where a mediation committee fails to 
arrive at a joint formulation of a bill or a joint formulation is rejected by both 
houses, the bill automatically fails.132 It does not depend on the president 
to make a declaration. In the case of Cameroon, it can be contended that it is 
unnecessary for the President of the Republic to intervene as this could be 
seen as an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Council.133 
The President of the Republic should be confined to promulgating laws passed 
by parliament, rather than interfering with parliamentary processes. It may, 
however, be argued that this does not constitute encroachment or unwarranted 
interference, as the Constitution vests on him, powers to ‘ensure the proper 
functioning of public authorities’ through his arbitration.134 There appears to 
be a certain ambiguity here which works in favour of Presidential intervention. 
In any event, this goes further to demonstrate the pervasive influence of the 
institution of the President. 
Part IV. Powers and functions of the legislature 
A. The legislative domain and law making 
One of the principal responsibilities of the legislative arm of government is 
law making and as stated earlier, the Constitution vests this power within the 
jurisdiction of both houses of parliament.135 Peculiarly, parliament has been 
vested with powers to legislate in very specific areas and these include funda-
mental liberties, civil status, penal procedures, political, administrative and 
judicial organisation, financial and patrimonial matters, social and economic 
programme and the education system.136 Beyond these areas, parliament has 
no competence to issue legislation. The reason for that restriction, as discussed 
in Chapter 2, emanates from the fact that the President is authorised to exercise 
statutory authority137 and to issue rules and regulations in the areas which 
do not fall within parliament’s competence.138 The Prime Minister (PM) is also 
vested with statutory authority.139 Thus, although parliament is the principal 
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legislative institution, its legislative competence is severely restricted in favour 
of the executive.140 
This approach to limiting the legislative domain of parliament is consistent 
with a highly presidential semi-presidential system which favours the vesting 
of exorbitant and largely uncontrolled powers on the president. Within the 
legislature, this is manifested in many ways including the admissibility criteria 
regulating the admission of bills in parliament. The admissibility criteria give pre- 
eminence to bills introduced by the President as they override all others in terms 
of the order of consideration.141 However, private member bills (not supported 
by the government) are considered subsequently and this may only occur three 
subsequent sittings after a bill was originally admitted.142 This is a formidable 
tool which can be used tactically to prevent the consideration of bills from 
the opposition by interminably postponing consideration.143 A case in point is 
the opposition’s proposals for the adoption of a harmonised electoral code which 
had been made repeatedly since 1991 on the basis that it was necessary for 
promoting the democratisation process.144 Lacking support from the government 
and parliament, consideration of the reform bill was consistently postponed and 
was eventually rejected.145 The debate was subsequently revived in 2005 and a 
code was finally adopted by parliament in April 2012.146 It is worthy to note that 
the bill was introduced by the President. 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned restrictions, parliament has the ex-
clusive jurisdiction to examine bills admitted through the Chairmen’s con-
ference of each of its two houses. In the National Assembly, debates occur 
typically within the General Committees although in certain circumstances 
the Chairmen’s Conference may decide to cause a bill to be considered by the 
entire house. When that applies, proceedings will be restricted to general dis-
cussions. In all circumstances, the substantive debates on a bill is undertaken 
within the General Committees which also have the mandate to produce a final 
draft of the bill. The Committees’ debates are open to the movers of proposals 
and amendments and in case of government bills, the relevant government 
minister and their close aid(s) may attend and be heard at their request. Given 
that the composition of the General Committees allows for non-partisan re-
presentation such as Parliamentary Groups, there is scope for scrutiny of bills at 
the Committee stage. However, the potentials for meaningful debate may only 
be realised where there is a fairly equitable representation of different political 
parties within the Committees. This is relevant because a General Committee 
that is dominated by one party may tend to be sympathetic to the party’s 
position, an aspect which might undermine objectivity in their scrutiny of bills. 
A fairly recent example is the Government’s Bill to amend certain provisions 
of the Electoral Code to the effect that ninety councillors would be allocated 
to each of the geographic regions of Cameroon.147 These councillors form 
an essential part of the governance structure of the regions and the Electoral 
College for the election of senators. When the Bill was debated in the 
Committee on Constitutional Laws, Legislation, etc,  the opposition SDF ob-
jected to the proposed amendments on the basis of the inequitable distribution 
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of representatives as it did not reflect the demographic disparities between 
the regions.148 The MRC also objected additionally on the basis that it was a 
strategy adopted by the central government to infiltrate regional governance 
by filling it with pro-CPDM councillors. The Minister of Decentralisation 
defended the amendment on the basis that all regions, irrespective of their 
demographic size, should be given an equal number of representatives.149 
Lacking support for the opposition’s objection, the SDF found it futile to 
continue with the Committee debates considering that, of the twenty members 
of that Committee, only three where from the opposition. Thus they abstained 
from further debates and from voting for the Bill.150 Unsurprisingly, the Bill 
was passed by both houses151 despite the arguments relating to the apparent 
inequality that it endorsed. That aspect of representation is perhaps one that 
would continue to undermine committee debates in parliament in view of the 
historically overwhelming domination of the ruling CPDM party in parliament. 
Nevertheless, if the system operates effectively, a private member bill discussed 
at committee stage can be amended or substituted, if it is not adopted or rejected. 
A government bill is accorded special status as it cannot be substituted with an 
alternative drafted by the Committee that is considering it. A bill that has been 
adopted by a committee is presented at the plenary session where it is further 
debated. It may be referred back to the General Committee for reconsideration 
or it may be adopted. In the latter instance, the adopted bill is forwarded by the 
speaker of the National Assembly to the speaker of the Senate. 
At the level of the Senate, a bill submitted by the President of the Republic or 
private member or government bills submitted by the speaker of the National 
Assembly is ultimately transmitted to the relevant General Committee through 
the Chairman’s Conference after ruling on its admissibility.152 The government 
or the Committee may request that the bill should be voted at the next plenary 
session without debating at the Committee level.153 If the bill is included in the 
agenda of the next plenary session, either the government or a Senator (sup-
ported by twenty Senators) may request its withdrawal.154 In which case, the bill 
will be withdrawn from the agenda and returned to the Committee which would 
be obliged to hear the objections raised.155 This is an important intervention 
to maintain the quality of the democratic process. It is necessary that bills are 
properly scrutinised to ensure refinement and that issues which may affect their 
enforcement are dealt with at an early stage. A system that allows for bills to be 
adopted without debate undermines the oversight potentials of parliamentary 
debates. Nevertheless, once the Committee has considered the objections, it is 
expected to produce a report containing the substance of the objections raised. In 
the absence of an objection or where an objection is either defeated or declared 
inadmissible, a bill would be voted in the plenary session without debating at 
Committee level following the normal procedure in the Senate.156 
At the Committee level, once a bill has been debated, a report is produced 
which forms the basis of the debate at the plenary session.157 Prior to the plenary 
debate, a Senator may raise a preliminary objection with a view to deciding 
whether there should be a debate.158 The objections may be made orally, 
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to which only the relevant government minister or the president or rapporteur of 
the Committee may respond.159 An objection may be adopted, in which case the 
bill will be rejected or where it fails, the bill will be debated.160 Again, this may 
be seen as an important step in ensuring that if an objection at the level of the 
Committee failed, a bill should not be adopted at the plenary session without 
debate. Of course the benefits of such an intervention would be realised only 
where an objection succeeds in preventing the adopting of a bill without debate. 
The procedure at the level of the Senate appears to take into account Senate’s 
role in scrutinising bills adopted by the National Assembly as there is some in-
tervention at various points and the process seems less straight forward than that 
of the National Assembly. A bill that has gone through preliminary objections 
(or where no objections were raised) is first debated generally during the plenary 
session.161 Even at this stage, interlocutory motions may be tabled with the effect 
of adjourning the debate until certain conditions are met or referring the bill 
back to the General Committee that had considered its substantive issues or even 
referring to a different Committee for an advisory opinion.162 This again is a 
commendable intervention which has the potential to reinforce the quality of 
scrutiny exercised by the Senate. A decision from the Committee in favour 
of rejecting the bill will invoke a vote immediately after the close of general 
debates.163 That may also occur alternatively, where the Committee or its rap-
porteur fails to submit a conclusion or a report, respectively.164 The Senate 
may vote whether or not to proceed to a substantive debate and a vote against 
debate will automatically defeat the bill.165 Where a bill is not defeated, a general 
debate is followed by a more substantive debate during which each section of the 
bill is discussed by the Senators. At this stage any alternative bills (amendments to 
the original bill) that had been validly submitted and discussed at the Committee 
level would be considered.166 Senate may either adopt the bill, reject or amend 
it and the procedure described earlier will apply.167 
A law adopted by the National Assembly is promulgated by the President of 
the Republic within fifteen days of it being forwarded to him except where he 
requests a second reading or refers the law to the Constitutional Council.168 
Where the deadline elapses without promulgation by the President and upon 
establishing his failure to do so, the law may be promulgated by the speaker of 
the National Assembly.169 In any case, a law that has been promulgated must be 
published in the Official Gazette of the Republic in English and French.170 
B. Scrutiny of the executive 
Another important role of parliament as per article 14(2) of the Constitution is to 
exercise oversight of the government. As discussed later, there are at least five 
principal mechanisms through which the legislature performs oversight of the 
executive. They include, oral and written questions, vote of no confidence and 
motion of censure, commissions of inquiry, fiscal oversight and impeachment.171 
These are typically powers exercised by the legislative arm of government in 
the pursuit of promoting accountable governance. However, in the case of 
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Cameroon, there are several challenges that impinge on the ability of the leg-
islature to exercise meaningful oversight of the executive, despite the powers it 
has been vested with. These mechanisms and related issues are discussed later. 
I. Oral and written questions 
The Constitution provides that, ‘Parliament shall control government action 
through oral and written questions’.172 The government is under obligation to 
provide any explanation and information, however, subject to the important 
caveat of national defence, state security or the secrecy of criminal investiga-
tions.173 In practice, this has been one of the fundamental ways by which ex-
ecutive officials have been subjected to some form of scrutiny to provide answers 
and justifications for government policies with respect to individual ministries. 
MPs or Senators intending to question executive officials are obliged to submit 
their questions to the speaker of the relevant house who ultimately transmits 
them to the relevant executive official.174 Upon receipt of a question, the relevant 
executive official is given fifteen days to respond, although that period is reduced 
to three days when the National Assembly or Senate is in session.175 An addi-
tional period of three days (or two days during sessions) may be allocated where 
further research is required to provide answers to the question(s).176 The process 
of prior information provides scope for the executive officials in question to 
prepare answers prior to the parliamentary question and answer session. 
A problem with the procedure for question and answer is that there appears 
to be no particular criteria in determining which questions are selected from 
among the multitude of questions submitted.177 The decision is made by the 
Chairmen’s Conference.178 This is an important facet of the question and 
answer process because it is the stage at which potentially probing questions on 
controversial issues might be eliminated in order to shield the government. This 
weakness is further exacerbated by the requirement that precludes questions 
which raise allegations relating to named third parties.179 Thus, a minister 
would not be questioned directly for actions by named third parties in their 
ministry. It is not surprising that although MPs have consistently questioned 
ministers on policies relating to their ministries, it is reported that such 
questions have been rarely critical.180 
Another problem emanates from the fact that although ministers are under 
obligation to provide answers, there is no obvious mechanism to ensure com-
pliance in practice.181 A solution to addressing a refusal to answer questions is the 
tabling of a draft resolution on the refusal.182 The law is not specific as to what 
follows a resolution183 but one implication is that a vote on the resolution might 
lead to a rejection of the question at the Committee stage or at the plenary. The 
weakness of the parliamentary questioning system was demonstrated in June 
2014 following the failure of the national football team in the World Cup football 
tournament in Brazil. There were other problems relating to financial arrange-
ments for the national team which might have affected its performance. The 
Minister of Sports and Physical Education was questioned in the National 
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Assembly about these problems. MPs of the opposition SDF demanded a clear 
financial evaluation of the trip to Brazil. The Minister responded that it was 
not possible to provide a financial evaluation at the time because the national 
team had just returned home from Brazil. He went on to state that all other 
questions were likely to be answered by the results of an ongoing investigation led 
by the PM. Although the PM’s investigation should not prevent Parliament 
from obtaining information from the Minister of Sports, the latter used that to 
evade scrutiny. 
In addition to the aforementioned weaknesses, it is doubtful what effect par-
liamentary questions may have in streamlining executive action. The answers 
provided by ministers would usually relate to information on government policy 
and an explanation of how and why they have been adopted or executed. They 
do not necessarily provide any undertaking to alter or change policies that 
legislators deem to be harmful to the electorate. In June 2018 during the par-
liamentary session, the government was questioned on its handling of the 
Anglophone crisis which had left hundreds of civilians and scores of soldiers dead 
in the struggle for self-determination of the Anglophone regions of Cameroon. 
Responding to a question from an opposition MP from the CDU party in the 
National Assembly, relating to a call for dialogue on the Anglophone crisis, 
the PM replied that the default method of resolving sociopolitical disputes in 
Cameroon was dialogue. In that respect, the President of Cameroon had created 
a Commission on Bilingualism and Multiculturalism, an institution which un-
dertakes to promote dialogue in times of peace and in times of crisis. He went 
further to state that everyone is obliged to respect the rule of law and that the 
government’s resort to the use of proportionate force in the Anglophone regions 
was necessary to protect the rights of innocent civilians who were not partici-
pating in the violence that has characterised the conflict in those regions. In 
this instance, the oral questions provided an opportunity for the government to 
discuss this issue openly with parliamentarians. Yet, there was no undertaking 
to ensure that the government engaged in meaningful dialogue with a view to 
resolving the crisis. The failure of the the National Assembly to be proactive in 
discussing and seeking solutions to the Anglophone crisis has demonstrated its 
inability to act as a credible oversight institution. 
Despite the limitations associated with the parliamentary question me-
chanism, in more recent times, the question and answer sessions have provided 
a platform for the opposition to expose incidents of maladministration and 
corruption in the government.184 
II. Vote of no confidence and motion of censure 
Motions of censure and confidence votes are important mechanisms through 
which a legislative body can perform oversight of the executive. According to 
Rodney Brazier, their real significance lies in the fact that they oblige every 
government to justify its actions and explain its policies to parliament and 
through parliament, to the entire country.185 In Cameroon, only the National 
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Assembly (as opposed to the Senate) can adopt a motion of censure or vote of 
no confidence against the government. Although this should be a formidable 
mechanism by which the National Assembly could effect the accountability of the 
government, the relevant provisions have been so narrowly construed that they 
do not afford sufficient capacity for the mechanism to be effective. 
The Constitution provides that, after the deliberations of the Council of 
Ministers, the PM may commit the responsibility of the government before the 
National Assembly on a programme or general policy statement.186 In which 
case, voting shall take place at least forty eight hours after a vote of no confidence 
was requested and a successful vote shall be passed by an absolute majority.187 
Similarly, after the deliberations of the Council of Ministers, the PM may 
commit the responsibility of the government before the National Assembly on 
the adoption of a bill.188 In which case, the bill may be considered adopted, 
except where a motion of censure tabled within twenty four hours is passed.189 
There are doubts as to the effectiveness of this process as an oversight 
mechanism.190 The procedure for vote counting appears to be an obstacle to 
obtaining the requisite majority as only the votes against the vote of no con-
fidence are counted.191 Thus, MPs who have abstained from voting for various 
reasons are counted as having voted against a vote of no confidence.192 
Moreover, it would appear that rather than being a mechanism for oversight, 
a motion of no confidence initiated by the PM is a means by which the executive 
curbs legislative scrutiny. This is so because government bills initiated through 
this process can become law without a vote from parliament as long as a motion 
of censure has not been submitted.193 This process can provide opportunity for 
the government to pass unpopular policies, while circumventing the legislative 
process. András Sajó has observed that, with reference to France (on which 
the Cameroonian system is modelled), the confidence vote is more a weapon 
of the sitting government than an exercise of government’s responsibility to 
Parliament.194 
In Cameroon, the National Assembly can also hold the government accoun-
table through a motion of censure.195 A motion of censure is only admissible if 
signed by at least a third of the MPs and shall be passed by a two-third ma-
jority.196 Where the National Assembly passes a no confidence vote or adopts 
a motion of censure against the government, the PM is expected to tender the 
resignation of the government to the President of the Republic.197 Nevertheless, 
the President may reappoint the PM and ask him to form a new government.198 
In the event of a rejection of a motion of censure, the signatories are prohibited 
from proposing another motion within one year, except where the PM commits 
the responsibility of the government on the adoption of a bill.199 As an oversight 
mechanism, these arrangements are problematic for at least three reasons. 
The first problem inheres in the fact that, although the PM and the cabinet 
implement national policy as defined by the President, the latter is not being 
censured as the authority from which the policy originates. Rather, it is the PM 
and the cabinet that are potentially being held accountable for implementing a 
policy initiated by the President. Admittedly, it is a commendable mechanism in 
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terms of scrutinising the activities of the government. The limitation, however, is 
that it allows the President to deflect criticism and censure onto the Cabinet, 
while exculpating himself from parliamentary scrutiny. 
The second problem stems from the possibility of the reappointment of the 
PM by the President. A PM who would have resigned from office following 
a censure from the National Assembly would be reappointed despite failing 
to command the support of that house.200 An important implication is that 
parliamentary oversight is rather ineffective if it can be overridden by the 
reappointment of the PM. 
The third problem can be gleaned from the fact that signatories to a motion of 
censure cannot propose another motion within one year in the event that their 
motion is rejected. This provision therefore has the potential to limit the fre-
quency of parliament initiated censure.201 Admittedly, it is unlikely that under 
the current dynamics in parliament with the ruling CPDM party controlling an 
overwhelming and largely disciplined majority in the National Assembly, with an 
increasingly fragmented opposition, a motion of censure or vote of no confidence 
has a fair chance of succeeding. The Inter-Parliamentary Union reports that, 
between 1990 and 2000, numerous motions of censure were tabled by the 
opposition but none were ever successful.202 Paul Ayah contends that,203 in 
practice, the constraints have made it impossible for parliament to hold the 
government to account.204 He argues that MPs from the ruling party are usually 
disinclined to vote against party initiative as it may constitute grounds for dis-
ciplinary action.205 That was the situation during the 2008 constitutional 
amendments which among other amendments, eliminated presidential term 
limits. Although proposals for the reforms met with stiff opposition from the 
electorate and the parliamentary opposition, it was widely voted for by the ruling 
majority. Paul Ayah was the only member of the ruling party who opposed the 
amendment and abstained from voting. Subsequently, in a press interview, he 
alleged threats to his life and that of his family and victimisation from security 
forces as a result of his criticism of the ruling party. He eventually resigned from 
the party to join the opposition.206 
A further rationale for the reluctance of members of the ruling party to 
vote against party initiatives (even if they disagree with such initiatives) is the 
patronage advantage associated with membership of the party.207 The CPDM 
party affords the best opportunity for patronage and according to the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, candidate selection is based on 100% loyalty to presidential policy.208 On 
account of those social circumstances, in addition to structural weaknesses, it is 
evident that the motion of censure and vote of no confidence are ineffective 
mechanisms for parliamentary oversight of the government. 
III. Commissions of inquiry 
Article 35(1) of the Constitution provides the basis for the creation of ‘committees 
of inquiry’ within parliament, with specific terms of reference.209 In that respect, 
each of the houses of parliament may adopt a draft resolution to set up a 
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commission of inquiry.210 The draft resolution must outline the facts necessi-
tating an inquiry or the government service(s) whose management is the subject 
of the inquiry.211 Such commissions are not permanent and exist only for the 
purpose(s) for which they are created.212 The members are appointed on the 
basis of a single round majority list ballot213 and their duties terminate following 
the submission of their report to the relevant house.214 
As commissions of inquiry within the context of the Constitution have specific 
terms of reference, their role is clearly outlined. This includes information 
gathering and the examination of administrative, financial or technical man-
agement of public services with a view to informing the relevant house.215 
Additionally, the commissions may inform the relevant house, on the status of 
some matters of national interest and assist the house to make appropriate 
proposals.216 
Although commissions of inquiry may be empowered217 to carry out their 
functions, they are subject to certain restrictions. Thus, where judicial pro-
ceedings have been instituted on the same matter the commission already in-
vestigating the matter is required to seize operations.218 Similarly, a commission 
of inquiry cannot be established where judicial proceedings have already com-
menced.219 Although the rationale is not specifically stated in the law, this 
approach can be argued, from a separation of powers perspective, to be an 
approach that allows the system of checks and balances to function appropriately 
without undue interference from another branch of the government. 
A further restriction can be gleaned from the requirement to respect official 
state secrecy legislation, by virtue of which members of the commission are 
bound by secrecy.220 This is perhaps to maintain the integrity of the investigation 
being undertaken on behalf of parliament. This also applies to the reports sub-
mitted to parliament following the conclusion of the investigation. No member of 
the commission or anyone else may publish in whole or in part, any reports from 
the commission or any information about its proceedings or acts.221 Parliament 
alone has the mandate to publish any part of the report, following a special 
resolution by either house and proposed by the speaker of the relevant house 
or the commission concerned.222 
Generally, parliamentary commissions of inquiry like those provided for by the 
Constitution should perform an important role in the checks and balances system 
of a government. Through their investigations, they act as a credible source of 
information which may be useful to the public and to the ultimate assessment of 
government policy.223 In the latter role, they may trigger the process for gov-
ernment accountability to parliament.224 However, the benefits of commissions 
of inquiry are yet to accrue to the checks and balances system in Cameroon. The 
reason reverts to the predominance of the ruling party in both houses of par-
liament. This poses an obstacle first in terms of the passing of a successful re-
solution to establish a commission of inquiry and second for the membership of 
the commission to be fairly representative and independent. This partly explains 
the absence of parliamentary scrutiny in the face of a significant number of 
incidents of maladministration or government high handedness towards the 
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population. For instance in December 2018, the SDF Parliamentary Group 
petitioned the speaker of the National Assembly to open a parliamentary inquiry 
into the withdrawal of the football tournament, Africa Cup of Nations which was 
to be hosted by Cameroon in 2019. Cameroon lost its hosting rights in 
November 2018 following persistent delays in the completion of relevant infra-
structural facilities, in breach of its commitment to the organising authorities 
(Confederation of African Football). The SDF Group was of the opinion that it 
was necessary for parliament to conduct an inquiry to understand what went 
wrong, to learn from the mistakes and hold those responsible to account. The 
incident was internationally embarrassing to Cameroon due to the international 
significance of the event and also in the light of the major financial commitments 
that the country had undertaken in that respect. Yet, the speaker of the National 
Assembly did not deem it necessary to open a parliamentary inquiry.225 
Similarly, the opposition have been unsuccessful is calling for a commission of 
inquiry to investigate the massive violations of human rights in the North-West 
and South-West regions. In the context of the current dynamics in parliament, 
successfully petitioning for the establishment of a parliamentary commission of 
inquiry remains a herculean task.226 
C. Fiscal oversight 
Budgetary scrutiny is the main mechanism through which parliament performs 
fiscal oversight of the government. An additional mechanism is through com-
mittees of inquiry appointed to investigate matters relating to public finance.227 
The rules governing such committees are identical to other committees of inquiry 
discussed earlier. The committee of inquiry for matters relating to public finance, 
however, may report cases to the budget disciplinary committee.228 
The power to perform budgetary oversight is particularly vested in the 
National Assembly which adopts the state’s budget as the finance law during 
one of its sessions.229 The Committee on Finance and Budget of the National 
assembly is responsible for scrutinising the annual budget of the state which is 
presented as the finance bill. The performance of this role is underpinned by 
three main phases.230 The first phase consists of a review process based on an 
examination of the execution of the previous budget which is presented as a 
settlement bill.231 If adopted this becomes the settlement law.232 The second 
phase is the approval of the budget based on an examination of allocations and 
projected income for the following financial year, presented as the initial finance 
bill.233 The process is aimed at ensuring that revenue projection is realistic and 
budget allocations adequately reflect government policy priorities for the sub-
sequent financial year. If adopted, this becomes the initial finance law.234 The 
third phase involves quarterly auditing of government reports submitted to 
parliament on budget execution and the implementation of the initial finance 
law.235 Amendments may be made to the initial finance law during this period 
but must be tabled before parliament following the procedure for the adoption of 
the initial finance law.236 Any amendments made to the initial finance law at this 
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stage are referred to as amendments to the finance law,237 which together with 
the initial finance law and the settlement law, have the status of finance laws of 
the state.238 
In terms of procedure, once the Chairmen’s Conference deems a finance 
bill presented by the government admissible, it is transmitted to the Finance 
Committee for a substantive study.239 The substantive study provides the op-
portunity for Committee members to scrutinise government action, for instance, 
scrutinising the projected revenue and expenditure stated in the initial finance 
bill. Additionally, each ministry represented by its minister or a designated 
representative would be required to make representations which include clar-
ifications on issues raised by Finance Committee members and statements 
defending their budgets. The Minister of Finance takes centre stage in defending 
the overall budget of the state and in presenting a report on the execution of the 
previous budget. This is an important phase of the oversight process as it pro-
vides a means by which parliament, through the Finance Committee, probes the 
government for any perceived anomalies or discrepancies in projected revenues 
and to provide the rationale for expenditure on selected programmes. In the 
November 2018 session during which the finance bill for the year 2019 was 
discussed, the Finance Committee raised a number of concerns to the Minister 
of Finance. Some of these included the negative balance of trade due to the 
importation of food, despite the national production capacity and government 
subsidies to the local industry; the need to budget for actions aimed at restoring 
peace in the North-West and South-West regions and the reasons for the 
failure to involve domestic companies in the construction of stadia to host the 
2019 AFCON.240 In response, the Minister noted that reforms aimed at re-
vamping production structures were currently being undertaken and stated that 
although it was difficult to quantify the action necessary in the North-West and 
South-West regions, to warrant separate budgeting, there were funds allocated 
under ‘common expenditure’ which could be used for that purpose should the 
need arise.241 He also informed the Committee that, in relation to AFCON 
preparations, domestic companies were excluded due to possible delays and that 
in order to pre-empt this, the government had opted for companies that 
were capable of delivering ‘prefabricated structures’.242 It is not clear that the 
Committee was persuaded by these responses. Nevertheless, it provided some 
basis for evaluating the decision of the government.243 
Although government ministers and their representative are required to de-
fend their budget, the Committee is often unable to elicit sufficient cooperation 
or clarification from the government. A notable instance is during the scrutiny of 
the 2019 Initial Finance Bill, when the Finance Committee inquired as to the 
sufficiently of funds allocated to ELECAM to improve on the electoral process 
and the electoral system.244 The relevant government representative opined 
that the Committee should concern itself with consideration of the budget for 
ELECAM and not with the budget for the organisation of elections.245 It is 
difficult to see how these two heads should be considered in isolation in the 
process of scrutinising the projected expenditure relating to the institution that 
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plays a key role in the election process, especially in the light of parliamentary 
and municipal elections which were expected in that financial year. Although it is 
clear that such lack of cooperation in practice undermines an effective oversight 
process, the Committee is not empowered to compel the government to co-
operate. In those circumstances, it does appear that there is potential for the 
effectiveness of the process to be adversely affected. 
As part of the process of scrutinising the budget, the Committee may make 
recommendations which could be accepted246 or rejected by the government. 
Where recommendations are accepted, the relevant budget head would be 
amended before being adopted by the Committee. The Committee stage is 
followed by a presentation of the budget (as adopted by the Committee) to the 
plenary of the National Assembly. Very often at this stage, the house adopts 
the budget as the finance law for the subsequent financial year.247 In view of 
the historic dominance of the CPDM and the entrenched party disicpline, the 
finance bill is usally adopted with ease. The 2018 finance bill was passed without 
much debate despite significant disturbances from the political opposition 
aimed at compelling the National Assembly to discuss the turbulent situation in 
the North-West and South-West regions. The Constitution, however, envisages a 
situation where the budget is not adopted before the end of the financial year. In 
which case, the President of the Republic is empowered to extend the current 
budget by one fifth until a new budget is passed.248 
Another aspect that remains questionable in the oversight process is the 
scrutiny of the settlement bill. In that process, the National Assembly works in 
collaboration with the Audit Bench of the Supreme Court which is vested with 
powers to provide its opinion on the execution of the budget for the preceding 
financial year.249 In addition, the Finance Committee may request the Audit 
Bench to conduct enquiries on the management of government services or en-
tities.250 One aspect which remains unclear is the extent to which parliament 
scrutinises the settlement bill, considering that the opinion of the Audit Bench 
should determine to a large extent whether the bill is passed or not. In the 
examination of the settlement bill for the 2017 financial year, the Audit Bench 
noted a number of significant inconsistencies in government income and ex-
penditure resulting from problems relating to poor budget discipline.251 Yet, its 
recommendation was for parliament to pass the bill as submitted by the gov-
ernment and it was indeed passed without parliament raising issues with the 
discrepancies.252 While this is not necessarily suggestive of weaknesses in the 
parliamentary process, it may be indicative of the limited role of parliament 
as simply one of authenticating the opinion of the Audit Bench, rather than 
providing an additional tier of oversight. 
The second aspects which may render doubtful, the effectiveness of the 
scrutiny of the settlement bill is the extent to which the government could 
be held accountable for the implementation of recommendations arising from 
the scrutiny. The Audit Bench noted with disapproval that during the process 
of auditing the settlement bill for the 2016 financial year, a number of specific 
recommendations were made to the government on improving efficiency and 
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transparency in the execution of the budget.253 However, these seemed not to 
have been implemented by the government as the same issues were noted in the 
settlement bill for 2017.254 Neither the Audit Bench nor the National Assembly 
seemed to have been able to compel the government to respond favourably 
to the recommendations. 
It appears from the aforementioned discussion that there is certainly a system 
which has potential to allow for effective scrutiny of the government. Yet, in 
practice, there are some difficulties orchestrated by the nature of the political 
system and party dynamics. While the Finance Committee may be empowered 
to carry out its functions, the issue of the overwhelming majority of the 
ruling party, coupled with party discipline might affect the ability or willingness 
of Committee members to be assertive in the oversight process. In the legis-
lative period for 2013–2019, of the twenty-member Finance Committee, only 
five members were from the opposition.255 The remaining fifteen members 
were from the CPDM. It is not difficult to see how or why finance bills would 
be passed with relative ease. 
The lack of political capacity or the will to submit the executive to effective 
oversight is not uncommon in many countries in Africa and appears to be a 
product of the nature of the political culture in many African states. It has 
been noted that in sub-Saharan Africa, clientelism and neo-patrimonial pol-
itics compel MPs to retain the favour of the ruling party. Thus, party loyalties 
prevent them from articulating national interest and incentivises them to pass 
the budget quickly in order for funds to be allocated to their constituencies.256 
For parliamentary budget and finance committees such as that of Cameroon 
to be effective, in addition to legislative guarantees, there is need for a shift 
in political cultures to embrace a utilitarian approach by which MPs are 
motivated by the need to work for the greater good of their constituents, rather 
than self and party interests. Such an approach is not without merit. In Ghana, 
for instance, the parliamentary committees are said to be effective in per-
forming their oversight functions, due significantly to the fact that at the 
committee level the collective interests of the MPs supersedes partisanship.257 
With respect to the Ghanaian Public Accounts Committee in particular, 
an additional factor that is said to enhance its clout is the fact that the 
chairperson is statutorily from a minority party represented in parliament.258 
This allows for the possibility of submitting the government’s budget proposals 
to effective scrutiny as the chairman has no personal or partisan interest 
in unduly favouring the government. 
Cameroon’s parliament is not incognisant of its limitations and is taking steps 
to enhance its working relationship with the executive to inter alia improve on 
the oversight process and in particular, to enhance the transparency of the 
budgetary process. As part of that initiative, a Parliamentary Platform has been 
created which aims to provide MPs and Senators access to updated information 
on the Finance and Settlement Bills as well as information on the execution of 
different budgets. It is hoped that this would provide an additional and effective 
level of parliamentary fiscal oversight of the government.259 
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Part V. Parliamentary accountability 
Having noted previously the powers and responsibilities of parliament and the 
constraints on the exercise of these powers, it is worth examining the extent of 
parliamentary accountability. Accountability is a basic requirement for public 
office in a democracy and owing to the nature of parliamentary functions, 
accountability is imperative. The position in Cameroon consists of vertical and 
horizontal accountability structures. Vertical accountability may be said to be 
embedded in the electoral process. In other words, MPs and Senators are held 
accountable by the electorates during elections. This should ordinarily be a useful 
and effective mechanism in a system that allows for free and fair elections, but 
as has been demonstrated earlier in this chapter, that is not often the case in 
Cameroon. The inevitable conclusion that may be drawn from this assertion is 
that the mechanism for vertical accountability is unreliable. 
In contrast, parliament is horizontally accountable to the executive. This is not 
explicitly stated in the Constitution or any statutory instrument. Nevertheless, 
as discussed in more detail in the previous chapter, the National Assembly can 
be dissolved by the President of the Republic after consultation with the 
Government, the Bureau of the National Assembly and the Senate.260 No further 
conditions are stipulated for the rationale to dissolve the National Assembly. As 
such, this may rely on the sole discretion of the President. Although it may be 
argued that this is not a method of accountability, it does seem, implicitly, that 
parliament is made answerable to the President as the decision to initiate a 
dissolution lies solely with him. The question to consider at this point is whether 
that provision leaves parliament vulnerable to the executive? An answer in the 
affirmative inherently suggests some form of accountability. 
Parliament is nevertheless protected by immunity provisions, which consist of 
a blend of both the parliamentary non-accountability model and the parlia-
mentary inviolability model.261 Under the former model, parliamentary agency 
is protected by ensuring that MPs and Senators are immune from prosecution, 
investigation, arrests, detention or trial for speeches made or votes cast in the 
exercise of their duties.262 The law on defamation further extends this protection 
by excluding from the offence of defamation, speeches made within any legis-
lative assembly or reports and other documents printed on the orders of such an 
assembly.263 It also excludes from the offence of defamation, ‘Faithful accounts 
without malice’ of the public sittings of such assemblies.264 These provisions 
appear sufficiently wide to protect legislators. In a democracy, immunity is a 
necessary element aimed at safeguarding inter alia, the independence of legis-
lators. On account of their role as largely elected representatives who collectively 
represent the public will, they must of necessity be granted scope for free and 
open debate. Despite this significant benefit, there remains the potential for 
human rights violations that may be facilitated by the non-accountability 
model.265 
However, Cameroon’s dual approach to an extent addresses that potential 
problem. Thus, the second model, the parliamentary inviolability model, allows 
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for the lifting of parliamentary immunity with the authorisation of parliament. It 
follows that, parliament (when in session) or the Bureau of each house (when not 
in session) may authorise criminal prosecution against any legislator following 
the lifting of their immunity.266 However, the authorisation of parliament is 
dispensed with in cases of offences committed in flagrante delicto or offences against 
the internal and external security of the state.267 Nevertheless, parliament or the 
Bureau of the two houses can, through a motion, suspend the detention or 
prosecution of any legislator by a public prosecutor or the Minister of Defence 
where the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the military tribunals.268 
The system which combines parliamentary non-accountability and inviol-
ability is consistent with constitutional checks and balances to the extent that 
although parliamentary agency is protected, any excesses can be streamlined 
through the authorisation of parliament itself. The underlying idea is for legis-
lators to be able to freely promote democratic ideals yet be constrained to act 
within the same democratic ideals which they purport to promote. In practice, 
the National Assembly has sometimes albeit reluctantly upheld these responsi-
bilities by lifting the immunity of some MPs. A notable instance was in February 
2005 when the Bureau of the National Assembly unexpectedly lifted the im-
munity of one of its influential members, Fon Doh Gwanyim, who was cumu-
latively the Mayor and MP for the Balikumbat Constituency under the banner 
of the ruling CPDM. The background to this relates to criminal investigations 
for the alleged murder of the district Chairman of the opposition SDF.269 There 
have been other instances where MPs have been divested of their immunity, 
although some have been tainted by allegations of political motivations in 
support of aims pursued by the government and the ruling CPDM.270 
Conclusion: democratisation and bicameralism in a 
one-party dominated state 
For decades, the image of the National Assembly remained that of a feasible and 
compliant institution brimming with self-serving representatives who exercised 
public office at the pleasure of the President. This counter-intuitively produced a 
system of representation of the executive will, rather than the will of the people. 
According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018 report, the legislature in Cameroon was 
described as weakened by overwhelming presidential influence.271 The report 
further stated that the overwhelming majority held by the ruling party ensured 
that parliament was subject to the wishes of the executive and almost no initiative 
originated from parliament.272 This is ironic as has been demonstrated pre-
viously in view of the functions and powers of parliament in holding the ex-
ecutive to account. A closer look at those powers and the dynamics within 
parliament explains to a large extent why the National Assembly remained a 
feeble institution. The change that was expected with the advent of multiparty 
politics and subsequently the establishment of a Senate has not been witnessed in 
any meaningful form. In fact, the composition of the Senate, in particular, 
militates against any meaningful political influence. In addition to the fact that it 
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is infused with members of the CPDM and appointed ardent supporters of the 
regime, there is an age issue which makes the efficiency of that house ques-
tionable. The Senate has been described as being ‘composed primarily of elderly 
former ministers and traditional chiefs’.273 While age should not necessarily 
hinder the proper functioning of an institution, it can have an overall effect on 
the dynamism and innovativeness of that institution and its amenability to adapt 
to changing political circumstances. The doyen, Chief Victor Mukete, is over 
hundred years old and the Speaker of the house, Niat Njifenji, is eighty five years 
old (and constantly absent for health reasons). In fact, the minimum age elig-
ibility limit for election or appointment of senators (forty years) already militates 
against a youthful senate. This is a pattern of the political system in Cameroon 
which is based on the ‘recycling’ of loyal political elite, to the exclusion of the 
younger generation that also has a perspective to offer in regards to the demo-
cratic advancement of the country and the development of national policy. 
Another pertinent observation with the age issue is that, most of the Senators 
especially the presidential appointees have been part of the regime for con-
siderably lengthy periods and have operated in a system that is not receptive to 
change. In consideration of the benefits they obtain from the system through 
lavish allowances and other advantages, there is very little incentive for change. 
Although bicameralism now exists in fact, in theory and practice, the chal-
lenges and ills that bedevilled monocameralism have transcended into the new 
dispensation. It remains the case of ‘pouring new wine into old wineskins’. Both 
the National Assembly and Senate are institutions that are configured to con-
solidate presidential power and to ensure the survival of the regime. There is 
arguably no intention to represent the popular will as the electoral system itself 
eliminates that possibility. For parliament to emerge as a credible public in-
stitution, a number of factors would require transformation, notably the electoral 
system which inhibits meaningful democratic advancement and the reform of 
internal working systems through the committees to give the opposition sub-
stantial scope to influence parliamentary debates and decisions. Similarly, there 
needs to be a shift in the clientelist structure and political culture. This is a wider 
issue which affects other areas of public life and therefore an overhaul of the 
entire system, difficult as it may be, would be essential. 
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4 The judiciary, judicial 
independence and power   
Introduction 
This chapter explores the judiciary as one of the ‘powers’ of the state, one of the 
major changes introduced in the 1996 Constitution. That innovation emerged 
from the 1990s’ journey towards democratisation as a recognition of the re-
levance of a strong and independent judiciary to an effective democratic process. 
However, as with other aspects of governance discussed so far, the foundations of 
‘judicial power’ have been laid on an executive-centric Constitution that limits 
the extent to which other arms of government can effectively exercise power. 
From the discussion that follows, it will be demonstrated that the way judicial 
power is structured, exercised and controlled belies any purported elevation of 
the status of the judiciary. Unlike some judiciaries in other countries that 
have promoted democratisation and respect for the rule of law, the judiciary 
in Cameroon has continued to be haunted by its past weaknesses and more 
contemporary challenges for which it is constitutionally ill-equipped to address. 
This chapter will provide a basic description of the organisation of the ju-
diciary and the jurisdiction of the respective courts. It will proceed to examine 
the status of the judiciary and the extent to which it can be considered 
independent. In the course of the discussion, the challenges that confront the 
judiciary will be identified. 
Part I. Organisation of the judicial system and 
jurisdiction of the courts 
According to the Judicial Organisation Law, judicial organisation shall comprise 
of the following1:  
– The Supreme Court  
– The Court of Appeal  
– The Special Criminal Court  
– Lower Courts of Administrative Litigation (Regional Administrative Courts)  
– Lower Audit Courts (Regional Audit Courts)  
– Military Tribunals 
– High Courts  
– Courts of First Instance  
– Customary Law Courts 
It can be seen from the above list that the Supreme Court is at the apex of the 
organisational structure of the courts. In the sections that follow, the relevance of 
that hierarchy will become apparent in discussing the jurisdiction of the courts 
and the appeals therefrom.  
Pursuant to the constitutional and statutory provisions2 regulating the judicial 
system, a dual classification of courts can be distinguished. The classification is 
often described in terms of courts of ordinary jurisdiction and courts with special 
jurisdiction as described briefly later. 
A. Courts of ordinary jurisdiction 
Courts of ordinary jurisdiction have general competence to settle all types 
of matters, be they criminal or civil. They include Customary Courts, Courts of 
First Instance, High Courts, Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court.3 Within 
this classification, there are courts with original jurisdiction and those with ap-
pellate jurisdiction. 
I. Ordinary courts with original jurisdiction 
These are courts with jurisdiction to hear matters at first instance. Thus, the 
Customary Courts, Courts of First Instance and High Courts have original 
jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters.4 Regional Administrative Courts 
and Regional Audit Courts are also ordinary courts with original jurisdiction. 
The courts are discussed later in turn. 
A. REGIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS 
Regional Administrative Courts are an innovation introduced by a 2006 statute.5 
Although article 42 of the Constitution provided for lower Administrative 
Courts, these were not established until 2016. Prior to that period, the Supreme 
Court exercised both original and appellate jurisdiction in administrative mat-
ters.6 The current position is that Regional Administrative Courts have exclusive 
ordinary jurisdiction in matters relating to administrative review, while appeals 
therefrom go to the Administrative Bench of the Supreme Court.7 The courts 
are located in the regional headquarters, although a court may serve more than 
one region where service needs make it imperative.8 
The courts are composed of a president, judges, a registrar in chief and re-
gistrars at the bench.9 At the Legal Department (LD), the composition includes 
the Procureur General of the Court of Appeal for that region and one or more 
deputy Procureur General.10 All matters are heard by a collegiate bench of three 
judges.11 Unlike most ordinary courts which are composed exclusively of career 
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judges, the law makes provision for the appointment of non-career judges such as 
senior civil servants and senior contract officers with a masters degree in law and 
fifteen years of work experience.12 Law professors with a minimum of ten 
years’ experience and lecturers with a minimum of fifteen years may also be 
appointed.13 These appointments would be made under exceptional circum-
stances where service needs make it necessary and in all instances, the ap-
pointments are for a temporary period of five years.14 The law does not state 
what these service needs may be, neither does it make provision for the training 
of the non-career judges. Perhaps this would be a matter to be dealt with 
internally by the individual courts concerned. 
The courts have exclusive jurisdiction in matters relating to administrative 
authorities. In that respect, they are competent to hear and determine disputes 
emanating from municipal and regional elections and disputes between the 
state, decentralised public authorities and state institutions.15 Administrative 
acts contemplated by the aforementioned provisions include petitions for 
the quashing of ultra vires acts, actions for damages resulting from administrative 
acts, disputes relating to public contracts and public utility concessions, disputes 
relating to state lands and the maintenance of law and order.16 In the exercise 
of its jurisdiction, the court may, when faced with difficulties in interpreting 
or assessing the legality of a legislative act or a regulatory instrument, refer 
the matter to the Administrative Bench of the Supreme Court.17 
B. REGIONAL AUDIT COURTS 
Regional Audit Courts are also a creation of a 2006 statute.18 They were first 
mentioned in article 41 of the 1996 Constitution but their establishment 
and functioning was dependent on a law which was enacted in 2006. The audit 
courts are in principle located in the regional headquarters, although due to 
service needs, their jurisdiction may cover several regions.19 
In terms of their composition, at the Bench, they are composed of a 
president, section presidents, judges, registrars, registrars on special duty, 
judges on special duty, commissioners of audit and trainee commissioners 
of audit.20 At the LD, there is the Procureur General of the Court of Appeal for 
that region, deputy Procureur General and deputies to the Procureur General on 
special duty.21 Matters are heard in that court by a collegiate of three 
judges.22 As with the lower Administrative Courts, provision is made for 
non-career judges fulfilling the same criteria as those described above, except 
that with the Audit Courts, the academic disciplines are broader and include, 
economics, public finance, management and accounting.23 The Courts are 
organised in separate sections with each allocated respectively to regions and 
urban councils, rural councils, councils trade unions and councils or regional 
public establishments.24 
The Courts are competent to control and adjudicate on public accounts and 
the accounts of regional and local authorities and public establishments within 
their area of territorial jurisdiction.25 They shall also decide on matters of 
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accounting expressly devolving upon them by law and those referred by the 
Supreme Court.26 
It is worth noting that the Audit Courts are yet to be established. Their es-
tablishment shall be progressive, depending on service requirements and the 
state’s available resources.27 In the interim, the Audit Bench of the Supreme 
Court exercises original jurisdiction while appeals are heard by a joint session of 
all the sections within the Audit Bench of the Supreme Court.28 
C. HIGH COURTS 
High Courts are established in every administrative division29 and are located in 
the headquarters of that division’.30 However, for service purposes, its territorial 
jurisdiction may cover several divisions by decree of the President of the 
Republic.31 The High Court is composed of a president, one or more judges, one 
or more registrars and a registrar in chief at the bench.32 At the preliminary 
inquiry, there are one or more examining magistrates and one or more regis-
trars.33 At the LD, there is a state counsel and one or more deputy state 
counsels.34 All cases brought before the High Court shall be heard by a single 
judicial officer, although some matters may be heard by a collegiate bench of 
three judges at the instance of the president of the Court or on the request of the 
LD or a party to the dispute.35 The composition of the Court in labour matters is 
regulated by the Labour Code.36 Following an amendment to the Judicial 
Organisation Law in 2011, the High Courts are organised into Benches and a 
General Assembly.37 There are separate benches for civil, commercial, criminal 
and labour matters,38 although the president of the Court of Appeal may by 
order merge two or more benches taking into account the service needs of the 
Court.39 The General Assembly shall be composed of all the legal and judicial 
officers of the Court and the registrars in chief.40 It shall have a judicial and an 
advisory jurisdiction and provide its opinion on issues relating to the functioning 
of the Court and in matters provided for by the law.41 
In terms of its substantive jurisdiction, in criminal matters, the Court has 
competence to try felonies and related misdemeanours and to hear and de-
termine bail applications, subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of First 
Instance.42 It has competence to entertain civil matters relating to the status of 
persons, civil status, marriage, divorce, filiation, adoption and inheritance.43 
Other civil matters include claims where the damages exceed 10,000,000 CFA 
and recovery by way of the simplified recovery procedure, claims not exceeding 
10,000,000 CFA.44 Its competence in commercial matters includes collective 
proceedings for the cancellation of debts, unquestionable, liquidated and due 
commercial debts of any amount where the obligation arises from a cheque, a 
promissory note or a bill of exchange and disputes relating to commitments and 
transactions between businessmen and commercial establishments.45 In addition, 
it can entertain disputes between shareholders of companies or economic interest 
groups relating to commercial companies and acts and bills of exchange between 
all persons as provided for by the Organisation for the Harmonisation of 
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Business Law in Africa (OHADA) Uniform Act on general commercial law, 
where the amount exceeds 10,000,000 CFA.46 Its jurisdiction in labour matters 
includes claims which exceed 10,000,000 CFA.47 Furthermore, the Court has 
jurisdiction in non-administrative matters, to issue the writs of mandamus, 
prohibition48 and habeas corpus49 and to hear petitions against administrative 
detention measures.50 The Court can additionally, through its president or a 
judge designated by the president, hear disputes relating to the enforcement of 
the decisions of High Courts.51 
D. COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE 
In principle, Courts of First Instance are found in every sub-division and located 
in the headquarters of that sub-division.52 However, for service purposes, its 
territorial jurisdiction may cover several sub-divisions by decree of the President 
of the Republic.53 The composition of the Court is as follows: at the bench, there 
is a president, one or more magistrates, one or more registrars and a registrar in 
chief.54 At the preliminary inquiry, there are one or more examining magistrates 
and one or more registrars.55 At the LD, there is a state counsel and one or more 
deputy state counsels.56 All cases brought before the Court shall be heard by a 
single judicial officer,57 although provision is made for a hearing by a collegiate 
bench of three magistrates when deemed necessary by the president or at the 
request of the LD or a party to the litigation.58 In matters relating to minors, the 
composition of the Court is regulated by a special law59 and in labour matters, 
it is regulated by the Labour Code.60 The Courts of First Instance are also now 
organised into Benches and a General Assembly.61 There are benches for civil, 
commercial and labour matters, benches for misdemeanours and simple offences 
and benches for matters relating to minors.62 Where service needs make it ne-
cessary, the president of the Court of Appeal may by order merge two or more 
benches.63 The General Assembly is comprised of all the legal and judicial of-
ficers of the Court and the registrars in chief.64 It shall have a judicial and an 
advisory jurisdiction and provide its opinion on issues relating to the functioning 
of the court and in matters provided for by the law.65 
The Court has substantive jurisdiction in criminal matters to try all offences 
classified as simple offences or misdemeanours and felonies committed by minors 
without adult co-offenders or accessories and to hear applications for bail.66 In 
civil matters, it has jurisdiction to hear matters where the damages claimed does 
not exceed 10,000,000 CFA and to recover by way of the simplified recovery 
procedure, claims not exceeding 10,000,000 CFA.67 In commercial matters, the 
court may hear disputes relating to commitments and transactions between 
businessmen and commercial establishments and disputes between shareholders 
of companies or economic interest groups relating to commercial companies and 
acts and bills of exchange between all persons as provided for by the OHADA 
Uniform Act on general commercial law, where the amount does not exceed 
10,000,000 CFA.68 The court also has jurisdiction in labour matters where the 
claim does not exceed 10,000,000 CFA.69 Additionally, when hearing a criminal 
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matter, the court has jurisdiction to entertain claims for damages resulting from 
the criminal act even where the amount claimed exceeds 10,000,000 CFA.70 
E. CUSTOMARY COURTS 
Customary Courts are the least influential in terms of the administrative and 
political governance of the country but they play an important role within the 
local communities in which they operate. They are found in administrative 
districts. Article 4(1) of the Judicial Organisation Law states that the organisation 
of courts including the Customary Courts shall be laid down by law. However, 
there are no new laws governing Customary Courts, so these continue to exist 
under the different regimes applicable in the Anglophone and Francophone 
Regions before 1972.71 Nevertheless, customary courts have civil jurisdiction in 
customary marriages, divorce, custody, succession and inheritance, applying the 
local customs and traditions of the districts in which they operate. They can only 
entertain matters for which the claim does not exceed 69,200 CFA. 
II. Ordinary courts with appellate jurisdiction 
The courts with appellate jurisdiction are the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court. 
A. COURTS OF APPEAL 
The Courts of Appeal are located in the headquarters of each of the ten ad-
ministrative regions in Cameroon.72 As with the other courts, its territorial 
jurisdiction may cover other regions where the need arises.73 The Court of 
Appeal is composed of a president, one or more vice presidents, one or more 
judges, one or more registrars and a registrar in chief at the bench.74 The LD is 
composed of a Procureur General, one or more Advocates General, one or more 
deputies of the Procureur General and one or more Legal Assistants at the Procureur 
General’s chambers.75 The Court is organised into Benches and the General 
Assembly.76 There are quite a number of benches, perhaps due to its appellate 
role to accommodate all matters of appeal from lower courts. There are separate 
benches for matters relating to motions and urgent applications, the enforcement 
of judgments, civil, commercial, criminal, labour and customary law matters and 
those relating to misdemeanours, simple offences and inquiry control.77 Despite 
the number of benches, the president of the Court may by order merge two or 
more benches taking into account the service needs of the Court.78 
Unlike the General Assembly for the High Courts and Courts of First 
Instance, that of the Court of Appeal is composed of all the judicial officers of the 
Court and the registrars in chief only.79 It also has a judicial and an advisory 
jurisdiction and provides its opinion on issues relating to the functioning of the 
Court and in matters provided for by the law.80 It is worthy to note that although 
section 20(2)(a) states that the Court is organised into Benches and a General 
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Assembly, subsequent provisions use the term ‘General Meeting’ instead. It is not 
clear why this discrepancy exists but both are interpreted to give effect to section 
20(2)(a). 
With respect to jurisdiction, a Court of Appeal is competent to hear appeals 
against decisions delivered by all courts (except those of other Appeal Courts and 
the Supreme Court), appeals against the rulings of Examining Magistrates and all 
other matters provided for by the law.81 The 2011 amendments introduced some 
changes to the substantive jurisdiction of Appeal Courts. Previously, each Appeal 
Court was competent to hear disputes relating to the enforcement of its own 
decisions. The current position is that the president of the Appeal Court can hear 
and determine disputes relating to the enforcement of decisions of all Appeal 
Courts.82 
All cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Court must be heard by three 
judges who are members of that Court.83 However, when hearing appeals from 
the Military Court, one of the judges must be a military judge or a member of the 
armed forces where a military judge is unavailable.84 In addition, when hearing 
appeals from military tribunals, a military magistrate shall be appointed to re-
present the LD.85 
B. SUPREME COURT 
There is one Supreme Court which has national jurisdiction and is located in 
Yaoundé, the capital city.86 It is the highest court of record with final jurisdiction 
in judicial,87 administrative and audit matters.88 The Bench of the Supreme 
Court is composed of a First President (who is the president of the Supreme 
Court), presidents of the bench, justices, masters, puisne justices, the registrar-in- 
chief of the Supreme Court, registrars-in-chief of the bench and registrars.89 The 
LD is composed of a Procureur General, a First Advocate General and advocates 
general.90 
In terms of its organisational structure, the Supreme Court is made up of a 
Bureau, a General Secretariat and a Registry and five benches designated as 
follows91:  
– The Administrative Bench ( jurisdiction in administrative litigation)92  
– The Audit Bench ( jurisdiction in the auditing of public accounts)93  
– The Judicial Bench ( jurisdiction in civil, criminal, commercial and social 
matters and those relating to customary law)94  
– Panel of Joint Benches ( jurisdiction in matters relating to the regulation of 
judges, recusal and transfer of cases between courts)95  
– A Full Bench (examines matters relating to the Court submitted to it by the 
First President, the Procureur General or by one third of the members of the 
Supreme Court)96 
Each of the Benches is composed of divisions97 which have a president, at 
least two justices of the Supreme Court and one or more Advocates General.98 
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A 2017 amendment to the Supreme Court Law introduced significant changes to 
the Judicial Bench and the composition of its relevant divisions.99 The necessity 
for the changes stemmed from the protracted Anglophone crisis and the grie-
vances of the common law lawyers regarding the insouciant treatment of the 
inherited English common law in Cameroon’s bi-jural legal system. This move 
was intended to assuage some of the concerns of common law advocates by 
appearing to be according the common law an equal status with the civil law. 
Thus, in addition to its previous competence, the Judicial Bench is also now 
competent to hear and determine final decisions of tribunals on matters governed 
by the common law.100 According to the new section 8, the Judicial Bench is 
composed of a civil division, a commercial division, a criminal division, a labour 
division, a customary law division and a common law division. The common law 
division is the innovation. It shall have jurisdiction, in matters relating to the 
common law, to hear appeals against final decisions of tribunals and judgments 
of Courts of Appeal.101 To ensure professional competence, the law provides that 
judges appointed to the common law division must have ‘an Anglo-Saxon legal 
background’. This is perhaps a response to one of the main grievances of the 
Anglophone lawyers in respect of the fact that the government has increasingly 
appointed civil law trained judges who have neither the language nor the pro-
fessional competence to serve in courts in the Anglophone regions which apply 
the inherited English common law. 
Despite the apparent attractiveness of the changes, one pertinent observation 
can be made here. The fact that all matters emanating from the Anglophone 
regions have to be heard by a single division in the Supreme Court, whereas 
appeals from lower courts from other regions applying the civil law are dispersed 
within the many divisions in the Supreme Court. The common law may seem to 
have been elevated because it now has a special division. This may not be an 
elevation in itself. In fact, it has been further relegated by giving it the same status 
as customary law. Note that, in the organisation of the Benches into divisions, the 
civil law is not mentioned as a division. A more appropriate approach would 
have been to increase the number of common law judges within the different 
divisions of the Court to ensure that every panel hearing an appeal has sufficient 
representation of judges from both legal traditions. By attempting to resolve a 
problem, the government might be creating another one in the sense that there is 
potential for the common law division to be overwhelmed by cases from the two 
Anglophone regions. This might lead to delays an aspect that is inimical to the 
efficient administration of justice. 
As an appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has specific provisions on the 
grounds for which its jurisdiction may be invoked. According to section 35, the 
grounds include:  
– Want of jurisdiction  
– Misinterpretation of facts  
– Default, contradiction or insufficient grounds  
– Irregularity 
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– Breach of the law  
– Failure to respond to the submission of the parties or the LD  
– Abuse of office  
– Violation of a general principle of law  
– Failure to comply with the jurisprudence of a panel of joint divisions or joint 
benches of the Supreme Court 
With the establishment of the Constitutional Council, the Supreme Court has 
ceased to exercise jurisdiction in the review of legislation, the standing orders 
of parliament and international instruments, and the resolution of disputes 
emanating from parliamentary and presidential elections and the functioning of 
institutions. 
B. Courts with special jurisdiction 
These are courts with specialised jurisdiction in terms of the subject matter. 
They may also be limited in terms of the category of persons with standing to 
sue or those over whom the court has jurisdiction. These courts are Military 
Tribunals, the Court of Impeachment, the State Security Court and the 
Constitutional Council. Since 2011, the judicial landscape has extended to 
include the Special Criminal Court created by an act of parliament to try the 
offence of misappropriation of public funds. It should be noted that the law on 
judicial organisation does not mention the Court of Impeachment, the State 
Security Court and the Constitutional Council. Therefore, they may be con-
sidered as courts that operate outside of the ordinary judiciary. However, on 
account of the fact that they perform judicial functions, they will be discussed 
briefly here (except the Constitutional Council which is discussed separately in 
the next chapter). 
I. Military tribunals 
In relation to the military tribunals, the law specifically states that they are tri-
bunals of special jurisdiction.102 Like the other courts discussed previously, they 
are located in the regional headquarters.103 Peculiarly, the tribunal in Yaoundé 
has a special status as it can exercise jurisdiction over the national territory 
during exceptional circumstances specified in article 9 of the Constitution104 or 
during circumstances leading to a serious threat to public order and state security 
or acts of terrorism.105 Additionally, it has competence to hear various type of 
offences committed by servicemen on official mission or during operations 
abroad.106 The general competence of military tribunals is regulated by section 8 
of the Military Justice Code. This provision gives the tribunals a very wide 
competence which includes crimes ranging from war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide, terrorism-related offences, the purchase, importation, sale, 
use, keeping and wearing of military effects and insignia and offences committed 
with the use of fire arms, by both military and civilian persons. 
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Two of the main criticism against the military tribunals are the breadth 
of their competence especially in the area of terrorism which is very vaguely 
defined107 and their jurisdiction over civilians, an aspect which contravenes in-
ternational and regional instruments ratified by Cameroon.108 In Walter Numvi & 
others v The People, the Court of Appeal in Bamenda confirmed that ‘ordinary 
civilians’ charged under the legislation on terrorism must be tried in a military 
tribunal.109 In recent years, the military tribunal has received considerable 
attention due to its active role in the fight against terrorism orchestrated by boko 
haram in the northern parts of the country and its controversial role in the pro-
secution of terrorism-related offences committed by political dissidents and 
Anglophone separatist and federalist leaders. 
II. Special Criminal Court 
The Special Criminal Court was created by an act of parliament110 as an 
accelerated means of combating corruption in Cameroon, principally the 
embedded criminal culture of misappropriation of public funds. The Court is 
located in Yaoundé, with jurisdiction over the entire country.111 The Bench of 
the Court is composed of a president, one or more vice presidents, one or 
more advisers (judges) and one or more examining magistrate.112 The LD is 
composed of a Procureur General, Advocates General and one or more deputy 
Procureur General.113 
The Court is competent to hear and determine matters relating to the mis-
appropriation of public funds and related offences provided for by the Penal 
Code and international conventions ratified by Cameroon, where the amount of 
the loss is a minimum of 50,000,000 CFA.114 This in effect limits the competence 
of the High Court to try felonies such as misappropriation, to those that result in 
losses below 50,000,000 CFA. The jurisdiction of the Special Criminal Court is 
original and appeals from there are made directly to the Supreme Court.115 A 
rationale for the direct approach (appealing directly to the Supreme Court) is 
partly to eliminate lengthy procedures and reduce trial times which remain an 
issue in the administration of justice in Cameroon. Whether the objective has 
been achieved remains a moot point. 
III. Court of Impeachment 
A Court of Impeachment is provided for under article 53 of the Constitution. 
This provision states very briefly the general competence of the Court.116 
According to article 53(4), the organisation, composition and conditions under 
which matters shall be referred to it, as well as the applicable procedure shall be 
laid down by law. This law is still to be enacted. Without further information, it is 
not clear whether this Court exists within or outside of the ordinary judiciary. 
One reason for the uncertainty is the role of parliament in indicting the President 
of the Republic. This question is likely to be answered by the enabling legislation. 
In any case, in light of the fact that it is not included in the Judicial Organisation 
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Law, it may be reasonable to presume that it exists outside of the ordinary 
judiciary. 
IV. State Security Court 
The State Security Court was provided for by a 1990 statute in the context of 
the democratic uprisings in the 1990s.117 It has ‘exclusive’ competence to try 
felonies and misdemeanours against the internal and external security of the 
state.118 The Court has both original and appellate (final) jurisdiction although 
appeals may be made exceptionally to the Supreme Court on matters of in-
terpretation and application of the law.119 Uncertainties now surround the 
role of the State Security Court considering the wide competence of the 
military tribunals in state security issues120 and the exclusive competence in 
matters relating to terrorism.121 It is not clear which of the courts will prevail 
in the relevant matters. However, the State Security Court has not been 
established, neither has the 1990 law been repealed. It has been argued that 
the Court is a tool to be used by the government to supress citizens.122 This 
position can neither be supported nor refuted considering that the Court is yet 
to be established. 
Part II. The status and independence of the judiciary 
Prior to 1996, the status of the judiciary in relation to the executive and the 
legislature was doubtful. In particular, it could hardly be considered as equal 
to those two arms of the government. This affected in practice its relation with 
legislative and executive bodies and institutions. In addition, its independence 
was called into question in the light of its inferior status and the manner in 
which judges were appointed and made to progress within the judiciary. This 
section attempts to unravel the changes introduced principally under the 
1996 Constitution and to determine the contemporary effects on the judiciary 
as a ‘power’. 
A. Structure and constitutional status of the judiciary 
It is worth stating at the outset that discussions on the judiciary in this part 
exclude the customary courts, the Court of Impeachment, the State Security 
Court and the Constitutional Council. With the exception of the customary 
courts, these courts operate outside of the ordinary judiciary and they all differ 
(including the customary courts) in many respects from the ordinary courts. 
The discussion here may not necessarily be relevant to them. 
I. Structure 
Cameroon has a peculiar judicial structure which is based on the French 
civil law system and therefore different from other judicial systems, particularly 
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those with an English common law orientation. It is deemed necessary to ex-
plain its peculiarities due to the fact that some of the terms have been used in 
the preceding sections of this chapter. The judiciary consists of two main ca-
tegory of judges, notably, judges ‘of the bench’123 and prosecutors.124 The 
former are those engaged in the conventional function of adjudication. There is 
also a judge known as the examining magistrate (a judge of the bench) with 
responsibility to conduct preliminary investigations in criminal matters.125 In 
contrast, prosecutors perform prosecutorial functions and form part of what is 
known as the LD. The LD is attached to all the courts.126 In the appellate 
courts, the LD is headed by the Procureur Général (directly responsible to the 
Minister of Justice)127 and a State Counsel128 in the lower courts (directly 
responsible to the Procureur Général of the Court of Appeal within its territorial 
jurisdiction).129 The role of the LD in criminal matters is to conduct in-
vestigations, issue warrants and carry out prosecution and generally to enforce 
laws, regulations and judgments.130 The Ministry of Justice also has a LD 
through which it performs its supervisory duties on the judiciary.131 
Interestingly, judges may be appointed to serve on the bench or the LD during 
their career or even to the Ministry of Justice.132 This has serious implications 
for judicial and prosecutorial independence as discussed subsequently. 
II. Constitutional status 
A major innovation of the 1996 Constitution with respect to the judiciary is the 
elevation of that institution from an ‘authority’ to a ‘power’ like the legislature 
and the executive. Both the 1961 and 1972 Constitutions referred to the ju-
diciary as an authority. The elevation was described as a measure to establish 
‘the balance and separation of power’.133 This was important in the context 
of the democratic revival in the 1990s to demonstrate concerted efforts at es-
tablishing a constitutional democracy. Article 37(2) of the Constitution further 
appears to enhance the position of the judiciary by providing that ‘The judicial 
power shall be independent of the executive and legislative powers’. Despite the 
audacious statement, the actual transformation of that status is doubtful. This 
is partly evident in article 37(3) which provides controversially that judicial 
independence shall be guaranteed by the President of the Republic, who ir-
onically is the executive. Admittedly, article 37(3) does not indicate a prima 
facie case of judicial subservience as it may be a positive duty imposed on the 
President to ensure that the necessary conditions exist for the judiciary to 
function independently. However, for that obligation to be meaningful, it 
should necessarily be backed by a mechanism to ensure that the President fulfils 
that obligation.134 
As will become evident, predominantly in the discussion of the judicial tenure, 
the conditions for securing judicial independence are inimical to the exercise of 
actual judicial autonomy or power. It would seem that, while normatively, the 
status of the judiciary has been elevated to a power, substantively, it is still 
perceived as an authority. 
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B. The judicial tenure: appointment, career progression and 
discipline of judges 
I. Appointment 
Unlike common law systems where judges are appointed from senior lawyers 
in private practice, Cameroon follows a typical civil law approach where the ju-
diciary is a career judiciary. Judges are appointed following the completion of two 
years of training in the National School of Administration and Magistracy (ENAM) 
in the Magistracy section.135 Entrance into ENAM is dependent upon success in a 
competitive exam undertaken by candidates who have completed a master’s degree 
in law or maitrise en droit.136 Following their training, they are integrated into the civil 
service as members of the judicial corps and enjoy a fixed tenure until retire-
ment.137 In terms of their appointment, the Constitution provides that they shall be 
appointed by the President of the Republic, with the assistance 
of the Higher Judicial Council (HJC).138 They may be appointed as judges on the 
bench, as prosecutors, investigating magistrates or to the Ministry of Justice.139 
The appointment method is a co-operative one as it involves both the 
President and the HJC. Ideally, this method affords more opportunities for 
transparency and independence. Indeed, this method has been described by the 
government of Cameroon as part of the ‘balancing mechanism’140 to prevent 
exclusive executive control of the judiciary. In support of that assertion, the 
government asserts that the HJC is composed of distinguished personalities and 
characterised by broad representation and balance.141 Yet, the co-operative 
method described earlier can be deemed ambiguous in terms of the statutory 
arrangements for the composition of the HJC. At the helm, there is the President 
of the Republic who is the chair, followed by the Minister of Justice as deputy 
chair. Other members are three parliamentarians, an independent personality 
appointed by the President, the President of the Supreme Court and three senior 
judges.142 It can be seen that the President is member of the same institution that 
is supposed to assist him in the appointment of judges and with the exception of 
the parliamentarians, all the other members of the HJC are presidential ap-
pointees. Perhaps at the initial appointment stage into the judiciary, this poses no 
significant issues, considering that all graduates from ENAM must be appointed 
to commence service anyway. The situation may be different in terms of career 
progression and discipline. 
II. Career progression 
As career civil servants, judges progress through a certain hierarchy through 
various means, including promotions or transfers which may in effect be pro-
motions. Consistent with the requirement for security of tenure, they have a 
fairly secured tenure as it is fixed until retirement.143 However, a judge’s term 
may be extended by presidential decree where necessitated by the nature or 
peculiarity of certain functions.144 This is a rather vague provision which does 
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not define the specific conditions under which an extension may occur. This is 
unfavourable to the basic tenets of judicial independence as it provides an op-
portunity to enhance the tenure of a conformist judge who may be more inclined 
to advance the political objectives of the executive.145 The point is not that 
extensions are inherently objectionable, but that they should be based on clearly 
defined criteria with the aim of facilitating the administration of justice. Some 
executive authorities in other jurisdictions exercise this power, albeit under well- 
defined conditions. For instance, in Botswana, the tenure of a High Court judge 
can be extended by the President to permit the conclusion of proceedings that 
commenced before him prior to attainment of the retirement age.146 This is 
clearly to allow for the efficient administration of justice and the power to extend 
that tenure is exercised in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service 
Commission.147 
In Cameroon, progression within the judicial hierarchy is further determined 
through promotions. Here again, the President of the Republic assumes a de-
cisive role. He is responsible for promotions and is assisted by the HJC ‘which 
shall give him its opinion on all nominations’.148 Note here that the HJC is only 
required to give an ‘opinion’ as opposed to advice and the President is not bound 
by it. In terms of procedure, promotion is purportedly based on recommenda-
tions backed by the evaluation of individual judges. There is a separate system for 
judges in the appellate courts. Senior judges149 within the Supreme Court, 
Courts of Appeal and the Ministry of Justice would be subject to evaluation by 
the Minister of Justice who subsequently recommends the judges for promotion 
on the advice of the Secretary General and directors at the Ministry of Justice.150 
Less senior judges are evaluated, respectively, by the presidents of the Supreme 
Court and Courts of Appeal.151 Judges in the lower courts are evaluated by 
the president and Procureur Général of the Court of Appeal for that administrative 
region.152 They must act on the advice of the presidents of the respective 
courts.153 There is also provision for judges who have not been recommended 
by their superiors. In those circumstances, the individual judges may submit 
personal requests to the Minister, paradoxically through their hierarchical su-
perior.154 The reports from evaluations and subsequent recommendations are 
forwarded by the Minister to the HJC which must decide through a process of 
voting and the collation of a final list of nominees.155 The list forms the basis 
of the recommendations to the President of the Republic who in principle 
promotes judges by presidential decree based on the nominations.156 
The process is ostensibly rigorous and potentially objective. There are, how-
ever, a number of issues which emerge from further analysis. For instance, the 
fact that the Minister and other executive authorities in the Ministry are in 
charge of the evaluation process for senior judges. The extent of their knowledge 
of the performance of these judges is doubtful. Moreover, given the composition 
of the HJC, there is effectively no distinction between those who perform the 
evaluation and nominations, and the institution responsible for recommenda-
tions and final appointment. It is akin to making the same institution or per-
sonalities, judge and jury in the process. More poignantly, the evaluations do not 
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seem to be based on an objective criteria, a situation which may engender ar-
bitrariness. Cumulatively, the system appears to be one that is prone to abuse by 
the executive. In fact, within the judicial sphere, the system has been said to 
impede on the individual independence of judges.157 
That is also the case with transfers which may sometimes be perceived as a 
double edge sword. Given the geographically decentralised nature of courts as 
described earlier, judges may be transferred to different geographical locations. 
In addition, they may be transferred functionally – between the bench, the LD 
and the Ministry of Justice. A major issue with transfers is the absence of 
specific criteria for selecting judges that should be transferred.158 The HJC is 
also required to provide its opinion on transfers, but as with promotions, the 
opinion is not binding and the President of the Republic retains decisional 
authority.159 This has prompted some senior judges to question the possibility 
of exercising judicial independence in the midst of such obscurity and executive 
control.160 The uncertainties with transfers perhaps account for why they are 
sometimes seen as punitive measures towards errant judges. For instance, a 
transfer from the bench to the LD is often seen (particularly among common 
law judges) as a punitive measure on judges who exercise decisional in-
dependence against the executive.161 The assumption is that, because the LD is 
directly answerable to the Minster of Justice, a judge so transferred would be 
‘cowed’ or ‘tamed’ through direct subordination to the Minister. A transfer to a 
geographically remote area is similarly perceived as a punitive measure on an 
errant judge who decides against the executive. Courts in remote areas are 
presumably places where the judge would be removed from the most con-
tentious cases where the executive has no particular interest to safeguard.162 
The judges are well aware of the potentially abusive nature of the systems of 
transfer. This was evident in the very controversial case of The People v Nya 
Henry163 where a number of the Southern Cameroons National Council 
members were arrested during peaceful celebrations commemorating the end 
of British colonial rule in Southern Cameroons. Uncharacteristically, their 
application for bail was granted due to irregularities in the execution of the 
arrest by executive officials and to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. 
This decision was unfortunately reversed on appeal. The trial judge was con-
scious of the possible repercussions for his heroism and clearly noted in his 
judgements that, ‘those who cherish the status of this country as a state of law 
should keenly follow-up … any developments in the career of this magistrate 
after this case’.164 Unswervingly, he was transferred to another jurisdiction to 
serve in the LD.165 A similar outcome was registered in Wakai v The People166 
where a panel of judges ruled against the executive in favour of granting bail 
to members of the opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF) party. They had 
been arrested under very irregular circumstances during nationwide protest 
at allegedly rigged presidential election results in favour of the incumbent 
President Biya. The judges’ decisional independence was sanctioned by the 
transfer of the president of that court (who was a member of the panel) to the 
LD and the transfer of the other two judges to remote areas.167 In both 
124 The judiciary, judicial independence and power 
cases, the transfer of the judges was an overt reaction to their decisional 
independence. 
A further controversy with transfers is that it can sometimes be used by the 
executive as a tool to manipulate the judicial process especially in political cases. 
This was the situation with the recent protracted trial of some Anglophone se-
paratist leaders in the Yaoundé Military Tribunal for secession, terrorism and 
other related offences. The case suffered a number of adjournments, with a 
disquieting adjournment on 10 January to reconstitute the panel of judges due 
to the transfer of a panellist to another region.168 This caused further delays in 
the trial with the result that the accused remained in prolonged pre-trial de-
tention. A pertinent question in relation to the transfer is whether it was abso-
lutely necessary to transfer the judge at that point. Another case in point is the 
trial of Titus Edzoa in the Mfoundi High Court for embezzlement of public 
funds, a trial widely believed to be politically motivated as Edzoa was seen as a 
potential contender for the presidency.169 On 18 July 2012 when the Court was 
expected to arrive at a decision, the matter was adjourned.170 It transpired that 
one of the judges in the panel was summoned the previous night to be ordered to 
take up an appointment elsewhere. Ironically, the judge had been appointed in 
April 2012 by presidential decree and it was not until this crucial moment that 
their effective transfer was deemed necessary. The intention of the executive here 
was very dubious as it had the effect of delaying the trial given that the case had 
to be heard all over by a new panel which had to be constituted. 
III. Discipline 
Although judges enjoy a fixed term until retirement, they are subject to dis-
ciplinary sanctions. This is necessary to maintain their accountability, a quality 
that is essential to the proper administration of justice. There are a number of 
breaches of professional conduct that can attract disciplinary sanctions. These 
include lack of professionalism, lack of integrity, impropriety, failure to adhere to 
the law, breach of duty to the state171 and breach of the judicial oath.172 While 
most of these conducts may seem easy to identify, others such as ‘breach of duty 
to the state’ may be controversial. For instance, what amounts to a judge’s duty 
to the state is unclear. Such a nebulous conduct cannot objectively form the basis 
of a disciplinary sanction. 
As with the progression system, the President of the Republic and the HJC 
play yet an important role.173 The disciplinary procedure is essentially adver-
sarial in nature. A potential disciplinary complaint received by the Minister is 
referred to the HJC for further investigation by an ad hoc committee of HJC’s 
members, appointed by the President.174 This would be followed by a hearing at 
which the judge in question may represent themselves or be represented by 
counsel or even a colleague.175 This process is thus dominated by the HJC which 
acts both as judge and prosecutor thereby undermining the objectivity of 
the process. Subsequent to the hearing and further deliberations by the HJC, the 
latter makes a recommendation which is transmitted to the President by the 
The judiciary, judicial independence and power 125 
Minister.176 This provision is controversial on the basis of the composition of 
the HJC. If the President and Minister are chair and vice chair, respectively, they 
would be expected to be part of the same deliberations and recommendations 
which are meant to be subsequently transmitted to the same President. The 
President may act on the recommendations or bypass them to sanction the judge 
in question by presidential decree.177 
There are a number of possible sanctions ranging from less severe to more 
severe sanctions, including elimination from the promotion list, a freeze on 
promotion for a maximum of two years, declassification, early retirement, tem-
porary suspension for a maximum of two years, a reprimand or caution178 and 
dismissal179 with or without pension.180 Despite the wide variety of possible 
sanctions, it is unclear what misconduct attracts specific disciplinary sanctions. 
There is no way of foreseeing the corresponding sanctions for a misconduct 
particularly because the presidential decrees do not often indicate the provision 
of the relevant law that has been breached. For instance, the decree sanctioning 
Pascal Magnaguemabe, a once reputed ‘Paul Biya super magistrate’181 contained 
the reasons for his dismissal – ‘extortion of powers of attorney’ and mis-
appropriation of the funds for the estate.182 The decree did not mention under 
what provision of the law he was being sanctioned or whether the sanction 
corresponded with the impugned actioned. Given the unfavourable reputation of 
the judge in the public sphere and his controversial role in the fight against 
corruption by the Biya regime, it would have been prudent for the decree to be 
more specific in order to dispel conspiracy theories.183 The obscurity of the 
system for sanctioning is a weakness that can create room for arbitrariness in 
the way judges are sanctioned by the executive. A recent example of executive 
arbitrariness in applying disciplinary sanctions was the summary retirement 
of Paul Ayah SCJ, a fierce critic of the government and former leader of the 
opposition Peoples Action Party. He was arrested during the Anglophone crisis 
on charges of terrorism after fiercely condemning the government for grossly 
mishandling the crisis in the Anglophone regions.184 He was quickly sent on 
retirement after a session of the HJC. The government argued that he was due 
for retirement anyway. However, this move was widely seen as a sanction for his 
criticism of the executive partly because as noted earlier, the retirement age can 
be extended by the executive. In view of the political context surrounding his 
retirement, allegations of executive arbitrariness in his abrupt retirement did not 
seem unfounded. 
Judicial independence under the current arrangements in Cameroon has 
been severely compromised by the specific arrangements to guarantee a secure 
judicial tenure. With the executive firmly in control of appointments, pro-
gression and discipline, there is little scope for judges to exercise decisional 
independence. These aspects have not gone unnoticed by the judges as a Court 
of Appeal judge affirmed that the judicial career is the ‘sole prerogative of the 
executive’ who exercises this role ‘without the restraints of transparent and 
objective selection procedures’.185 More recently, in ironically, a protracted 
habeas corpus hearing,186 an advocate commented on the influence of the 
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executive on the decisional independence of judges. The case concerned, a 
journalist arrested in connection with the Anglophone crisis and accused of 
supporting armed separatists. The advocate remarked that the inability of the 
judge to exercise decisional independence in that case was indicative of their 
lack of independence.187 
C. Judicial independence versus accountability:  
a tenuous relationship 
Stephen Burbank asserts that judicial independence and accountability can be 
more appropriately described as ‘different sides of the same coin’188 due to their 
complementary relationship. Judicial independence is instrumental in providing 
the medium through which judges can render justice impartially, promote the 
rule of law and secure human rights. In contrast, accountability is necessary in 
order to avoid undermining the same goals that independence aims to achieve. 
An unaccountable judiciary stands the risk of exercising power in an abusive way 
which does not afford impartiality or promote any of the goals described earlier. 
The importance of that relationship has been reflected in the Constitution which 
vests the President of the Republic with the duty to guarantee judicial in-
dependence.189 In addition, judges are required to render justice in accordance 
with the law and their conscience.190 Moreover, judicial decisions are required 
to be in writing, well-reasoned and supported in law and in fact.191 This is to 
pre-empt judicial arbitrariness and provide scope for accountability through a 
process of appeal or through public scrutiny.192 
Despite the complementarity of the two concepts, accountability and in-
dependence are inherently conflicting, primarily because it is not always possible 
to determine the appropriate balance between the two concepts. Excessive in-
dependence can lead to an unaccountable judiciary whereas an overly accoun-
table judiciary is likely to be deprived of the requisite level of independence. The 
latter scenario is feasible where the mechanisms to secure independence have 
been conceived or structured in ways that render the judiciary almost exclusively 
accountable to one institution, for instance, the executive. Moreover, where the 
tenure and career progression are exclusively controlled by one institution, the 
judiciary is unlikely to have the capacity to act independently, at least towards 
that institution.193 Independence can be further compromised in a system that is 
devoid of an objective or transparent mechanism for judicial accountability. 
The judiciary in Cameroon exhibits that tension between accountability and 
independence.194 As demonstrated earlier, the judiciary is excessively reliant on 
the executive for appointment, tenure and discipline. Moreover, the disciplinary 
system is obscure and lacks objectivity. This is a situation that does not augur 
well for judicial independence. Epuli SCJ, Fonachu JA and Evande J, have 
condemned the accountability system which lacks objectivity and its punitive 
focus for which disciplinary files are left interminably open.195 The judges assert 
that the system engenders a sense of constant apprehension, a fact which affects a 
judge’s ability to be independent.196 During a ceremony to mark the beginning 
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of the judicial year in 2011, Martin Rissouk à Milong, then Procureur Général at the 
Supreme Court, questioned whether judges could be independent and act im-
partially towards the executive when the judiciary is structurally attached to the 
executive, the career of judges is dependent on the executive and judges have to 
measure all the consequences of the decisions they make.197 It may be argued 
that the inclusion of the HJC in the determination of the judicial tenure is a 
cooperative mechanism aimed at balancing the oversight of the judiciary. Yet, as 
already discussed, this is doubtful given the composition of the HJC and its 
nominal role of making recommendations rather than binding decisions. This 
fact was condemned in Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al v Cameroon,198 a complaint to the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights against the government of 
Cameroon. The complainants, the SCNC and Southern Cameroons Peoples’ 
Organisation (SCAPO),199 complained inter alia about the lack of judicial in-
dependence in Cameroon, in breach of article 26 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. On that point, the African Commission held that 
the presence of the President of the Republic and the Minister of Justice and 
their respective roles in the HJC are ‘manifest proof that the judiciary is not 
independent’.200 It stated further that ‘[t]he composition of the HJC by other 
members is not likely to provide the necessary “checks and balances” against 
the chairperson, who happens to be the President of the Republic’.201 The 
Commission recommended the restructuring of that institution to remove the 
President and the Minister. That recommendation resonates with the approach 
taken by the French government in restructuring its equivalent institution to 
eliminate the role of the President and the Minister202 as a means of reinforcing 
the independence of the judiciary.203 A more objective judicial service institution 
relies little on the executive. Such arrangements are more prevalent in common 
law oriented systems where judicial service commissions are predominantly 
independent of the executive and are more influential in overseeing the 
judiciary.204 
A further means by which the accountability of the judiciary undermines its 
independence is through its financial dependence on the executive. The 
funding of the judiciary is an important aspect by which the proper adminis-
tration of the courts can be obtained and also a means to enhance the ad-
ministration of justice. A system of funding based on transparent and objective 
criteria makes the judiciary as an institution less susceptible to undue influence 
and promotes the integrity and competence of individual judges. One way of 
enhancing financial independence is by charging the judiciary’s budget to a 
consolidated fund which is not controlled exclusively by one institution.205 A 
judiciary that is dependent on one institution for its funding and lacks the 
qualities of objectivity and transparency is likely to be susceptible to undue 
influence from that institution.206 
That is regrettably the position in Cameroon where the judiciary’s budget is 
not a fixed percentage of the national budget. As a department in the Ministry of 
Justice, its budget is inextricably linked to that of the Ministry. That invariably 
impacts on the mechanisms for providing the remuneration and allowances of 
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judges which are determined by the executive through decrees that are suscep-
tible to erratic changes.207 The lack of objectivity and transparency provides 
an additional dimension through which the independence of the judiciary is 
undermined208 and judges have described the situation as objectionable and 
a threat to their independence.209 This has been noted in relation to the dis-
criminatory augmentation of the salaries and allowances of judges involved in 
presidential and parliamentary elections.210 Prior to the establishment of the 
Constitutional Council, the Bertelsmann Stiftung reported that Supreme Court 
judges who were involved in overseeing electoral processes received regular 
salary increases.211 In response to the challenges facing the judiciary, Maurice 
Kamto has advocated for the creation of an independent institution with com-
petence in matters relating to the funding of the judiciary.212 He contends that 
such an approach has potential to secure judicial independence. 
D. The prosecutor in the judicial landscape 
Prosecution and adjudication are inherently separate functions, although in 
Cameroon that distinction is increasingly blurred. As noted earlier, judges as-
sume the role of adjudicators or prosecutors at different points in their career. 
There is, however, a normative distinction particularly in terms of the hier-
archical relationship between the Ministry of Justice and the LD. The judiciary is 
considered a department in the Ministry and is hierarchically linked to it through 
the LD which is made up of prosecutors. The Procureur Général who is head of the 
LD is central to that relationship as he provides the hierarchical link with the 
Ministry.213 The relationship is underpinned by the principle of subordination to 
hierarchy which proceeds on the assumption that prosecutors are answerable to 
the Minister (through the hierarchy of the Procureur Général ).214 That relationship 
is sometimes perceived as a good accountability mechanism.215 Emmanuel 
Ndjere, for instance, asserts that the hierarchical relationship between the ju-
diciary and the Ministry is an instrumental one.216 It is the means by which the 
Minister, as the representative of the executive in the Judiciary, can coordinate 
and harmonise judicial politics in his department to conform to public policy 
objectives such as maintaining peace and public order, which are necessary for 
economic development.217 Similarly, Kamto is of the view that it is a system of 
accountability that ensures the consistent and impartial application of the law.218 
While acknowledging the excessive dependence of the judiciary on the executive, 
he argues further that the relationship would be necessary to maintain law and 
order and to prevent the development of an errant judiciary.219 This may well be 
the case if the prosecutorial service were distinctively separated from the judicial 
services. Thus, while those arguments may sound compelling, there is need to 
take into account further implications for the judiciary. 
A principal implication of that relationship of subordination is that prosecutors 
are required to act in accordance with the instructions of the Minister,220 failure 
of which may attract a disciplinary sanction. That position was confirmed by the 
government in its Fourth Periodic Report to the UN Human Rights Committee 
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when it reiterated that prosecutors were ‘bound to respect the principle of sub-
ordination to hierarchy’ since they represent the executive in the judiciary.221 
This may be contrasted with judges of the bench who are required to act ac-
cording to the law and their conscience. A problem with the hierarchical sub-
ordination of the LD is that prosecutors act only at the instance of the Minister 
who must give them specific instructions on matters relating to prosecution of 
criminal offences, particularly those involving senior public officials.222 The effect 
is to limit the independence and initiative of prosecutors.223 It also creates room 
for the political interference of the executive in cases where it has a specific 
interest to prosecute. 
A further controversy of the system inheres in the fact that prosecutors can 
become judges of the bench who should hear and determine cases applying the law 
and their conscience impartially. The problem is that a prosecutor who has been 
subordinated to the executive due to the requirement to be subordinate may 
not necessarily be disposed to independent initiative when they sit on the bench. 
Moreover, as demonstrated earlier, it is the same executive that determines 
important aspects of their career. Those two factors combine to provide an en-
vironment that is unconducive to independence. Irrespective of whether the 
former prosecutor is now a judge of the bench and no longer required to submit to 
the will of the Minister, it is still a fact that judges of the bench belong to a judiciary 
that is dependent on the executive. Their tenure is still determined by the executive 
through arbitrary processes. Fonachu JA notes that due to the dependence of the 
judiciary on the Ministry of Justice, ‘a judge feels compelled to respond positively 
to the dictates’ of those that determine their career.224 Moreover, it is not very 
convincing that psychologically, a former prosecutor would feel completely 
detached from the LD or the Minister. According to Anyangwe, judges who have 
served as prosecutors cannot ‘suddenly become independent and fearless’ and 
are more likely to act as prosecutor than impartial judges.225 This resonates with 
the argument relating to the transfer of judges to the LD as a disciplinary measure 
aimed at ‘cowing’ judges into submission. 
The International Bar Association has condemned this system noting that the 
inter-changeability of judicial functions creates insecurity in the judicial tenure 
and severely compromises the independence of judges.226 In France where a 
similar system applies, empirical research has demonstrated that some judges 
have found it difficult to determine their actual status and assert that the problem 
results from the fact that they ‘have multiple functions’.227 As such, they some-
times question whether they are judges or prosecutors.228 A recent decision of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding the relationship between 
the prosecutor and the judiciary in Germany and Lithuania unveils the inter-
national perspective on the issue. In Germany, in particular, the Court held that 
the prosecutor’s office in not an independent judicial authority on the basis that 
the prosecutor is part of an administrative hierarchy headed by the Minster of 
Justice and therefore exposed to the risk of political interference.229 This decision 
makes it even more problematic to argue, as Kamto has done, in favour of the 
relationship between the LD and the Ministry of Justice and the alternating 
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functions of judges in Cameroon. As discussed, this relationship is inimical to 
judicial independence conceptually and as a matter of its practical application 
to Cameroon. 
E. Judicial scrutiny of the executive 
The main mechanism by which the judiciary performs oversight of the ex-
ecutive is through judicial review of administrative acts. The system of review 
is closely modelled on that of France which has a specialised jurisdiction for 
administrative authorities. This is partly an upshot of the French approach 
to the principle of separation of power which has the effect of subordinating 
the judiciary to the executive. A necessary implication is that executive 
or administrative authorities must be tried by a specialised court rather 
than the ordinary judiciary. In Cameroon, jurisdiction in administrative 
review is vested in lower Administrative Courts with appeals going ex-
clusively to the Administrative Bench of the Supreme Court.230 This section 
will discuss some of the most salient issues relating to judicial review such as 
the scope of review, matters exempt from review and the problem of lack 
of judicial power.231 
I. Scope of review 
Administrative courts have jurisdiction to hear petitions emanating from the 
acts of administrative authorities carried out in their capacity as administrative 
officials. Thus, they have competence to entertain petitions for the annulment of 
ultra vires or unlawful acts, claims for damages resulting from an administrative 
act, disputes emanating from contracts or public service concessions, disputes 
relating to state land and disputes emanating from the application of procedures 
on the maintenance of law and order.232 Ultra vires acts include acts that are 
bad in form, acts made without jurisdiction, acts that infringe a legal provision or 
constitute an abuse of authority.233 Additionally, a decision which is materially 
inaccurate or based on an inaccurate interpretation of the law constitutes a 
breach of authority.234 
The administrative Bench of the Supreme Court, sitting at first instance in 
Cameroon Music Corporation (CMC) v Ministry of Culture235 has applied its powers to 
annul an administrative decision. This action was initiated by the Cameroon 
Music Corporation (CMC), an organisation responsible for regulating copyright 
and related rights of musical artists in Cameroon. It challenged an earlier de-
cision236 of the Minister of Culture, Ama Muna, dissolving the CMC on the basis 
of inefficient management. The Minister had arbitrarily taken over the man-
agement of the CMC and subsequently, unilaterally created a separate organi-
sation to replace the defunct CMC. The Court held that the Minister’s decision 
was not taken in the interest of public order or public security and instead had 
the potential to cause permanent damage to the CMC. As a result, the decision 
was annulled.237 
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An essential criteria which must be fulfilled is that the impugned act must be 
performed by a respondent in their capacity as an executive or administrative 
official.238 Where the impugned acts are not performed in an official capacity, 
they will still be subject to judicial scrutiny. However, the competent courts 
would be the ordinary courts such as the high courts.239 Impugned acts per-
formed under that category are known as voies de fait, a doctrine of French 
administrative law. It was introduced in Cameroon in Nve Ndongo v Ngaba Victor240 
and incorporated into the legal order under the 1972 Supreme Court 
Ordinance.241 The doctrine proceeds on the understanding that the action of an 
administrative authority can be challenged in the ordinary courts on the basis 
that it is so irregular or arbitrary that it loses its administrative character. In that 
context, it is considered as the personal act of that individual because it has lost 
its administrative character. It is a formidable means by which executive arbi-
trariness can be curbed particularly in an effort to protect human right.242 
A classic example was demonstrated in the Wakai case mentioned earlier. In 
that case, as a result of the upheavals following the proclamation of the pre-
sidential election results, a state of emergency was proclaimed. Executive officials 
proceeded to effect mass arrests of supporters of the main opposition party 
SDF, among whom where the plaintiffs. They made an application to the 
Mezam High Court to be released on bail. Their arrest and detention was 
tainted by irregularities which included arrests without warrants and night arrests 
contrary to the law and the issuing of backdated warrants to legalise unlawful 
detentions. Irregularities also included detentions beyond the limit imposed by 
the emergency legislation. Moreover, some individuals were arrested in different 
jurisdictions but were transferred to the restive zones to be made subject to the 
emergency legislation. In the view of the court, the irregularities were so severe 
that they lost their administrative character; therefore, the bail application could 
be heard in the Mezam High Court, an ordinary court. 
The doctrine of voies de fait has also been applied in Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) 
Oku v Shey Ndifon & Oku Rural Radio Association (ORRA),243 where the Senior 
Divisional Officer for Oku repeatedly and unlawfully interfered with the op-
eration of the Oku Rural Radio. He unlawfully formed a commission to audit 
the accounts of the ORRA, appointing himself as chair of the commission with 
remuneration of 180,000 CFA from the accounts of that Association. He sub-
sequently suspended the Board of ORRA and when a new Board was appointed 
by ORRA’s coordinating committee, the SDO issued an administrative order 
dissolving that and indefinitely suspending the Station Manager. Due to the 
repeated interference, ORRA was pre-empted from its broadcasting service. 
The Court held that the acts of the SDO were manifestly arbitrary and that 
he had no authority to interfere with the management of a private entity such as 
the ORRA. He was held personally liable for the damages to the Association and 
ordered to desist from further interference. 
It can be seen from the aforementioned information that the actions of 
executive officials can be subject to judicial scrutiny whether they act in their 
official capacity or where they act arbitrarily. 
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II. Exemptions from judicial scrutiny: actes de gouvernement 
In spite of the jurisdiction of the courts in scrutinising executive officials, not all 
executive acts can be subject to scrutiny. There is a specific category of acts 
known as actes de gouvernement which are exempt from judicial scrutiny. According 
to section 4 of the Administrative Courts Law, no court shall have jurisdiction 
over acts of the government. The doctrine of actes de gouvernement is an ancient 
French doctrine which pre-empts judicial review of regulatory measures taken 
by executive officials such as the President, the Prime Minister and Minister 
of External Relations.244 The acts or measures are those taken in the context of 
the constitutional relationship between the executive and the legislature and the 
government’s foreign or diplomatic relations.245 Their essential characteristic is 
that they are politically motivated.246 According to the Supreme Court in Kouang 
Guillaume, the rational for jurisdictional immunity is the preservation of the state 
and the maintenance of public order.247 The Court went further to state that, by 
granting such wide powers to the executive, the legislator intended to allow 
political authorities to act without interference from the judiciary and without the 
apprehension of acrimonious conflicts with political powers. The effect is that 
the administrative judge is given powers over ordinary administrative acts, while 
allowing political powers some degree of jurisdictional immunity which is in-
dispensable for them to act without constraints. It follows that if measures are 
taken to preserve the state or public order, submitting them to review can have 
severe consequences.248 
Although the law does not identify or outline any specific acts or measures 
in that category, the Supreme Court (embracing the approach in France) has 
provided some indication of what they may be.249 They include regulatory 
measures relating to parliamentary elections, convening of the electoral college 
prior to legislative elections, convening of the first session of a new parliament, 
the government’s right to initiate bills in parliament, requesting a second reading 
and withdrawal of a bill or failure to introduce a bill, negotiating or ratifying 
international treaties or agreements, treaty enforcement measures and instruc-
tions to diplomatic officials.250 The Court in a later decision considered that 
category incomplete and not specifically reflective of the political context of 
Cameroon or the discretionary powers of the President.251 The Court held that it 
did not take into account some powers which have no distinctive legal or political 
character such as discretional powers to award damages to victims of ter-
rorism.252 Other measures which have been identified in the jurisprudence of the 
Court include the appointment of officials to government and other public in-
stitutions253 and measures taken in the context of the suppression of terrorism.254 
In view of the nature of the acts exempt from scrutiny, it can be argued that it 
is a weakness in the governance and checks and balances system in Cameroon. 
Those are acts that can have significant consequences on individual rights and 
effective public administration. Yet, the acts cannot be scrutinised irrespective of 
the potential severity of their consequences. Consider, for instance, the fact that 
as discussed in Chapter 3, the President of the Republic is almost unaccountable 
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legally or politically despite his overwhelming powers. The President is vested 
with extensive regulatory powers which have been exercised to circumscribe 
some fundamental rights and the independence of institutions such as ELECAM 
charged with the responsibility of overseeing the exercise of some democratic 
rights. Moreover, unlike the clearly defined scope of the legislative competence 
of parliament, the legislative scope of the President is indeterminate such that 
he can assume competence over every aspect which is not under parliament’s 
responsibility. Considering the breadth of those powers it is important that some 
oversight mechanism is available to regulate their effective exercise to ensure that 
regulatory powers are not used arbitrarily, particularly to undermine funda-
mental constitutional rights and principles. In Social Democratic Front v État du 
Cameroun,255 the main opposition party (SDF) petitioned the Supreme Court to 
declare null and void the 2008 presidential decree appointing ELECAM 
members.256 The petitioner argued that the appointment of members of the 
ruling CPDM party to that institution contradicted the incompatibility, neu-
trality and impartiality safeguards provided in sections 11 and 13 of the 
ELECAM Law. The petition was dismissed on the basis that the impugned 
decree was issued by the President in the exercise of his regulatory powers. That 
constituted an act of the government for which no court was vested with powers 
of review.257 That decision is disappointing bearing in mind the potentially 
negative effect an impartial composition of ELECAM may have on free and fair 
elections, thereby undermining democratic rights. Similarly, in Mvogo Jean-Marie 
v État du Cameroun,258 a presidential decree appointing a consular officer was held 
to be an act of the government, which could not be subjected to judicial review. 
The position in Cameroon is at odds with contemporary international stan-
dards which require executive decrees to be subject to review as a means of 
preventing executive arbitrariness. This requirement was affirmed in Civil Liberties 
Organisation v Nigeria,259 where the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights condemned the ousting of the jurisdiction of the courts from reviewing 
executive decrees as an ‘invidious attack on human rights’. In France, the courts 
have attempted to limit the effect of the exemption when fundamental rights 
are threatened. Thus, regulatory acts emanating from the executive can be 
challenged in the Conseil d’État and the Cour de Cassation where they adversely 
affect the exercise of fundamental rights.260 Perhaps, a similar approach can be 
adopted by the courts in Cameroon to ensure at least that fundamental rights 
and other fundamental constitutional principles are not jeopardised. The rig-
orous application of such a controversial doctrine in Cameroon only serves to 
entrench excessive executive hegemony. 
F. Judicial power and the enforceability of judgments 
In addition to the problem of lack of individual and institutional independence, 
judicial power to effectively exercise oversight of the executive is limited by 
the inability to enforce judgments rendered against executive officials.261 The 
latter aspect has been partially demonstrated in some cases discussed earlier.262 
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The inability to enforce judgments against the executive results from the 
deep-seated culture of executive contempt of the courts263 which explains why 
judges are sometimes harassed by security forces.264 In January 2011, for in-
stance, a State Counsel for Tignere, Faro and Deo Division in the Adamawa 
region was severely beaten by soldiers of the Rapid Intervention Battalion 
(BIR) when he attempted to stop them from harassing a civilian.265 One area 
where executive contempt is prominent is in matters relating to arbitrary de-
tention. This was demonstrated in D S Oyebowale v Company Commander Fako266 
where a Nigerian sailor was arbitrarily arrested by the Company Commander 
of the Gendarmerie Company for Fako Division, on the high seas, on his way 
to Cameroon. There were no apparent reasons for his arrest, neither were any 
charges read to him at the time of the arrest. He was later detained in 
Cameroon, still without being informed of the reasons for his arrest or de-
tention. He made an application for bail to the State Counsel but the process 
was thwarted by the failure of the respondent to report in Court when sum-
moned. The applicant then made an application for habeas corpus (immediate 
release) on the basis of his unlawful detention. The respondent was summoned 
to appear in Court for the hearing and again he failed to do so. The Court 
considered the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest and determined that the 
arrest was lawful. It consequently ordered the immediate release of the appli-
cant. Yet, this order was flouted by the respondent. Regrettably, his repeated 
contemptuous conduct was neither condemned by the LD nor the Governor of 
the South-West region, his administrative superior. Such unbounded contempt 
for the judiciary was also demonstrated in Albert Chidi v The People,267 where a 
Nigerian resident in Cameroon was arrested and detained by security officers 
and was allegedly tortured while in detention. His resident permit and pass-
ports were confiscated by the officers, although they alleged that he was an 
illegal immigrant. He successfully applied to the Court for bail and the return 
of his documents. However, the security officers failed to release him. 
The culture of executive disregard for court orders is symptomatic of the 
subordinate relationship of the judiciary in relation to the executive and the fact 
that the enforceability of court decisions is dependent on the executive. As with a 
classic separation of powers system, the execution of judgment is the responsi-
bility of the executive. The system in Cameroon is that, the Ministry of Justice 
supervises and controls the execution of judgments pronounced by criminal 
courts268 and this is done through the LD which has the responsibility to 
supervise the enforcement of judgments.269 To exercise that role, the LD acts in 
conjunction with security forces such as the police. 
A major problem with the dependence of the judiciary on the executive is that 
due to the subordinate position of the LD to the Ministry, there is a limit on the 
extent to which it can enhance enforceability. Bearing in mind that the career of 
judges depends on the executive, their actions have to accord with the instruc-
tions of the executive in order to avoid jeopardising their career. In that context, 
enforcing a decision against the executive is problematic particularly where this 
has been implicitly or expressly forbidden. In Nya Henry, for instance, although 
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the trial judge acted heroically in deciding against the government in such a 
politically contentious case, the judgment was not enforced. The reason as it later 
emerged was that the Procureur Général, head of the LD, instructed the LD not 
to enforce the decision.270 This, sadly, was confirmed by the clerk of the Court 
and the prosecution, which is part of the LD.271 
In addition to the unwillingness or the apathy of the LD to facilitate en-
forcement of court orders, security forces who are mandated to assist the LD272 
also exhibit a similar reluctance or unwillingness. The attitude of the security 
forces may be explained by their subordination to the President of the Republic 
who is their Commander in Chief.273 As discussed in Chapter 2, he is responsible 
for their appointments and career development and controls them through the 
Minister of Defence.274 As with the judiciary, the processes are neither trans-
parent nor objective. Given their dependence on the executive, security officers 
would naturally be inclined to protect the executive in order to secure their 
career. In addition, as executive officials themselves, there is a tendency to re-
inforce the historical subordination of the judiciary to the executive. Thus, police 
and armed forces as executive officials have the tendency to showcase their 
political ascendancy by portraying themselves as being accountable to the 
executive hierarchy rather than the judiciary. In fact in the Oyebowale case, 
the respondent made it clear that he was answerable to the regional Governor 
(an executive authority) rather than the courts.275 
The attitude of the executive is symptomatic of a general culture of the ab-
sence of the rule of law in Cameroon. Without the political will of the executive, 
the execution of decisions from the courts remains a herculean task. That 
explains why Evande J (a High Court judge) was of the view that, where a 
judgment affects the interest of the government, enforcement is only possible 
with the executive’s cooperation.276 Regrettably, despite the pervasiveness of the 
problem, there appears to be limited attempts to eradicate it. Epuli SCJ, once 
lamented why, ‘[s]tate officials who maliciously resist the enforcement of court 
decisions, are not brought to book?’.277 
Conclusion 
The judiciary as demonstrated previously lacks independence as an institution. 
Its excessive dependence on the executive limits the extent to which it can act 
as a credible institution and discharge its constitutional mandate effectively. 
The individual independence of judges is also constrained by their methods of 
appointment, promotion and discipline. Their dependence on the executive, 
through mechanisms that are neither objective nor transparent contributes 
significantly to their inability to be assertive towards the executive. As noted 
by Fonachu JA, that position of dependence creates ‘an unbalanced state of 
affairs where the executive imposes its will and has significant control over the 
judiciary’.278 In effect, although the status of the judiciary was elevated to a 
‘power’ equal to the executive and the legislature, its status continues to be 
framed by a culture of subordination and dependence on the executive. In its 
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2017 Report on Human Rights in Cameroon, the Ministry of Justice implicitly 
affirmed the subordinate role of the judiciary and confirmed that Cameroon’s 
international partners: 
were concerned about the interference of the Executive Power in the 
management of the Judicial Power through the appointment of Judges, 
disciplinary procedures and the possibility of the Executive Power to stop 
proceedings pending before the courts. They recommended that the 
composition and functioning of the Higher Judicial Council be amended 
and ensure that the Executive Power does not in any way interfere in the 
activities of the Judicial Power.279  
Until such recommendations are heeded, the judiciary remains an institution 
severely influenced by the executive. Although it has sometimes exercised its 
independence, such circumstances have been limited and the general environ-
ment obviates against that. As a result, the judiciary is not in a position to 
influence meaningful change in accountable governance and the protection of 
human rights and fundamental liberties.  
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5 The Constitutional Council 
and democratic advancement   
Introduction 
The Constitutional Council (the Council) is one of the institutions created by the 
1996 Constitution in the context of the 1990s transition to multi-party democ-
racy. As would be demonstrated in the subsequent section, it appeared to have 
been given a significant role in promoting the rule of law and in harnessing 
the democratisation process. Although the Constitution made provision for the 
establishment of a Constitutional Council, its first organic law was only enacted 
in 2004,1 while the Supreme Court continued to exercise its jurisdiction tem-
porarily.2 It was not until February 2018 that the first members of the Council 
were appointed and it eventually went into operation. Part I of this chapter will 
discuss the structure of the Constitutional Council, examining its composition 
and jurisdiction as well as the rules on standing and the procedures in the 
Council. It will additionally examine the role of the Council in protecting con-
stitutional rights and in promoting the democratic advancement of the country. 
Part II delves into an exploration of a possible alternative approach to con-
stitutional review, in view of the limited mechanism applied by the Council. 
Part I. Structure and competence of the  
Constitutional Council 
A. Composition 
The Council is composed of eleven members3 appointed by the President of the 
Republic for a renewable term of six years.4 The appointments are based on 
nominations by the executive, the legislature and the judiciary as follows:  
– Three members including the president of the Council, by the President of 
the Republic  
– Three members by the Speaker of the National Assembly (with the Bureau’s 
approval)  
– Three members by the speaker of the Senate (with the Bureau’s approval)  
– Two members by the Higher Judicial Council 
In addition to the eleven regular members, former presidents are ex officio 
members for life.5 This category would presumably be more relevant when there 
has been a change of political leadership in Cameroon. The willingness of former 
presidents to contribute to the debates in the Council and the extent or effect of 
their contributions, however, remain uncertain. In France, from which the 
Cameroonian model was adopted, a number of former French presidents have 
either never sat on the French Conseil Constitutionnel or have sat infrequently and 
others have made minimal contributions.6 So, in Cameroon, the presence of 
former presidents may add little to the dynamism of the composition. In addition 
to the preceding reservations, it is not clear what the role of this category is. For 
instance, do they have voting rights or merely observer status? What is clear 
though, in terms of membership, is that it is inconsistent with any other public 
office whether elected or appointed.7 
Although members have a six-year term with a possibility for renewal, it may 
be terminated at the request of the nominating authority or the Council itself for 
incompatibility of functions or abuse of office, or loss of civil or political rights 
and for violation of the regime.8 Nevertheless, the termination must be approved 
by a two-third majority of the Council. A member is also permitted to terminate 
their term by resignation.9 
Members are accorded a number of immunities, including immunity from 
civil or criminal prosecution.10 There are, however, circumstances under which 
arrest or detention may be permitted, but this must occur with the approval 
of the Council.11 The circumstances contemplated include where a crime has 
been committed in flagrante delicto and in the event of a final decision from the 
courts.12 In all other circumstances, the Minister of Justice must refer the matter 
to the president of the Council as soon as possible.13 
Another important aspect relating to composition is the qualification of 
members. The Cameroonian approach unsurprisingly clearly mirrors that of 
France, which favours a wider representation with no specific requirements for 
legal qualifications. The law only requires nominees to be persons of integrity, 
with an established professional reputation and renowned competence.14 In fact, 
the first members appointed in February 2018 could be said to be persons who 
are renowned as they have occupied significant administrative positions for 
decades. In addition, there are notable legal professionals such as the president, 
Clement Atangana, who has served as president of the Administrative Bench of 
the Supreme Court15; Florence Arrey, a senior judge, who has served both in the 
Supreme Court of Cameroon and at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda as its vice president16; Joseph-Marie Bipoun-Woum, a public law 
professor, former Dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Science of the 
University of Yaoundé II and former Minister of Culture and Bah Oumarou 
Sanda, a trained judge, who has served in the National Assembly and the dip-
lomatic services.17 Thus, although not specifically required, there is a significant 
presence of members with a legal background. 
There is still a question of whether constitutional jurisdictions in general 
should, as a matter of principle, be made exclusively of legal professionals. There 
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is some merit in this suggestion. Due to their legal training and experience in the 
profession, legal professionals and career judges can be deemed to have acquired 
the relevant competence in the practical interpretation and application of the 
law. In the particular case of professional judges, they have specific training and 
competence in judicial reasoning. These are indispensable qualities and skills in 
carrying out a constitutional court’s functions in constitutional review, ad-
judication and dispute resolution. These skills and qualities have potential to 
enrich the quality of debates.18 It has been argued that because legislators are not 
involved in the practical application of the law, they are not necessarily aware of 
some of the constraints that may arise from formal application but professional 
judges have this exposure in the course of their career through adjudicating 
concrete cases.19 Thus, the argument that the judges in constitutional jurisdic-
tions should have a professional legal qualification or judicial experience seems 
justified and widely accepted. This is reflected in the composition of constitu-
tional institutions in other jurisdictions. For instance, the Italian Constitutional 
Court has fifteen judges selected from retired judges, law professors and lawyers 
with at least twenty years of experience in practice.20 Similarly, the South 
African Constitutional Court is made up of the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief 
Justice and nine other judges, at least four of whom must have been serving 
judges at the time of their appointment.21 Other jurisdictions, however, include 
diverse professions but give predominant place to legal professionals. This can be 
seen in the Constitutional Court of Benin, which has seven judges, three of whom 
are magistrates and two others are law professors or prominent jurists or legal 
practitioners, with a minimum professional experience of fifteen years.22 Another 
example is the German Constitutional Court, which has two panels,23 each 
composed obligatorily of six Supreme Court judges and two other judges either 
law professors and former politicians who, in practice, have usually been regional 
or federal ministers of justice.24 
In Cameroon, although the law does not prescribe a specific background and 
training, the professional background of the first members demonstrates that an 
important place is accorded to the legal profession. Additionally, professional 
diversity is recognised through the appointment of members outside of the legal 
profession. For instance, Paul Nchoji Nkwi, a renowned professor of anthro-
pology. Is that approach necessarily problematic? There is no definitive answer 
to that question. Perhaps it is best to focus on what diversity may bring to the 
deliberations of the Council. A diverse composition may enrich deliberations in 
other ways that are unfamiliar to the legal profession and potentially resulting 
in a more holistic approach to interpretation and in ensuring compliance with 
constitutional principles. However, the benefits of diversity may accrue to a 
system if among other conditions, the members are permitted to express their 
opinion whether affirming or dissenting with the majority. The value of diversity 
would be lost where members are constrained by circumstances that prevent 
them from freely expressing their views. In a typical Kelsenian style constitu-
tional court, dissenting or separate opinions are impermissible.25 This approach 
is consistent with the civil law tradition and exemplified by the constitutional 
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courts of Austria, France and Italy where decisions are formally ‘unanimous’.26 
This approach has been justified on the basis that the authority of law is per-
ceived to be better protected by a unified voice.27 Another view, however, is that 
the practice inherently conceals contentious issues.28 In Cameroon, there is no 
express provision on dissenting judgments but the procedure within the Council 
makes dissenting unfavourable. For every matter that is referred to the Council, a 
rapporteur is appointed whose role is partly to produce a report on the matter 
and a draft decision.29 The members have to demonstrate collegiality, which 
means presenting a united front. This is partly reflected in the provision that 
prevents members from abstaining from voting.30 Once a rapporteur’s report 
has been produced, the members must vote, not necessarily in favour of the 
Council’s position, but a dissenting opinion is not generally expressed or pub-
lished. This is partly a reason to emphasise the value of legal training as a 
rapporteur without any form of legal training and experience in reviewing leg-
islation, in adjudication or dispute resolution may potentially render a report, 
which does not sufficiently or satisfactorily deal with the issues raised in a petition 
to the Council. The argument is not that a member with a legal background can 
identify and exhaustively deal with all the potential issues. Nevertheless, their 
training and experience lend more support to the contention that judicial 
reasoning and interpretation would form a significant basis for their decisions. 
B. Jurisdiction 
As a specialised jurisdiction, the Council has a complex amalgamation of duties, 
both adjudicatory and advisory. However, the three main areas of its jurisdiction 
include reviewing the constitutionality of laws, the standing orders of parliament 
and international treaties and conventions31; regulating the functioning of state 
institutions and the regions32; and ensuring the regularity of presidential and 
parliamentary elections and referendum operations (ruling on electoral disputes).33 
These roles are discussed in the subsequent sections in turn. 
I. Constitutional review 
The framework for constitutional review under the 1996 Constitution replicates 
many aspects of the 1972 Constitution, although that jurisdiction is now ex-
ercised by the Council rather than the Supreme Court. Article 47(1) of the 
Constitution envisages a preventative control of the constitutionality of laws. At 
least three main categories of control are contemplated under the current system. 
The first category relates to parliament’s internal regulations. According to 
article 47(1), the Council shall give a final ruling on the constitutionality of the 
Standing Orders of the National Assembly and the Senate, ‘prior to their 
implementation’. Here, there is an obligation for the speaker of the relevant 
house to refer its Standing Orders to the Council, whether these are newly 
adopted Orders or amendments to existing Orders.34 A referral to the Council 
automatically suspends the enactment of the Standing Orders.35 
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The second category relates to international treaties and agreements. The 
President of the Republic is vested with authority to negotiate and ratify 
international treaties and agreements where these fall within the executive’s 
regulatory domain defined by article 27 of the Constitution.36 Treaties or 
agreements that fall within parliament’s competence as defined by article 26 
shall be referred to parliament for authorisation to ratify.37 The role of the 
Council is to make a final ruling on the constitutionality of the treaties or 
agreements prior to their ratification.38 Unlike the Standing Orders, referral to 
the Council in this instance is not obligatory. Considering the increasing nor-
mative importance of international treaties within the legal system, it is sub-
mitted that this is one area where a mandatory referral should have been 
constitutionally prescribed. The presence of an international treaty with un-
constitutional provisions in the domestic legal order may pose significant pro-
blems in its implementation and further uncertainties in the application of 
related domestic provisions. This was the situation with the (old) article 42 of the 
OHADA Treaty,39 which originally prescribed French as its working lan-
guage.40 This Treaty was ratified by Cameroon despite the inherent un-
constitutionality of article 42. This is so because Cameroon is a bilingual 
country, with both English and French as official languages having an equal 
constitutional status.41 A treaty that recognises only one of the official languages 
of Cameroon is inconsistent with the linguistic equality enshrined in the 
Constitution. The old article 42 of the OHADA inevitably excluded English- 
speaking Cameroonians, rendering the practical application of the Treaty pro-
blematic. Advocates trained in the common law system, whose working language 
is English, were vehemently opposed to its application and viewed it with sus-
picion, contending that it was a ‘neo-colonial’ imposition from the pre-
dominantly French-speaking government of Cameroon.42 In addition, while 
judges trained in the French civil law system were inclined to applying it, some 
trained in the common law system had objections to its application.43 For in-
stance, in Akiangan Fombin Sebastian v Foto Joseph & Others,44 Paul Ayah, J (as he 
then was), refused to apply the OHADA Treaty noting emphatically that due to 
its French-language prescription, the Treaty suffered from self-exclusion in the 
English-speaking regions of Cameroon. Prior to the revision of article 42 in 
2008, this created uncertainty and chaos due to the different approach of the 
judiciary and indeed the Bar in Cameroon. Although it may be argued that a 
compulsory review may not have precluded the ratification of the OHADA 
Treaty, it would have provided the Council, at least, the opportunity to engage 
with the constitutional issues raised by the Treaty. Moreover, a compulsory 
review is still a valuable process from a constitutional perspective for the purpose 
of preserving the supremacy of the Constitution. 
The third category of constitutional review relates to the review of legislation. 
As with the first two categories, the Council shall give a final ruling on the 
constitutionality of laws prior to their promulgation. It is worthy to note that, 
‘law’, in this instance, is confined to statutory instruments and not regulatory 
instruments such as executive decrees. This position has been confirmed by the 
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Council in a matter relating to a regulatory instrument on social security.45 
Although the application was declared inadmissible for want of standing, in its 
decision, the Council stated that assuming however that the applicant had 
standing, the subject matter was beyond the jurisdiction of the Council because 
its competence did not extend to regulatory instruments. 
The system of review envisaged by the Constitution is the a prior (pre- 
legislative) system. An implication is that a challenge is made in the absence of 
a concrete case. More importantly, a challenge relates to laws that have been 
adopted by parliament prior to their promulgation,46 indicating that the scope of 
constitutional review precludes the review of legislation already in force.47 There 
are a number of advantages attributed to this system, although in the specific 
case of Cameroon, these advantages are outweighed by disadvantages equally 
attributed to the system. In terms of the advantages, one is that it promotes the 
idea of constitutionality especially with respect to human rights legislation, on the 
basis that the issue of its constitutionality would have been determined prior to 
the enactment of the relevant law.48 Another advantage inheres in the fact that it 
adds another dimension to the checks and balances in the constitutional system, 
since parliament is made to ‘police’ itself by referring its legislation for review.49 
Additionally, as argued by Louis Favoreu (with respect to the system in France), 
it can accord a reasonable degree of cohesion within the legal order and its pre- 
emptive nature has the potential to reduce a floodgate of litigation that can occur 
with post-legislative review in concrete cases.50 
Despite the advantages outlined earlier, a closer examination of the system in 
Cameroon demonstrates that those advantages are notional rather than real, 
particularly given the fact that (as discussed later) the opportunities for referral to 
the Council are almost non-existent. Therefore, most often, laws would enter the 
legal order without scrutiny from the Council. Thus, the disadvantages of the a 
prior review system tend to be more real for Cameroon. From a human rights 
perspective, one significant disadvantage is that an unconstitutional provision 
breaching human rights may continue to apply without any possibility of sub-
jecting it to scrutiny, until such a time as the legislature or the executive may 
deem its amendment or repeal necessary. Charles Fombad also asserts that the a 
prior system deprives Cameroon of the potential for review to contribute to the 
adaptability of legislation to reflect evolving conceptions of rights.51 A notable 
example relates to the contemporary understanding of freedom from dis-
crimination that has evolved under international law to include discrimination 
on the grounds of sexual orientation.52 Although the Constitution prohibits 
discrimination,53 the first harmonised post-independence Penal Code, which 
entered into force in 1967,54 prohibited homosexuality and imposed a maximum 
custodial sentence of five years and a fine of up to 200,000 CFA.55 This was 
inherently in breach of the constitutional right to equality and freedom from 
discrimination. A number of independent reports have indicated a high level of 
arrests and detention of persons perceived to be homosexuals in Cameroon.56 
Despite the unconstitutionality of that provision of the Penal Code and objur-
gating from the domestic and international human rights community, it was 
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re-enacted in the new Penal Code promulgated in 2016.57 It is argued that a 
mechanism for post-legislative review could provide the opportunity to challenge 
such impugning provisions, thereby, potentially contributing to the development 
of the constitutional right to equality and freedom from discrimination. It is 
recognised that homosexuality is a criminal offence in some Commonwealth 
African countries, which have mechanisms for post-legislative review. 
Nevertheless, the recent Botswana case of Letsweletse v Attorney General, in which the 
High Court in Gaborone declared similar provisions of the Botswana Penal Code 
unconstitutional, lends support to the role of post-legislative review in con-
tributing to the development of constitutional rights. In that case the High Court 
in Gaborone stated that it was incumbent upon the courts ‘that exercise posterior 
control’ to give effect to constituional rights by taking into account the ‘ex-
panding scope, content and horisons of human rights’.58 
The a prior system of review is a heritage of French colonialism in Cameroon 
and can be seen in other French civil law jurisdictions in Africa. Yet, it must 
be emphasised that the pitfalls of that system have been noted by France and 
other African countries. Thus, France in 2008, as part of a broader initiative 
to modernise the institutions of the fifth French Republic, introduced post- 
legislative review vesting the Conseil Contitutionnel with the authority to review 
the constitutionality of legislation59 through a system referred to as La Question 
Prioritaire de Constitutionnalité (QPC).60 This is similar to the system adopted by 
other civil law jurisdictions in Africa such as Benin,61 Congo and Senegal, known 
as l’exception d’inconstitutionnalité (EI). In these systems, an individual involved in 
proceedings in court may raise the issue of the constitutionality of a statute on 
the basis that it infringes on their fundamental rights guaranteed by the con-
stitution. The determination of the substantive matter is suspended and the 
constitutional question is referred by the court to the constitutional jurisdiction 
for a ruling on constitutionality. The post-legislative nature of the procedure 
provides the basis for individuals to assert their fundamental rights by challenging 
legislation that has been enacted and is being enforced. 
Cameroon’s Constitution provides no such opportunities for post-legislative 
review. Moreover, the ordinary courts have been clear in affirming their lack of 
jurisdiction in engaging in QPC or EI.62 Perhaps the closest mechanism could be 
through the provision of an advisory opinion. The problem with that mechanism 
is that it would depend on a referral by political actors who are often un-
concerned with the application or interpretation of the law and would most likely 
have initiated the laws in the first instance. The Council may, however, raise 
such issues on its own initiative.63 There is some normative basis for that pro-
position as the Council has powers to automatically raise issues of public policy 
and to inform the relevant authority.64 Therefore, if a matter of public policy is 
underpinned by a legislative provision that is unconstitutional and the Council 
finds this to be so, it may raise the issue and inform the relevant authority. It is 
not clear though, how the authority is required to react to the issue raised by the 
Council. It may nevertheless provide the basis for a change of public policy to 
bring it in line with the Constitution. 
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II. Regulating the functioning of state institutions and the regions 
Section 30 of the Constitutional Council Law reiterates the constitutional role of 
the Council in giving final rulings on disputes between state institutions, between 
the state and the regions and between the regions. Not much information is 
provided to elaborate on this role. It is nevertheless an important attribute in the 
light of the decentralised system provided for under the Constitution. It is feasible 
to envisage conflicts between existing state institutions and regions in terms of 
how powers have been devolved and how responsibility is defined within the 
devolved system. This is not limited to decentralisation. The semi-presidential 
system of Cameroon and in particular the ambiguous distribution of powers 
between the executive and the legislature could equally be cause for concern. An 
interesting question to explore is what happens when the conflict is between the 
Council itself and another institution such as ELECAM in determining the scope 
of their powers in regulating elections? Such a controversy has not yet been an 
issue for determination but it is possible to assume that the Council would still act 
as an arbiter given that it already performs such an ambiguous role (through its 
president) in the Commission on the Final Counting of Votes.65 
III. Ensuring the regularity of elections 
By virtue of article 48(1) of the Constitution, the Council shall ensure the reg-
ularity of presidential elections, parliamentary elections and referendum opera-
tions and proclaim the results thereof.66 Section 40 of the Constitutional Council 
Law provides additionally and, perhaps, controversially that the Council shall 
ensure that voting is free and fair. This, as has been noted, may come into 
conflict with ELECAM as it has similar responsibilities in that respect.67 Both 
provisions, vesting the Council with responsibilities to ensure the ‘regularity’ and 
the free and fair nature of the process, appear, upon further examination, to be 
stating the same objective. Regularity may relate to the expectation that the 
elections are carried out following the relevant procedures. If so, that ensures 
freedom and fairness, at least to the extent provided by the law. To discharge 
that mandate, the Council has been vested with pre- and post-electoral duties 
that arguably may not provide sufficient scope to do so. 
The Council’s pre-electoral responsibility in presidential and parliamentary 
elections is to confirm the eligibility of candidates for presidential and parlia-
mentary elections.68 In that respect, any aspiring candidate whose candidacy has 
been rejected can petition the Council for a determinative ruling.69 Here, it can 
be seen that the Council’s ruling on eligibility can make a difference between a 
fair process and an unfair one by ensuring at the outset that candidates are not 
unfairly excluded from contesting the elections. 
The Council’s role in the post-electoral process evokes considerable con-
troversy. First, the president of the Council is the chair of the National 
Commission for the Final Counting of Votes (NCFCV), which has the pivotal 
responsibility of carrying out the final collation and counting of votes from all other 
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electoral sub‐commissions.70 The NCFCV forwards the reports containing, among 
other things, the result of the elections to be proclaimed by the Council. It is ob-
jectionable that the Council is then vested with the monumental responsibility of 
hearing and giving final rulings on petitions contesting the regularity of the same 
elections. How can it possibly do so impartially if, as chair of the NCFCV, it has 
already affirmed the results and subsequently proclaimed them? It is submitted that 
both subjectively and objectively, justice cannot be seen to be done if the status quo 
is maintained. Perhaps a more acceptable approach would be to completely ex-
clude the president of the Council from the NCFCV. 
C. Access 
Access to the Council is one of the features that lend credence to a perception 
that it is an institution that serves the political organs of the state. To what extent 
is that view accurate? That question can be answered through a closer ex-
amination of the standing requirements. There is a limited category of officials 
who have standing in the Council, depending on which substantive jurisdiction is 
being invoked. Thus, in matters relating to the constitutionality of laws, these are 
the President of the Republic, the speaker of the National Assembly, the speaker 
of the Senate, one-third of MPs or Senators71 and heads of regional executives 
(where the interest of their regions is likely to be affected by legislation).72 In 
electoral matters, political parties and candidates who took part in elections have 
standing, including any persons or officials who acted as representatives of the 
government during elections.73 It is obvious from the discussion that the ordinary 
citizen is excluded from this institution, which may potentially be of great ben-
efits in securing their constitutionally guaranteed rights and ensuring their 
meaningful participation in the democratic process. 
A closer analysis of the system of restriction on standing further demonstrates 
the factual alienation of the ordinary citizen as a major deficiency of the 
institutional architecture of the Council. Despite being accessible to certain 
political actors, their inclination to invoke the jurisdiction of the Council is 
doubtful. This is particularly so with constitutional adjudication. The President 
of the Republic is unlikely to challenge any laws as they would have been 
initiated by the executive (of which he is the head) and or the government. In 
the light of the fact that the parliament is composed of a largely disciplined and 
overwhelming majority of the ruling CPDM party, it is also improbable that 
they would attempt to challenge laws which they would have voted for, in the 
first place. Regional executives may also challenge laws that affect their regions. 
This would be a very limited category of laws with very limited scope of 
application. Additionally, considering that they are appointed by the President 
of the Republic and they lack institutional independence, they are hardly 
potential contenders for challenging any laws. Access is further limited as the 
parliamentary opposition can only succeed in initiating a challenge by ob-
taining a one-third majority in the National Assembly or Senate. This is not an 
easy majority to obtain in any democracy and in the specific case of Cameroon, 
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it may be considered a herculean task on account of the current overwhelming 
CPDM majority in parliament, as discussed in Chapter 3.74 This is further 
compounded by the fact that some opposition parties are in coalition with 
the government. Numerically, the opposition cannot initiate a challenge and 
their difficulty has been a source of frustration. This was noted in the period 
leading to the enactment of the Electoral Code. The draft bill contained several 
provisions implicitly undermining civil and political rights and granting 
electoral advantages to the incumbent.75 Despite fierce objections from the 
opposition, they were unable to use constitutional adjudication to challenge 
the constitutionality of the specific provisions in the Council.76 More recently, 
in relation to the 2019 law77 on decentralisation, which, among other things, 
grants a special autonomy status to the North-West and South-West regions, 
the opposition was unable to mount any meaningful challenge. In spite of 
their objection to the bill for reasons including the constitutionality of some 
provisions, no constitutional challenge was initiated. It may be that lacking 
the requisite numbers to initiate a challenge, the parliamentary opposition 
considered it worthless to even contemplate that option. 
Thus, in terms of constitutional adjudication, the ordinary citizen who is more 
likely to be affected by legislation, especially those limiting fundamental human 
rights, has no recourse to challenge unconstitutional provisions. This limitation 
was evident in a matter78 challenging the constitutionality of section 322-1 of the 
Penal Code brought by an ordinary citizen. The impugned provision provides a 
custodial sentence for a tenant who defaults in their contractual obligation to pay 
rents on a property for two months. That provision is contrary to the right to 
personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution79 and other international in-
struments to which Cameroon is a party.80 Article 11 of the ICCPR in particular 
prohibits the imprisonment of a person ‘merely’ on the ground of inability to 
fulfil a contractual obligation (including payment of a debt). Rent arrears are 
considered to be debts and while a landlord can take steps to recover such a debt, 
the steps should be proportionate. The law in Cameroon allows for action that is 
arguably disproportionate, especially as freedom from imprisonment under ar-
ticle 11 of the ICCPR is absolute. Despite the apparent inconsistency of section 
322-1 of the Cameroonian Penal Code with the Constitution and international 
law, the Council dismissed the application on the basis that the applicant had no 
standing. This demonstrates clearly the vulnerability of the ordinary citizens and 
their subjection to possibly oppressive legislation that may continue to apply to 
them despite their unconstitutionality. The restriction on standing compels de-
pendence on the same politicians who are unlikely and unwilling to challenge the 
laws that they have initiated or enacted. This can be demonstrated by reference 
to the 2019 Law on the National Human Rights Commission.81 The govern-
ment bill introducing the law stated among other things that the law was in-
tended to strengthen the Commission, to enhance its independence and to 
comply with the Paris Principles.82 However, the bill had a number of flaws that 
undermined several Paris Principles and the independence of the Commission 
with the effect of undermining its ability to effectively protect human rights 
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guaranteed by the Constitution.83 These observations were raised by a con-
sortium of civil society human rights organisations, which called on parliament to 
have the bill reviewed and to have an open consultation process before the law 
was passed.84 These calls, of course, were ignored by parliament and the law was 
passed with neither an open consultation nor submission for constitutional re-
view. If access to the constitutional jurisdiction were open to individuals or 
groups, the civil society consortium would have had the opportunity to refer the 
bill to the Council. 
With respect to restriction on individual access, Jean Aba’a Oyono has stated 
that the restriction can be understood on the basis that individuals are not privy 
to the bills and the debates in parliament prior to promulgation of a law.85 While 
this may be the case, it is submitted here that from the perspective of the right to 
information, a government bill is a public document, which individuals in society 
should have the freedom to access and to comment on. Human rights law 
particularly affects individuals and they should be well informed about any 
government proposals that may potentially affect their rights. From the per-
spective of democracy, the government should be open and transparent in a way 
that people can understand the basis of government decisions and policies. In 
addition, good and effective governance requires that the government should 
gauge the effect that proposed policies and legislation would have on the public. 
One way of doing so is to make government bills accessible to the public prior to 
debates in parliament. Oyono, however, acknowledges that the restriction of 
standing to a specific class of politicians or authorities potentially renders con-
stitutional justice less dynamic because of the overwhelming influence of the 
regime and the political system, which is structured in a way that prevents op-
position to presidential policy implemented through laws.86 This argument can 
be supported by the fact that, as described earlier, even the selected politicians or 
authorities that have access to the Council in practice would face considerable 
obstacles in referring matters to the constitutional jurisdiction. In effect, it would 
appear that only the President can realistically access that jurisdiction. This 
perhaps explains why Oyono, citing François Mbome, asserts that the notion of 
constitutional supremacy only exists to the extent that the President recognises 
it.87 As such, in his view, the supreme legal order of the state is no longer the 
Constitution but the President who is the sole guardian of the constitutional 
hierarchy and therefore the supremacy of the Constitution.88 
Although this approach of restricting standing to the political branches was 
adopted from the French model and transplanted to other civil law jurisdictions, 
the weaknesses of the approach have been acknowledged and countries like 
France have made significant constitutional reforms allowing individual access to 
their constitutional jurisdictions. Ordinary citizens can now challenge the con-
stitutionality of laws and a challenge can be raised in the course of litigation in 
the ordinary courts.89 In some civil law-oriented jurisdictions in Africa such as 
Benin90 and the Democratic Republic of Congo91, individuals have direct access 
to the constitutional courts. In view of the fact that the Cameroonian 
Constitutional Council was created to enhance the democratic process and to 
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strengthen the rule of law in Cameroon, it is disappointing that the ‘drafters’ of 
the 1996 Constitution opted for such a restrictive system. In fact, during the 
constitutional reform process, a proposal for open access to the Council was 
made to the Technical Committee on Constitutional Matters headed by Joseph 
Owona.92 It was rejected by the Committee on the basis that it will lead to a 
floodgate of petitions that will encumber the Council.93 That position seems 
unsupported as similar institutions in other jurisdictions that have open access 
tend not to be encumbered with a floodgate of cases. In Benin, in particular, 
individual access has been described as the ‘key’ aspect that permits the court to 
discharge its mandate as a protector of human rights.94 In Cameroon, there is 
insufficient evidence to support a contention that the Council will be flooded 
with constitutional petitions. 
The position in Cameroon undermines the effective enforcement of funda-
mental human rights and other constitutional obligations. This is not limited to 
constitutional adjudication as problems of access can be identified in electoral 
matters. For instance, section 132(2) of the Electoral Code allows an electoral 
petition to be lodged by an official who acted as a representative of the gov-
ernment during elections, but does not allow access to representatives of other 
political parties. This provision undoubtedly grants incumbency advantages and 
there appears to be no basis to justify the discriminatory treatment of party 
representatives in electoral procedures. The limitation of this system was exposed 
when a representative of the SDF opposition party brought a petition against 
ELECAM, the CPDM and two other opposition parties challenging the results of 
the 2018 senatorial elections for Lebialem, Kupe-Manengouba and the entire 
South-West region on the basis of gross irregularities.95 The petitioner had acted 
as the SDF representative for the Regional Supervisory Commission. Some 
of the irregularities complained against included the closing of the polling 
station before the statutory time thereby disenfranchising voters, the CPDM 
representative being the sole signatory of the report from the polling station, 
excluding the other members of the polling commission, none of whom received 
a copy of that report,96 in violation of the Electoral Code,97 the tally sheet ac-
companying the report being riddled with cancellations that were not endorsed 
or signed by any of the members of the polling commission.98 The Council held 
that, as the petitioner was a representative of an opposition party, he had no 
standing by virtue of section 132(2) of the Electoral Code. Despite the irregu-
larities that may have marred the legality and credibility of the elections, a re-
presentative of an opposition party who witnessed these irregularities was unable 
to successfully request the intervention of the Council to discharge its mandate 
in ensuring the regularity of the election process. 
D. Procedures before the Constitutional Council 
In relation to the procedure in the Council, generally, to deliberate, the 
minimum composition is nine of its eleven members,99 while a simple majority 
can arrive at a binding decision, with every judge voting.100 Where there is a tie, 
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the president of the Council has the casting vote.101 The Council is seized by 
means of a simple application that should generally contain details of the ap-
plicant and respondent and well-supported legal and factual grounds for the 
petition, submitted within specified deadlines.102 A petition that is manifestly 
inadmissible would be rejected by a reasoned decision of the Council without 
further investigations or adversarial procedures.103 Where a petition is deemed 
admissible, the president appoints a rapporteur among the members whose role 
is to examine the petition, to hear the parties (where necessary), to make a report 
and issue a draft decision.104 The rapporteur’s report is based on an analysis of 
the facts and legal grounds submitted by the petitioner(s), on documentary evi-
dence provided and investigations carried out.105 The report and draft decision 
are submitted to the president who forwards them to the secretary general.106 
The latter, in turn, distributes them to the members as these form the basis of 
deliberations in the Council, a date for which is fixed by the president.107 During 
the hearing, the rapporteur is required to read out the report after which de-
liberations will follow.108 The Council may adopt the decision of the rapporteur 
or amend and adopt it as the decision of the Council.109 
In addition to the general procedure, there are specific procedural issues re-
lating to the different areas of competence of the Council. In that regard, there 
are at least two specific areas of interest – constitutional review and electoral 
petitions.110 These are examined in the following sections. 
I. Constitutional review 
In constitutional adjudication, the Council may be seized through a simple 
petition signed and dated by the petitioner.111 The petitioner must state their 
complaint and the legal and factual grounds in support thereof.112 The President 
of the Republic and the two houses of parliament must be informed of the 
petition and a copy thereof sent to them.113 
A law referred to the Council for review has the effect of suspending its pro-
mulgation until the Council has arrived at a decision,114 which must be rendered 
within fifteen days or reduced to eight days at the request of the President of the 
Republic.115 Following the rapporteur’s report, and voting, the Council arrives at a 
decision declaring the law to be either in conformity with the Constitution or not. In 
the former case, the suspension on enactment is uplifted and the statutory enactment 
deadline becomes applicable.116 In the latter case, there are two possibilities. First, a 
provision of a law may be declared unconstitutional but it does not affect other 
provisions of the law. The result is that the parliament would be authorised to pass 
the law without the expunged provision.117 Alternatively, the law may be referred to 
parliament for a new reading.118 Second, a provision may affect the constitutionality 
of the entire legislation to the effect that, it would be declared unconstitutional.119 In 
that case, the Council makes a declaration prohibiting the enactment or enforce-
ment of the law.120 The outcome of the declaration of unconstitutionality of an 
international treaty or agreement is different in that authorisation to sign the 
agreement or treaty would be deferred until the Constitution is amended.121 
The Constitutional Council 161 
II. Electoral petitions 
Electoral petitions must be addressed to the Council within seventy-two hours of 
the close of polling.122 Petitions should be dated and should include the name, 
address and status of the petitioner and the respondent(s).123 They must contain 
the factual and legal grounds on which they are based and the relevant sup-
porting documents.124 Once received by the secretariat of the Council, they must 
be posted within twenty-four hours of their filing and notified to the relevant 
parties who are expected to file their written submissions within forty-eight hours 
of receipt of the notification.125 Where necessary (as determined by the Council), 
the parties may be heard or the Council may order the production of evidence 
and written submissions or investigations.126 It should be noted that the hearings 
of the Council in electoral matters are public.127 Following the report of the 
rapporteur and the public hearing, the Council renders its decision. 
The requirement for public hearings is an important aspect of transparency, 
which is vital for democracy. In the electoral petitions relating to the November 
2018 presidential election, the public hearings proved to be a significant factor in 
providing the public the opportunity to witness and appreciate the procedures of 
the Council. The public hearings demonstrated, among other things, how the 
Council strenuously avoided engagement with substantive issues relating to the 
complaints of the petitioners. This was followed live by members of the public 
who received the information directly without the risk of dilution by second- or 
third-party reporting. In that respect, the public hearings helped to formulate 
and, in some cases, reinforce the perception of the Council as an institution that 
lacked credibility and existed primarily to lend legitimacy to an undemocratic 
regime. 
III. Effect of the Council’s decisions 
The decisions of the Council are final128 and binding on all public, administrative, 
judicial and military authorities, as well as natural and corporate entities.129 
Additionally, they must be enforced without delay.130 Despite the fact that the 
decisions are not subject to appeal, they can be amended in the event of a ‘material 
error’.131 There is no definition of what ‘material error’ entails but, presumably, 
this will be determined as the jurisprudence of the Council develops. It is not clear 
how this may affect the finality of the Council’s decision. In terms of dissemination, 
the law provides that the decisions should be read in public, notified to the 
interested parties and published in the Official Gazette.132 
E. Protecting constitutional rights and promoting  
democratic advancement 
As noted earlier, the Council was created in the context of a democratic uprising 
as part of the strategy to harness the democratic process. The earlier discussion 
has highlighted several weaknesses in the institutional framework that make it 
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difficult for the Council to achieve that objective. Nevertheless, it also identified 
areas where the Council can apply its constitutional and statutory powers to 
adjudicate more positively in favour of democratic advancement. The problem 
seems to be a convergence of political and institutional factors and the absence of 
‘judicial activism’. 
In addition to the institutional weaknesses discussed earlier, the appointment 
process militates against the independence of members, a factor which has a 
potential for enhancing the promotion of party interest rather than the Council 
acting in the national interest. Although the appointment system discussed earlier 
appears diverse in the sense that it involves all three arms of the government, a 
cursory examination reveals significant anomalies, akin to those relating to the 
appointment of judges in the ordinary judiciary. The President of the Republic 
has a preponderance in the nomination of members. Of the eleven members, 
he appoints three, in his capacity as the President of the Republic, including 
the president of the Council who has the casting vote. As Chair of the Higher 
Judicial Council (HJC), it can be said that he is also responsible for the two 
members nominated by the HJC, as a nomination cannot be made without his 
approval. In addition, as the leader of the CPDM ruling party, he exerts some 
influence in the nominations made by parliament particularly in the context of 
the overwhelming influence of the ruling party in the Bureaus of each house, 
which makes the nomination. This is even the more so with the Senate where 
30% of Senators are appointed by the President directly and the speaker of 
Senate is among the appointees. While this is not per se an indictment on the 
members’ independence, the particular context of Cameroon demonstrates the 
overwhelming influence of the President on almost all major aspects of political 
life such that members, who depend on the institution of the presidency for 
their tenure, tend to be more disposed to act favourably to policies advanced by 
the ultimate authority in power.133 Moreover, as the members do not have 
life tenure, they may be interested in preserving good relations with the nomi-
nating authorities in the hope of securing feature appointments.134 We saw in 
Chapter 2, the extent of the presidential appointment powers that give the 
latter significant control over many public and para-public institutions. In ad-
dition to that, the Council’s members are endowed with a number of benefits 
and allowances that are determined solely by presidential decree,135 a situation 
unfavourable to their independence. 
The inadequate institutional system for securing their independence may 
explain why, in many of the cases decided so far, the Council has adopted an 
avoidance technique, by shying away from the substantive aspects of complaints 
and instead favoured a very textual approach to the interpretation of the law. 
This tendency was apparent in a number of electoral petitions challenging the 
March 2018 senatorial elections136 and the November 2018 presidential elec-
tion137 where the Council ruled against the petitioners partly on the basis that 
the irregularities would have no effect on the results as per the relevant statute. 
The Council failed to delve deeply into what these irregularities were or to 
attempt to deliver well-reasoned decisions capable of developing the law in the 
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specific areas complained about. An important role of the Council is to ensure 
the regularity of elections, an element which is important for both present and 
future elections, as part of the process of enhancing democracy in Cameroon. As 
such, even where the Council determines that the irregularities would have no 
effect on the results, it is still important to probe into the problem to ensure 
that the irregularity does not develop into an institutional practice capable of 
having more severe consequences in the future. In some of the petitions, the 
complaints included stuffing of ballot boxes in the presence and in plain sight of 
electorates,138 registration of some voters on several electoral registers with the 
provision of several voter cards.139 These were serious complaints violating 
provisions of electoral laws and therefore required further investigations. Yet the 
Council concerned itself more with the statutory provisions that enabled it to 
dismiss the petitions rather than taking alternative steps to probe into the irre-
gularities. A failure to at least condemn such unorthodox practices enhanced 
the Council’s perfidiousness. It is submitted that, in such cases, the Council 
should mandatorily refer the matter to ELECAM for further investigations, and 
where the allegations relate to possible criminal offences, these should be referred 
to the prosecutor. The aversive approach of the Council can be contrasted with 
the approach of the Supreme Courts in Kenya140 and Malawi,141 which recently 
took a firm stance against electoral malpractices by cancelling presidential 
election results that were fraught with irregularities. In adopting such an ap-
proach, both courts demonstrated their willingness to support the rule of law and 
to promote progressive democratic practices in their countries. The Council in 
Cameroon is far removed from such activism. 
In fact, the Council also adopted the avoidance technique when ELECAM 
was accused of collusion in the 2018 presidential election,142 and the petitioner 
demonstrated that in violation of the Electoral Code,143 some local polling sta-
tions under the supervision of ELECAM permitted high-ranking executive of-
ficials such as the Prime Minister, who are supporters of the CPDM, to vote 
outside of their constituencies. In addition, other authorities who are supporters 
of the CPDM (for instance, the speaker of the Senate) were allowed to change 
their constituencies after the time permitted by law and under circumstances that 
were not contemplated by the law. The petitioner argued that the irregularities 
cumulatively indicated collusion by ELECAM to favour the CPDM party. Even 
on that point indicting the impartiality of the national electoral institution, the 
Council made `no substantive comments, except a referral to the provision of 
the law that allows it to reject a petition on the ground that it has no effect on the 
election results. Its role is not only to police the results, but also importantly, 
the regularity of the process that has a bearing on the credibility of the results. The 
Council appeared disappointingly disingenuous when petitioners complained 
about the security situation in the North-West and South-West regions, which 
contributed to a significantly low voter turnout in those regions.144 The SDF 
presidential candidate, in particular, argued inter alia that the failure of the 
government to provide adequate security measures resulted in disenfranchising 
these populations and, therefore, the results emanating therefrom could neither 
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be representative nor credible given the irregular circumstances in which the 
election took place.145 Many voters were also internally displaced due to in-
security and could not access their polling stations. The Council upheld the 
counterargument of ELECAM that the government had provided adequate 
security, whereas the petitioner had provided substantial evidence to demon-
strate the insecurity in these regions, including the fact that the Prime Minister, 
Head of Government and other state officials could not vote in their con-
stituencies in the North-West region and had publicly cited insecurity as the 
reason for their demand to ELECAM to change their polling stations. In addi-
tion, the Council was undaunted in affirming that the low voter turnout was only 
indicative of the popular exercise of the freedom to vote or to abstain from voting 
and could not be attributed to the insecurity in these regions.146 It stated further 
that, in any case, there was no legally prescribed minimum threshold for parti-
cipation.147 The Council was, in effect, resisting to acknowledge a matter of fact 
relating to the insecurity in the North-West and South-West regions, which even 
the Prime Minister acknowledged. It was clear that the Council was determined 
to err on the side of caution in order to protect the incumbent regime. 
In avoiding to deal with substantive issues, the Council fails to develop stat-
utory and constitutional principles and, instead, entrenches a system that endows 
considerable advantages to the incumbent government and the ruling CPDM. 
In another matter initiated by the MRC presidential candidate challenging the 
impartiality of the Council’s members,148 the Council was disappointingly 
technical in its approach and overtly keen to maintain the status quo. The pe-
titioner alleged that the members lacked the capacity to be independent and 
impartial to oversee the regularity and transparency of the presidential election. 
The grounds raised in support of the allegations included the fact that some of 
the identified members, including the president of the Council have some affinity 
with the ruling CPDM party. Others exercised additional functions that were 
incompatible with their role as Council members. The petitioner requested 
the Council to forward the petition to the relevant nominating authority, for the 
‘replacement’ of the members to be recused in application of their nominating 
power under article 51(3) of the Constitution. In the meantime, the Council 
should apply its powers under section 18 of the Constitutional Council Law, 
which empowers it, on its own initiative and in regards to 2/3 of its members, to 
terminate the functions of a member for incompatibilities. The Council did not 
object to any of the allegations and in particular, in relation to the issue of in-
compatibilities, the Council failed to examine the specific allegations relating to 
the incompatibilities of its memebers. Instead, it was keen to highlight that there 
was no statutory provision dealing with recusal of members of the Council. It 
determined that recusal must be done through a special procedure. Surprisingly, 
the Council neither outlined the procedure nor provided the normative basis for 
it. Nevertheless, it stated that the petitioner lacked standing to initiate that 
procedure even though it did not outline what the procedure was and the basis 
for determining that the petitioner had no standing. As a result, the petition was 
dismissed. Given the significance of the complaint, and the factual grounds raised 
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by the applicant, it is disappointing that the Council did not probe further into 
the substance of the petition. Although there may not be a statutory provision 
relating to the recusal of Council members, the implications of the issues raised 
warranted some judicial activism – a more profound exploration of the issue, and 
it gave the Council the opportunity to engage in a positive analysis and devel-
opment of the law on the subject. The Council did not, even in good faith, 
undertake to explore the matter in the future to obtain clarity. Moreover, it failed 
to refer to its powers under section 18 of the Constitutional Council Law to 
determine its applicability in this case. 
The Council appears to favour textualism in the interpretation of laws and one 
of the weaknesses of that approach is that it has the potential to allow members to 
advance personal preferences especially where constitutional texts are vaguely or 
broadly worded or where the text is silent on important constitutional provi-
sions.149 This approach only lends further credence to the perception of the 
Council as an institution that exists to lend legitimacy to the incumbent regime. 
The Council can adopt more objectivity in its reasoning, taking into account 
other considerations such as those based on moral reasoning, practical con-
sequences and structural relationships.150 This approach promotes the rule of 
law and arguably will help to dispel perceptions of arbitrariness because its 
decisions will be well reasoned and objective. The Council should be at the 
forefront of democratic reform in Cameroon by shaping electoral rules and other 
relevant rules, by vigorously enforcing constitutional and fundamental human 
rights and democratic principles. It should demonstrate sincerity in its efforts to 
resolve electoral disputes. This cannot be done through an avoidance technique 
or through a focus solely on textualism. 
Part II. International treaties and the alternative to 
constitutional review 
A. International law and the domestic legal order 
International law plays an important role in the domestic legal order, not least 
because it extends the range of rights in the country. As noted earlier, the 
President of the Republic is vested with powers to ratify international treaties and 
agreements that fall within the reserved legislative domain.151 For those that fall 
within the legislative competence of parliament, the latter may authorise the 
President to ratify the treaty or agreement.152 Where the Constitutional Council 
finds a treaty provision incompatible with international law, ratification is de-
ferred until the Constitution is amended.153 For a treaty to become applicable 
once duly ratified, it must be published in the official gazette.154 Application is 
also subject to reciprocity. However, that requirement may be dispensed with in 
the application of human rights instruments.155 
Cameroon operates a monist system, which implies that once the appropriate 
procedures for ratification and publication have been complied with, an inter-
national treaty becomes directly applicable. In addition, international law takes 
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precedence over domestic law (legislative acts ordinances and regulatory in-
struments). The basis for supremacy is article 45 of the Constitution, which states 
that, ‘Duly approved or ratified treaties and international agreements shall, 
following their publication, override national laws’. In terms of hierarchy, the 
position is represented in Figure 5.1. 
B. Le contrôle de conventionnalité des lois 
The hierarchy depicted earlier, has important implications for issues relating to 
consistency within the domestic legal order. The Constitution is at the apex of 
that hierarchy and all other norms obtain their validity from it and, therefore, 
must be consistent with the Constitution. It can be seen that international law is 
second in that hierarchy. As international law takes precedence over domestic 
law, there is a necessary implication that domestic law should comply with 
international law in order to maintain consistency within the legal order. This 
may affect the ways in which domestic courts deal with provisions of domestic 
law that appear to be inconsistent with international law. Although there is no 
statute expressly empowering the courts to exclude domestic provisions that are 
incompatible with international law, the courts can adopt such a practice by an 
implicit reading of article 45 of the Constitution, as requiring compatibility of 







Figure 5.1 Hierarchy of norms in the domestic legal order.   
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known as Le contrôle de conventionnalité des lois (conventionnalité), has been developed 
by the ordinary courts in France (the Cour de Cassation and the Conseil d’Etat) 
through a reading of article 55 of the French Constitution, which accords 
precedence to international law.157 The ordinary courts in France have de-
termined that an implication of article 55 is the requirement of compatibility of 
domestic law with international law.158 As a result, through conventionnalité, the 
courts can exclude provisions of domestic law that are incompatible with in-
ternational law. This has been a very important mechanism for the protection 
of human rights in France, primarily prior to the constitutional amendments in 
2010 that paved the way for the introduction of post-legislative constitutional 
review. 
Conventionnalité is particularly important in Cameroon for at least two specific 
reasons. First, due to the limited mechanism for constitutional review (pre- 
legislative) performed by the Council and second, due to the limitation on 
standing. In Cameroon, because article 45 of the Constitution grants interna-
tional law precedence over domestic law, there is a constitutional basis for ar-
guing that implicitly, the Constitution requires the compatibility of domestic law 
with international law.159 Like their French counterparts, the courts in 
Cameroon can adopt the practice of conventionnalité to review domestic law for 
compatibility with international law. This will play a significant role in the 
protection of human rights, particularly in the present context where a number 
of provisions which infringe on human rights, are being enforced without the 
possibility of challenging their constitutionality. 
The courts are not completely adverse to the application of international law. 
However, it has not been routinely applied as the basis to exclude the application 
of domestic provisions that infringe international law.160 Nevertheless, a recent 
decision of the Supreme Court demonstrates judicial awareness of the practice of 
conventionnalité. In Zouhair Fadoul v Omaïs Kassim,161 the Supreme Court affirmed 
the constitutional basis for conventionnalité.162 
The appellant in that case appealed against the decision of the Littoral Court 
of Appeal rejecting the enforcement in Cameroon of a deed notarised by a 
notary public in the Republic of Benin. The Appeal Court submitted the 
notarised deed to an authentication procedure and declared it unenforceable. 
The Court had based its decision on section 10 of the Law on the Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments in Cameroon.163 That provision requires foreign judgements 
and other judicial orders and instruments such as notarised deeds to be subjected 
to additional authentication procedures before they became enforceable in 
Cameroon. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellants argued that 
section 10 of that domestic law was incompatible with the provisions of article 29 
of the General Convention on Judicial Cooperation ratified by Cameroon and 
Benin. Article 29 provides a list of documents including notarised deeds that are 
directly enforceable within members states provided they have been issued and 
certified by the relevant authorities in the member states. This was sufficient to 
establish authenticity. As the notary public in Benin was the relevant authority, 
article 29 had been satisfied. 
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To address the issue, the Supreme Court referred to article 45 of the 
Constitution that gives international law precedence over domestic law. The Court 
stated that article 45 implied a system of hierarchy by which subordinate legislation 
was required to be consistent with superior legislation. Thus, in the present case, 
section 10 of the Law on Foreign Judgment had to be consistent with article 29 of 
the General Convention on Judicial Cooperation. In the light of the inconsistency, 
article 45 of the Constitution empowered the Court to exercise le contrôle de la 
conventionnalité to make the provision of the Convention to prevail over domestic 
law.164 The effect of conventionnalité was to exclude section 10 of the domestic law 
from application to the present case. It followed that the notarised deed from 
Benin should have been enforceable without additional authentication procedures. 
The Supreme Court, thus, annulled the decision of the Court of Appeal. 
Fadoul is important for at least two reasons. Foremost is the fact that is has 
given effect to the supremacy clause of the Constitution, thus affirming the 
constitutional basis for conventionnalité. Second, it has set a precedent for other 
ordinary courts in determining the compatibility of domestic law with interna-
tional law.165 This implies that domestic provisions, especially those that impinge 
on the exercise of human rights, can be challenged where they are incompatible 
with international human rights law. 
One significant advantage of conventionnalité is that it is exercised by ordinary 
courts such as the High Courts, the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court, 
which are accessible to ordinary citizens. This is an advantage because the limited 
system of constitutional review of legislation performed by the Council is only 
accessible to a defined class of politicians. A further advantage is that it is post 
legislative. It can be used to exclude the application of legislation that is already in 
force. Therefore, conventionnalité, if well developed, may provide a suitable alter-
native mechanism to post-legislative constitutional review in Cameroon. 
Conclusion 
Constitutional jurisdictions are known to play an important part in upholding the 
rule of law and in protecting constitutional rights and democratic values. This 
perhaps explains why the ‘drafters’ of the 1996 Constitution thought that by 
introducing a Constitutional Council, such values would be promoted or at 
least it would appear so to the restive populations. After long decades of waiting 
expectantly for the actual establishment and functioning of the Council, it has 
become clear that the institution, like many others created under the 1996 
Constitution, is a smoke-screen. This chapter has demonstrated that the Council 
is significantly politicised in terms of its appointment mechanism, which accords 
very limited de facto independence to the members. In addition, its mandate, 
especially in the area of constitutional review, is very limited. In electoral matters, 
the system appears to be a finely tuned web attached to ELECAM to preserve 
incumbency advantages. It is clear from the Council’s institutional structure and 
its mandate that it serves better the political branches and in particular, like the 
ordinary judiciary, is very much under the influence of the President of the 
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Republic. While the Council is still witnessing its embryonic years and thus an 
argument can be made in support of the fact that it is still on the learning curve, 
early signals reveal that this institution has limited capacity to develop into a 
positively influential institution in the political landscape. From its early decisions 
in the electoral petitions, it has been clear that the Council has neither the in-
dependent capacity nor the will to be objective or to embark on a strategy to 
develop meaningful constitutional jurisprudence. 
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6 Managing diversity 
The Anglophone struggle for  
self-determination   
Introduction 
Since 2016, Cameroon has been embroiled in a crisis that has led to the re-
surgence of the Anglophone problem. As we saw in Chapter 1, the problem can 
be traced to historical grievances against the marginalisation of the Anglophones 
by the predominantly Francophone government. Despite persistent calls from 
the Anglophone minority for better recognition by the government, these calls 
have been largely unheeded. Historically, the government embarked on a 
strategy of denial of the existence of that problem and promoted a divide and 
rule policy pitting the South-West region against the North-West region. For 
many Anglophones, the federal structure that was adopted in 1961, upon 
reunification, was the ideal form of the state to guarantee the protection of 
their minority status and to ensure the preservation of their distinctive identity, 
specifically in the linguistic, education and judicial spheres. For others, a genuine 
preservation of that identity can only be secured through secession. The gov-
ernment has maintained that the decentralised structure of the state introduced 
in the 1996 Constitution constitutes the only acceptable approach which un-
derscores the government’s policy to unify the country against a single 
Cameroonian identity and to guarantee respect for difference through circum-
scribed regional autonomy. This policy has been largely unsuccessful and matters 
came to a head in 2016 when sectoral demands by teachers and lawyers in the 
Anglophone regions degenerated into armed struggles between the government 
and radical secessionist groups. As part of a wider governance initiative to en-
hance the autonomy of the administrative regions and in particular to resolve the 
Anglophone crises, a special autonomy status was granted to the North-West and 
South-West regions within the context of decentralisation. 
This chapter examines the opposing approaches to governance proposed 
relentlessly as solutions to resolving the Anglophone problem. The first section 
provides a synopsis of the immediate triggers of the armed struggle that has 
engulfed the North-West and South-West regions. This will be followed by an 
examination of the government’s approach to decentralisation and an analysis of 
the legislative provisions granting a special autonomy status to the North-West 
and South-West regions. The two other dominant ideological strands, 
federalism and secession, are also discussed. The chapter concludes with an 
outlook for holistic strategies to manage minority grievances in the midst of 
armed conflicts. 
Part I. The immediate triggers of the Anglophone 
crisis in brief 
The current explosion of tension in the Anglophone regions originated on 
11 October 2016 when lawyers from the North-West and South-West regions 
went on strike in protest at the repeated failure of the Ministry of Justice to 
respond to their grievances, arising from the imposition of civil law trained judges 
and other judicial personnel on the essentially common law oriented courts and 
judicial procedures in those regions.1 Their grievances related to the fact that the 
judicial personnel in question understood neither the common law system nor 
the English language to serve effectively within these regions. On 21 November, 
the lawyers were joined by teachers in the same regions with similar complaints 
relating to the lack of recognition of the ‘Anglo-saxon’ nature of education in the 
Anglophone regions and the deployment of teachers without proficiency in the 
English language or knowledge of the education system in those regions and 
could therefore not effectively educate students without the ability to commu-
nicate. While these protests were peaceful, security forces and gendarmes dis-
persed the protesters by violently beating and injuring some, while others were 
arrested and a few shot dead.2 The repressive stance adopted by the government 
precipitated violent exchanges between the security forces and unarmed pro-
testers, compelling the government to attempt to seek solutions. An ad hoc 
committee was appointed, composed of four Francophone ministers under the 
supervision of the Prime Minister (PM), to seek solutions to the problem.3 
It immediately suffered from a legitimacy crisis given that it was composed 
predominantly of Francophone ministers. The situation was exacerbated by the 
fact that prominent Anglophones such as the Minister of Territorial 
Administration and the former PM Peter Mafany Musonge maintained that 
there was no ‘Anglophone problem’. 
The lawyers and teachers subsequently formed the Cameroon Anglophone Civil 
Society Consortium (CACSC) led by Felix Nkongho Agbor Balla. Between 
December 2016 and January 2017, CACSC and the government committee 
entered into negotiations to which only the teachers were initially invited. The 
committee acceded to some demands in the education sector such as measures to 
recruit over 1000 bilingual teachers and the redeployment of some Francophone 
teachers from the Anglophone regions.4 Other concessions subsequently made 
included the creation of a common law division within the Judicial Bench of the 
Supreme Court,5 the creation of a department in the National School of 
Administration and Magistracy (ENAM) for judicial training in the common law 
system, complemented by an increase in Anglophone instructors in ENAM, and the 
recruitment of more Anglophone judges. A fifteen member National Commission 
for Bilingualism and Multiculturalism (the Bilingualism Commission) was also 
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created in January 2017.6 These measures were, however, seen as cosmetic and 
insufficient to address the root causes of the Anglophone problem. The govern-
ment’s intentions were also seen as dubious due to its objection to adopting sys-
tematic changes with potential to address more substantive grievances. For instance, 
it objected to demands for the unconditional release of protesters arrested during 
peaceful demonstrations and resisted demands for the adoption of a five-year de-
velopment plan and the reintroduction of federalism.7 Although the protests began 
initially with sectoral demands, at this stage, CACSC leaders where under pressure 
from the public to make wider demands relating to general issues affecting the 
Anglophone population. That explains the reasons for the last three demands that 
were shunned by the government. The government felt betrayed into negotia-
tions for the alteration of the form of the state for which the committee had no 
mandate.8 Mistrust between the negotiating parties and further repressive 
practices by security forces in January led to the breakdown of negotiations on 
14 January 2017. CACSC declared a two-day civil disobedience campaign 
known as ‘Operation Ghost Town’ in the Anglophone regions. The govern-
ment banned the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) and CACSC 
and proceeded to arrest their leaders while other members of CACSC went 
into exile in Nigeria, South Africa and the USA.9 The government embarked 
on a spate of arrest of journalists, members of civil society organisations and 
Anglophone activists, including the prominent Supreme Court Judge and po-
litician, Ayah Paul.10 Due to the influence of information technology in 
publicising the Anglophone crisis and the atrocities of the security forces, the 
government shut down internet access in the Anglophone regions between 
January 2017 and March 2018 for 240 days, branding social media as a new 
form of terrorism. That was interpreted as a further demarcation of and 
discrimination against the Anglophone regions.11 The Anglophone regions 
remained heavily militarised with the deployment of the Rapid Intervention 
Battalion (BIR) noted for the use of brute force and for perpetrating atrocities 
such as torching of villages, enforced disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests 
and extra judicial executions.12 
Following the arrest of CACSC leaders in January 2017, provisional lea-
dership was handed over to activists in the diaspora. Fuelled by increased 
government atrocities and pressure from the population, some of the leaders 
insisted on a complete secession of the Anglophone regions. Other CACSC 
leaders in exile severed links with the moderates to form the Southern 
Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF), a group that 
advocates secession.13 An unrecognised Interim Government of Ambazonia 
was formed with Julius Ayuk as the president. On 1 October 2017, SCACUF 
prematurely declared the independence of the South-West and North-West 
regions, with the aspiration to form a Federal Republic of Ambazonia. 
Despite the abortive declaration, the move inevitably prompted more re-
pression from the government. There was a further twist in events when 
Julius Ayuk and forty-six members of the Interim Government were arrested 
in Nigeria in January 2018 and unlawfully14 taken to Cameroon where 
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they remained incommunicado for close to six months.15 They were even-
tually tried by the military tribunal in Yaoundé and sentenced to life 
imprisonment in August 2019, a move that further strengthened demands 
for secession. 
The humanitarian fallouts have been phenomenal with an estimated casualty 
of over 2000 people.16 According to the United Nations, since 2016, about 
530,000 people have been forced to flee their homes due to the insecurity in the 
Anglophone regions.17 More than 35,000 of the displaced persons have fled to 
neighbouring Nigeria and the UNHCR estimated that by the end of 2019, that 
number would increase by more than 20,000.18 In the education sector, 80% of 
the schools in the region have been closed affecting an estimated 600,000 chil-
dren.19 Many schools have been burned down, while others have not functioned 
effectively for three academic cycles.20 
What began as simple sectoral demands, morphed into a political crisis that 
led to the resurgence of the Anglophone problem, which could no longer 
be ignored by the government. It required some decisive action to deal with 
the historical grievances that have continued to mar the relationship with the 
government. 
Part II. Responses to the Anglophone problem 
The Anglophone problem is one without an obvious solution and has arguably 
been made more problematic with the emergence of the armed struggle. While 
proponents of federalism and secession have persisted in their demands, the 
government has added another angle to its decentralisation scheme by granting a 
special status to the North-West and South-West regions. This section analyses 
the major ideological strands and attempts to identify their potential to serve as 
lasting solutions to the Anglophone problem. 
A. Decentralisation 
Decentralisation (through devolution) is the governance option adopted by the 
government of Cameroon, introduced partly as a concession to the Anglophones’ 
demand for federalism in the early 1990s.21 The 1996 Constitution describes 
Cameroon as a ‘decentralised unitary state’,22 composed of a central government 
with autonomous subnational units represented by the ten administrative re- 
gions, and 360 councils.23 Although this governance structure was introduced in 
1996, the first implementing legislation only emerged in 2004 and further leg- 
islative instruments were enacted between 2008 and 2009.24 It was not until 2010 
that some aspects of decentralisation began to be implemented slowly. On 
2 March 2018, the Ministry of decentralisation and local development was 
created by presidential decree as part of the initiative to expedite the process of 
decentralisation.25 Further strides were made on 19 December 2019 when 
parliament passed a law on decentralised regional and local authorities, amidst  
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the raging crisis in the Anglophone regions.26 As per the government’s ex-
planatory statement accompanying the bill that was tabled before parliament, 
that law combines all the previous legislative instruments regulating decen-
tralisation.27 At the time of writing this monograph, that law had not come into 
force. In the subsequent discussions, the new provisions will be highlighted. 
I. Justifying decentralisation 
The government of Cameroon has advanced both a legal and a functional basis 
for decentralisation. 
From a legal perspective, the argument is that the form of the state is inviolable. 
Reference is often made to article 64 of the Constitution, which provides that: 
No procedure for the amendment of the Constitution affecting the 
republican form, unity and territorial integrity of the State and the 
democratic principles which govern the Republic shall be accepted.  
According to the government and proponents of decentralisation, the form of 
the state is provided for in article 1(2) of the Constitution, which makes 
Cameroon a decentralised unitary state. Read together with article 64, the form 
of the state is inviolable and any procedure that has the effect of altering that 
form, and indeed the territorial integrity of the state, is unlawful. Two pertinent 
observations warrant consideration. First, article 64 does not preclude a dis-
cussion of other forms of the state that do not alter its unitary nature or its 
territorial integrity. For instance, federalism does not imply a disintegration of 
the state. While it entails some devolution of powers, just like decentralisation, it 
preserves the unity of the state and its territorial integrity. The United States, for 
instance, is a unitary state with a federal structure. Federalism has not under-
mined the ‘unitary’ nature of the United States.  
Second, an argument that article 64 prohibits any proposal for altering the 
form of the state stands at risk of questioning the lawfulness of decentralisation 
itself. Article 64 is a re-enactment of article 37 of the 1972 Constitution.28 
Moreover, article 1 of the 1972 Constitution described Cameroon as a ‘Unitary 
State’. The ‘decentralised unitary’ form of the state was introduced through the 
1996 amendment of the Constitution. If a discussion of the form of the state is 
not acceptable now on the basis of article 64, the same argument could be made 
that article 37 of the 1972 Constitution prohibited the kind of amendment or 
alteration of the form of the state introduced under article 1(2) of the 1996 
Constitution, vis decentralisation. It is submitted here that article 64 does not 
prohibit discussions of or proposals on the amendment of the form of the state 
(for instance, federalism), which do not impair the unity of the state or its ter-
ritorial integrity. Therefore, from a constitutional perspective, decentralisation 
should not be the only acceptable form of the state. 
From a functional perspective, the government has often argued that decen-
tralisation within a unitary state is a more suitable form of government, due to 
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Cameroon’s multi-ethnic context. Decentralisation is perceived as the basic 
driving force for the promotion of development, democracy and good govern-
ance at the local level.29 There is some merit in the argument in support of 
decentralisation as a functional tool for a multi-ethnic country like Cameroon. 
Decentralisation is credited with promoting a number of virtues, including de-
mocracy and sustainable development30 and the reduction of ethnic conflict and 
secessionism by bringing the government closer to the people.31 The potential 
outcome is that it increases the opportunities for local populations especially 
threatened or embattled minority groups to participate in government, giving 
them control over their social, economic and political affairs. Ultimately, there 
will be fewer incentives for local communities or regional minorities to seek their 
own independent status.32 Thus, as a multi-ethnic community with pressing 
needs for the Anglophone identity to be respected and protected within the 
decentralised unitary state, it can be argued cautiously that decentralisation can 
accomplish some favourable outcomes.33 
These benefits, however, do not accrue automatically. They are dependent on 
the existence of a number of factors including clearly defined constitutional and 
legal frameworks, the extent and nature of the devolved powers, institutional 
capacity, implementing processes and monitoring mechanisms.34 More funda-
mentally in relation to conflicts and minorities, the extent of their protection 
within the decentralised framework and the governing principles of the im-
plementing process are of primary importance. The absence of some of the vital 
factors or their ill-conceptualisation may have the reverse effect. This partly 
explains why decentralisation is sometimes viewed with much scepticism. Thus, 
other scholars have argued that decentralisation on the contrary amplifies the 
risk of ethnic division, conflict and demands for secession.35 Decentralisation 
has often been advanced as the cause of the failure of integrationist projects in 
countries such as Kosovo and Yugoslavia.36 The literature, thus, demonstrates 
that the evidence on the merits of decentralisation is inconclusive37 and in re-
gards to the resolution of conflicts, the potential for decentralisation to amplify 
conflict depends on the nature of the conflict and the role of ethnic tensions as a 
source of the conflict.38 As Benjamin Edwards and Serdar Yilmaz note, ‘[w]hile 
decentralisation can serve to mitigate or reduce conflict, the processes involved 
can also exacerbate conflict. It all depends on country context and, especially, 
on the nature of the conflict itself ’.39 These competing perspectives indicate that 
the government of Cameroon must approach decentralisation with caution, 
focusing on the factors and conditions likely to promote economic and political 
development and, in particular, in resolving the Anglophone problem. 
One can note, for instance, the restrictive nature of the principles of sub-
sidiarity and complementarity40 governing devolution and power sharing, which 
have inevitably contributed to a flawed decentralisation architecture and process. 
The subsidiarity principle demarcates the powers exercised by the central gov-
ernment and the devolved units and is based on the idea of ‘transfer and exercise 
of authority at the territorial level which is most suitable or closest to the 
people concerned’.41 Thus, the state shall devolve to local authorities, the powers 
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necessary for their economic, social, health, educational, cultural and sports 
development.42 In that respect, regional and local authorities shall have ad-
ministrative and financial autonomy in the management of their interest and 
have separate assets, staff, property and services from the state.43 Moreover, they 
shall have their own budget and resources prepared and voted by them and 
receive all or part of the proceeds from exploitation of natural resources 
within their territorial jurisdiction (under conditions laid down by law).44 They 
shall also receive resources from the state and generate the resources necessary 
for the promotion of economic, social, health, educational, cultural and sports 
development in their jurisdictions.45 
Despite the purported autonomy in the management and administration 
of their affairs and resources, their powers are restricted to those that are 
‘necessary’ to achieve the previously mentioned objective and are to be ex-
ercised concurrently with the state under certain conditions.46 For instance, the 
state may exercise devolved powers on an ad hoc basis to ensure the balanced 
development of the territory or to address an emergency, or where there has 
been a ‘failure’ duly established by the minister in charge of local authorities or 
a two-third majority of the deliberative organ of the region.47 The law does not 
define a ‘failure’, as such, the implications are unclear. Again, although the 
devolved units are purportedly autonomous in the preparation and manage-
ment of their budget and resources, some decisions, like those relating to 
budgets, accounts, special expenditure authorisation, loans, execution of public 
contracts, staff recruitment and international cooperation, are subject to the 
prior approval of the representative of the state, a presidential appointee.48 
The other underpinning principle, the complementarity principle, as de-
scribed by a Minister Delegate at the former Ministry of Territorial 
Administration and Decentralisation, relates to the idea that, ‘authority trans-
ferred by the state does not exclude the fact that the latter continues to exercise 
same’.49 Both principles are indicative of the extent to which the state may be 
reluctant to relinquish power to the devolved units and keen to interfere unduly 
in their affairs.50 This is reflected in a number of provisions of the relevant 
normative instruments. For instance, presidential appointees, such as regional 
governors and senior divisional officers, are empowered to exercise supervisory 
duties over elected regional and council officials.51 The RLA Code creates the 
position of the Secretary General, a presidential appointee responsible for co-
ordinating regional administrative services, handling the business of the regions 
and implementing the decisions of the regional council president.52 He is au-
thorised to attend Bureau and regional council meetings for which he shall 
provide secretarial services.53 The autonomy and stability of regions are further 
undermined by the fact that the President of the Republic can interfere with local 
governance by creating, renaming and re-defining geographical boundaries of 
local authorities unilaterally.54 Further, under certain circumstances, the regional 
councils may be suspended by the President of the Republic or dissolved by the 
same in ‘consultation’ with the Constitutional Council.55 In the context of such 
restrictions, there can hardly be any meaningful exercise of autonomy, therefore 
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restricting the extent to which local populations can influence their governance 
and development. This is a factor that can further antagonise local communities 
and inflame their demands for greater autonomy and secession. However, the 
new law purports to grant local communities opportunities to participate in local 
governance through neighbourhood and village communities56 and through 
consultative processes in the preparation of local budgets.57 
Section 9(2) of the 2004 Law on Decentralisation also included the progres-
siveness or gradualism principle, which has partly determined the slow pace of 
decentralisation. According to that principle, ‘transfer of authority is spread over 
time and is done in packages or levels’.58 One of the problems affecting the pace of 
decentralisation, as explained by the Minister Delegate, is the ‘lack of a local 
governance and participatory democracy culture’.59 That has not been mitigated 
by legislative provisions, which, in effect, stymie participatory democracy. This 
factor, as well as others already outlined, makes for a decentralisation process that 
does not accord the devolved units meaningful autonomy to address the issues that 
are of concern to them. With respect to the Anglophone problem, the pre- 
December 2019 laws on decentralisation attempted to deal with issues such as 
education and culture. However, there were no specific provisions that went to the 
heart of the preservation of the elements that comprise the distinctive Anglophone 
identity. At the constitutional level, decentralisation did not address these issues in 
a clear and distinctive way. The closest it came was in article 62(2), which provides 
vaguely that, ‘the law may take into consideration the specificities of certain 
Regions with regard to their organisation and functioning’. That was, however, 
not reflected in any of the implementing legislative texts before December 2019. 
Hence, as a means of achieving the objectives intended by the government, the 
decentralisation process and the normative framework seemed fundamentally 
flawed. There was, therefore, a need for reconsidering an alternative or, at least, 
reassessing the process of decentralisation with a view to amending the constitu-
tional and legislative provisions to ensure that decentralisation could achieve fa-
vourable outcomes, including resolving the Anglophone problem. That was not a 
matter overtly contemplated by the government. However, it became even more 
necessary following the resurgence of the Anglophone problem. 
B. Special autonomy status 
On 10 September 2019, in a rare address to the nation, President Biya an-
nounced plans to convene a broad-based national dialogue to seek solutions 
to the crisis rocking the Anglophone regions.60 The dialogue was preceded 
by a pre-consultation phase during which the PM, as the designated chair, 
received various delegations to obtain views that would inform the discussions 
during the dialogue itself. This was in line with the process stipulated in the 
presidential speech. The delegations included representatives of national 
groups and institutions and government representatives and institutions.61 
Government appointed delegations were dispatched abroad to consult diaspora 
groups and community representatives. 
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The main dialogue took place between 30 September and 4 October 2019. 
It is worth noting that this was organised, chaired and supervised by the gov-
ernment. No independent organisation was given any of the aforementioned 
duties to steer the process. To facilitate the discussion, a Dialogue Bureau was 
set up with a president/chair (the PM), four vice presidents – two of which were 
Anglophones – four rapporteurs – three of which were Anglophones – and eight 
themed commissions, as stated in the following list.  
– Bilingualism, Cultural Diversity, and Social Cohesion  
– Educational System  
– Judicial System  
– Assistance to Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons  
– Reconstruction and Development of Regions Affected by Crisis  
– Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reinsertion of Ex-Combatants  
– Role of the Diaspora in the Crisis and Contribution to the Country’s 
Development  
– Decentralisation and Local Development 
These commissions were the intended fora for ‘inclusive’ discussions with 
a view to developing proposals and recommendations to resolve the issues 
identified in the presidential speech. As a conflict-mediation strategy, the dia-
logue process seemed flawed at its very inception. For instance, the agenda 
seemed pre-determined. Major actors, such as the separatist leaders, were still 
incarcerated while the discussions were ongoing and diaspora separatist groups 
and leaders were excluded from discussions. Although they were purportedly 
invited, no special guarantees were provided to ensure their safety or their 
personal liberty and security. In addition, Anglophone representatives who 
attended the discussions perceived the process as inadequate in many respects 
but particularly because the dialogue was stage-managed without the oppor-
tunity for them to express their genuine concerns and proposals. For instance, 
when Agbor Balla (the first leader of the proscribed CACSC) and the National 
Chairman of the Social Democratic Front (SDF) Fru Ndi mentioned federalism 
in their speech, they were heavily criticised and heckled. The perceived 
inadequacies caused prominent figures like Barrister Akere Muna to withdraw 
from the dialogue. 
Nevertheless, a number of recommendations were made at the end of the 
process aimed at resolving the Anglophone crisis. According to the Rapporteur 
General of the Dialogue, some of the recommendations need to be particularly 
highlighted and these include recommendations to: 
Grant a special status to the North-West and South-West Regions, in 
conformity with Section 62 Sub 2 of the Constitution; Take specific 
measures to ensure equality of English and French in all aspects of national 
life; Reinforce the autonomy of Decentralised Local Entities; Improve upon 
the infrastructure of judicial services throughout the country …62 
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While these recommendations, if implemented, may go some way to address 
the root causes of the Anglophone problem, critics still perceive the dialogue 
and the recommendations as a smokescreen.63 It is worth noting that parlia-
ment passed a law on bilingualism, which emphasises the government’s policy 
on the equal status of the two national languages.64 It also promotes their 
compulsory use in public institutions and enshrines the rights of citizens to 
communicate with public institutions in their (official) language of choice. The 
bilingualism law is purportedly a complementary instrument to the special 
status arrangements. 
I. An overview of the special status for the North-West and South-West Regions 
The proposal for a special autonomy status for the North-West and South-West 
regions, unsurprisingly, was not without controversy. Some critics initially 
objected to the suggestion on the basis that it is an inferior arrangement for these 
regions and symbolises subjugation. One reason that may account for the 
objection is perhaps the fact that the proposal originated from pro-government 
supporters who were members of the Decentralisation Commission at the 
Dialogue, notably, Constitutional Council member Akame Mfoumou. The ob-
jection relates to the contention that the proposal was used to forestall any dis-
cussions of federalism. This was reinforced by the fact that the proposed special 
status would be granted within the context of article 62(2) of the Constitution, 
which makes provision for laws on decentralisation to take into account the 
specificities of certain regions. 
The SDF opposition party initially backed the proposal emphasising that the 
implication was that, 
the regions will have to enjoy autonomy characterised by constitutionally 
entrenched Executive, Legislative and Judicial Powers with an adminis-
trative set up that reflects the aspirations of the people of these regions.65  
The SDF made reference to the special status granted to the minority French- 
speaking province of Quebec in Canada as a model for the establishment of 
a special status for the Anglophone regions of Cameroon. In their view, the 
arrangements in Quebec would be suitable to Anglophone Cameroon as there is 
some resonance with the cultural heritage of the two entities. Although the 
similarities between Quebec and the Anglophone regions of Cameroon might 
be overstated, the SDF’s optimism was not totally unfounded. That optimism 
was, however, short lived. In December 2019, parliament passed the Code on 
Regional and Local Authorities (RLA Code), which made provisions for a special 
status for the North-West and the South-West regions.66 Some of the substantive 
provisions are analysed in the subsequent section. Attention is also accorded to 
the normative framework and the procedural mechanisms through which special 
status has been granted. 
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II. Substantive provisions 
According to the government’s Explanatory Statement preceding the bill to in-
stitute the RLA Code,67 one significant advantage is that it compiles all the 
related laws on decentralisation in one document. The RLA Code regulates 
the general framework of decentralisation, the status of the local elected re-
presentatives, rules applicable to councils and regions and the financial regime 
applicable to regional and local authorities.68 It states that the local authorities 
shall be regions and councils and shall carryout their activities with due respect 
for national unity, solidarity, territorial integrity and the primacy of the state.69 
The specificities of the Anglophone regions are recognised at the outset. Thus, 
section 3(1) provides that, ‘[t]he North-West and South-West Regions shall have 
a special status based on their language specificity and historical heritage’. 
That provision is reiterated in section 327(1), which states additionally that the 
North-West and South-West shall have a special status in accordance with the 
provisions of article 62 of the Constitution. The Law states further that the special 
status shall be reflected in the context of decentralisation, ‘in specificities in the 
organisation and functioning of these two regions’70 and ‘shall also entail respect 
for the peculiarity of the Anglophone education system and consideration of the 
specificities of the Anglo-Saxon legal system based on common law’.71 Those 
provisions indicate clearly that there is acknowledgment of the distinct nature of 
some key features that constitute the core of the Anglophone identity.72 In terms 
of devolution of powers, how does the RLA Code reflect those specificities? 
A. DEVOLVED POWERS 
The powers devolved on all the ten regions of the state are covered in sections 267 
to 273. They include defined competencies in the areas of economic development, 
health and social development and education, sports and cultural development. All 
are not discussed here. This subsection focuses exclusively on some of the powers 
related to the central theme of this chapter. Specifically in the area of education, 
regions have, among other competencies, powers to participate in drawing up and 
implementing the regional portion of the national school map.73 In the area of 
culture and promotion of national languages, regions are empowered, inter alia, to 
collect and translate works of oral tradition with a view to facilitating their pub-
lication, to encourage functional command of national languages and to produce 
the regional linguistic map.74 In addition, they have powers to participate in the 
promotion of publishing and broadcasting in the national languages.75 
According to section 328(1), in addition to the powers exercised by all regions, 
the North-West and South-West shall exercise the following powers:  
– Participating in the formulation of national public policies relating to the 
Anglophone education subsystem  
– Setting up and managing regional development authorities  
– Participating in defining the status of traditional chiefdoms 
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This is commendable in that the law explicitly attempts to reflect the speci-
ficities of the Anglophone regions in certain areas such as its distinct education 
system. In the education sphere, all other regions have a limited scope in de-
termining education policies as their role is restricted to participating ‘in drawing 
up and implementing the regional portion of the national school map’.76 Whereas, 
the local authorities in the Anglophone regions can participate in formulating 
‘national’ education policies that relate to the Anglophone system. The implica-
tion is that there is potential for local authorities to ensure the continued respect 
and the preservation of the Anglophone education system through national 
policies and to influence developments in that area. 
Anglophone regional authorities can also set up and manage local develop-
ment initiatives that promote local economic development in their regions. For 
instance, the creation of a local produce marketing board as in the federal era 
when the West Cameroon Marketing Board existed to facilitate the marketing 
of local cash crops such as cocoa, coffee, tea and palm oil.77 On the strength of 
section 328(1), such initiatives would be created at the behest of the local au-
thorities and managed by them, taking into account issues that are specifically 
relevant to their local populations.78 
The Law also recognises the distinct legal tradition based on the common law 
system. Thus, section 328(2) provides that the Anglophone regions may be 
consulted in the formulation of judicial policies in the common law sub-system. 
That recognition is novel as no other existing statute specifically vests con-
sultative powers on any Anglophone representatives in the formulation of judicial 
policies relating to the common law. As such, there is some scope for the re-
inforcement of the equality of the common law system and its preservation, 
an aspect that has gained renewed significance since the onset of the crises in 
2016. As discussed in previous chapters,79 as part of that recognition, a common 
law division was established in the Judicial Bench of the Supreme Court. 
In ENAM, a special section for the training of judicial officers with a common 
law background was established. 
In spite of the apparent special powers granted to the Anglophone regional 
authorities, in terms of devolution, they do not appear to go far enough to allow 
sufficient scope for the authorities to significantly influence the management and 
development of those features that are specific to their regions. For instance, 
although they can participate in the formulation of national policy relating to 
the Anglophone education system, to what extent can they influence the de-
velopment, amendment or adoption of these policies? If the regional authorities, 
reflecting current public opinion, proposed to the relevant minister that teachers 
without training in the Anglophone education system should not be routinely 
transferred to schools in the Anglophone regions, what weight would that pro-
posal carry? The law only states that they shall participate but does not state in 
what capacity nor does it require the relevant national authority to be bound by 
the proposals emanating from the authorities of the Anglophone regions. 
Similarly, with respect to the formulation of judicial policy relating to the 
common law, the North-West and South-West regional authorities ‘may’ only be 
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‘consulted’. This formulation raises two important questions. First, why ‘may’ the 
authorities be ‘consulted’ as opposed to a requirement that they should ‘parti-
cipate’ in the formulation of national policy? The latter formulation is applied 
in the case of the formulation of education policy and provides more scope to 
influence policy in that area. Second, the use of the term ‘may’ indicates that 
consultation is not mandatory. Rather, it provides opportunities for national 
authorities to apply their discretion to exclude regional authorities from the 
formulation of policies in that area. That approach can be contrasted with 
section 277(5), which provides, in relation to all regional councils, that they ‘shall 
mandatorily be consulted’ in the implementation of development projects in their 
region. It is curious that a similar approach was not adopted in the crucial area of 
formulating judicial policies in the Anglophone regions in the context of their 
‘special status’. An argument that the adoption of that less-meaningful approach 
was deliberate, may be compelling. In terms of devolution of powers, this does 
not go very far in attempting to vest Anglophone regional authorities with 
sufficient powers to control the development and preservation of the common 
law tradition, especially in the training of legal and judicial personnel and the 
administration of the court system. These aspects would continue to be regulated 
at the national level without a mandatory contribution from the Anglophone 
regional authorities. In fact, in reacting to these supposedly special powers, a 
number of Anglophone MPs and Senators, both from the opposition and the 
ruling CPDM party, expressed doubts as to the significance of the ‘participatory’ 
and ‘consultation’ powers. In their view, it gave the North-West and South-West 
no influence in the development of education and judicial policies at the national 
level.80 They were of the opinion that a special status should empower the re-
gions to ‘determine’ policies in education and judicial administration and those 
relating to the legislative and the executive system, both at the national and the 
local level.81 
III. Institutional structures 
A. DELIBERATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ORGANS 
With regard to the organisational structure of the regions, the relevant organs are 
the Regional Council and the President of the Regional Council, both charged with 
the administration of the region.82 The Regional Council is the deliberative organ 
and is composed of 90 councillors elected for a term of five years.83 The Regional 
Council consists of the divisional representatives elected by indirect universal suf-
frage and representatives of traditional rulers elected by their peers.84 It comprises 
four committees, namely, Committee on Administrative and Legal Affairs, and 
Standing Orders; Committee on Education, Health, Population, Social and 
Cultural Affairs, Youth and Sports; Committee on Finance, Infrastructure, 
Planning and Economic Development; and Committee on Environment, Regional 
Development, State Property, Town Planning and Housing.85 The President of the 
Regional Council is the executive organ of the region86 elected from among 
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members of the Regional Council.87 The president is assisted by a bureau com-
prising a senior vice-president, a vice-president, two questors and a secretary.88 
Unlike the other eight regions, the North-West and South-West Regions, 
pursuant to their special status, have a ‘specific organisational and operational 
regime’ as per section 327(2). In that respect, the organs of the region are the 
Regional Assembly (RA) and the Regional Executive Council (REC).89 The 
RA is the deliberative organ,90 composed of 90 members elected for a five-year 
term.91 It comprises two houses, the House of Divisional Representatives 
(seventy members) and the House of Chiefs (twenty members).92 The former 
are elected by the municipal councillors of the region through a one-round 
mixed list vote, comprising a majority system and a proportional representation 
system,93 while the latter are elected ‘in accordance with the laws in force’.94 
The House of Divisional Representatives rules on all matters falling within the 
competence of the Regional Assembly.95 It comprises of five committees, 
namely,96 the Committee on Administrative and Legal Affairs and Standing 
Order; Committee on Education; Committee on Health, Population, Social 
and Cultural Affairs, Youth and Sports; Committee on Finance, Infrastructure, 
Planning and Economic Development; and the Committee on Environment, 
Regional Development, State Property, Town Planning and Housing. The 
House of Divisional Representatives shall be chaired by the president of 
the REC.97 
The House of Chiefs also rules on all matters falling within the competence 
of the Regional Assembly.98 Additionally, it provides opinions on the status of 
traditional chiefdom, the management and conservation of historical sites, 
monuments and vestiges, the organisation of cultural and traditional events in 
the region and the collection and translation of elements of oral tradition.99 It is 
composed of two committees, namely, the Committee on Administrative and 
Legal Affairs and Standing Orders, Education, Health, Population, Social and 
Cultural Affairs, Youth and Sports; and the Committee on Finance, 
Infrastructure, Planning, Economic Development, Environment, Regional 
Development, State Property, Town Planning and Housing.100 The House of 
Chief is chaired by the vice-president of the REC.101 
On the other hand, the REC is the executive organ of the region and comprises 
a president, a vice-president, a commissioner – each for economic development; 
for health and social development and for educational, sports and cultural de-
velopment , two secretaries and a questor.102 Members of the REC are elected 
from members of the Regional Council for the term of the Council.103 Curiously, 
both the president and the vice-president of the REC are elected from members 
of the RA104 (divisional representatives and traditional rulers, respectively).105 
The president of the REC is the executive organ of the region.106 
A cursory glance at the provisions of the law demonstrates that, structurally, 
there is a marked distinction between the organs of the special regions and those of 
other regions. Notably, the deliberative organ of the North-West and South West 
regions is the RA as opposed to a Regional Council in other regions. Moreover, the 
executive organ of the North-West and South-West is the REC whereas the other 
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regions have the institution of a President of the Regional Council. Remarkably, the 
RA of the North-West and South-West have the much desired House of Chiefs, an 
iconic institution representative of both the cultural and institutional identity of the 
Anglophones. As discussed in Chapter 1, the Southern Cameroons House of Chiefs 
from the colonial era morphed into the West Cameroon House of Chiefs as one of 
the houses of the bicameral legislature of West Cameroon. It played an important 
role in the governance of the Anglophone regions under both the colonial and 
immediate post-independence periods. There have been repeated calls for its re-
institution as far back as the time of the AAC I and AAC II and, more recently, 
during the Major National Dialogue. Therefore, its reintroduction as a distinct 
feature of the special status can be perceived as a positive response to that call. 
However, a more profound analysis of some specific provisions indicates that the 
differences may be more in terms of structural design. Substantively, the institu-
tions, though different in appellation, are endowed with analogous personalities 
and competencies. For instance, the RAs in the special regions is composed 
of ninety members and partitioned into two houses – House of Divisional 
Representatives and House of Chiefs, with the latter elected from among regional 
councillors. The Regional Councils in the other regions are also composed of 
ninety members and divided into two sub-organs, Divisional Representatives and 
Traditional Rulers elected from among regional councillors. Although different in 
terminological designation, the composition is the same. In effect, the executive 
organs in all the regions are composed of councillors, some of whom are traditional 
rulers with the obvious difference that in the special regions, the traditional rulers 
are in a House of Chiefs. The fact of applying the terminology of ‘House’ in the 
case of the sub-organs of the RAs in the special regions is not sufficient to dis-
tinguish them substantively from the sub-organs in the other regions. Similarly, 
from the provisions of the law, there is no apparent substantive difference between 
the appellation, ‘Regional Assembly’ and ‘Regional Council’, particularly in view 
of the fact that the rules relating to regional administration107 and operating 
procedures108 are the same for Regional Assemblies and Regional Councils and 
there are corresponding committees through which their duties are exercised.109 
Moreover, in terms of competencies, the deliberative organs in all regions are 
vested with analogous competencies and functions, as per section 278 of the RLA 
Code. Although the law specifically provides that the House of Chiefs shall give 
its opinion in certain areas relating to culture and traditions (as defined in 
section 337(2)), this is not exclusive to them. The Regional Councils in other 
regions also have competencies in those areas.110 It implies that traditional rulers, 
as part of the Regional Council, are likely to provide their opinion in the relevant 
areas, similar to their peers in the House of Chiefs. 
Parallel arguments can be made in terms of the structure and competence 
of the executive organs. For instance, the president of the REC of the special 
regions performs similar functions to those of the president of the Regional 
Councils in other regions,111 with the exception that the former chairs the ses-
sions of the RA or the House of Divisional Representatives when it seats sepa-
rately from the House of Chiefs.112 Similarly, according to section 361, the rules 
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relating to the president of the Regional Council in other regions shall apply to 
the president of the REC in the special regions. 
B. THE PUBLIC INDEPENDENT CONCILIATOR 
Perhaps the most distinctive and innovative institution is that of the Public 
Independent Conciliator (PIC).113 The law provides that – the PIC shall be a 
highly experienced personality with reputed integrity and proven objectivity.114 
He shall be appointed for a non-renewable term of six years, by presidential 
decree pursuant to a ‘concerted proposal’ of the representative of the state in the 
region and the president of the REC.115 As a public official, the PIC’s role is 
incompatible with other public duties or employment or the exercise of any paid 
professional activity.116 To safeguard his independence, the PIC shall neither 
seek nor receive instructions in the exercise of his duties.117 The law also provides 
that, ‘professional secrecy shall not be enforceable against him’.118 
The duties of the PIC include the amicable resolution of disputes between 
‘users’ and regional and council administration; defending and protecting the 
rights and freedoms of citizens from encroachment by regional and council 
authorities; ensuring that regional and local authorities comply with ethical 
obligations and designing; and implementing measures to prevent and combat 
discriminatory practices that may affect service users.119 It has further oversight 
powers to conduct investigations on the functioning of regional and council 
public services and to prepare reports thereto. The PIC may receive complaints 
from natural or legal persons alleging infringement of their rights or from persons 
alleging to be victims of discriminatory practices forbidden by domestic and 
international instruments ratified or approved by Cameroon.120 This is com-
mendable because it allows complainants to use both domestic law and the 
expansive range of rights under international law, to hold local government to 
account where individual rights have been breached. In addition to dispute re-
solution and oversight powers, the PIC may propose legislative and regulatory 
amendments to the President of the Republic.121 The law is silent on the cor-
responding action to be taken by the President.122 
In terms of admissibility, the relevant complaints must be between a natural 
or legal person or public employee and a regional or council public au-
thority.123 The complainant must also have initially submitted an appeal to 
the authority concerned and the matter must not have been adjudicated by the 
courts.124 Following investigation of the complaint, the PIC shall make re-
commendations to the relevant authority with a view to ensuring respect for 
the complainant’s rights and freedoms, settling the dispute and preventing 
reoccurrence.125 Where the authority fails to comply with the recommenda-
tions, the PIC may issue an order mandating compliance within a specified 
period.126 Further non-compliance will result in the preparation of a report by 
the PIC, which will be forwarded to the authority concerned and the re-
presentative of the state.127 The report may be published together with any 
response from the authority.128 
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From the preceding discussion, it would seem that the PIC intervenes where 
the public authority has initially failed to resolve the complaint. It provides that 
additional level of support to complainants before any legal action is instituted. 
In that respect, the PIC may be seen as an institution with the potential to protect 
the rights of ordinary citizens against encroachment by public institutions. 
Additionally, through its oversight mechanisms, it can ensure the proper func-
tioning of public institutions for the benefit of the local populations. This would 
prove particularly useful in services such as education and the judiciary, if service 
users were not being guaranteed certain rights such as their linguistic rights. 
However, a major weakness of that institution is that the PIC has no powers 
of compulsion. It can only make recommendations, which are not binding. In 
circumstances where the public authority fails to implement the recommenda-
tions, the PIC can only forward a report to the representative of the state. The 
law is silent on what the latter may do with the report or what sanctions may be 
imposed on the recalcitrant authority. Moreover, the law does not prescribe any 
specific time limits for the investigation of complaints or the implementation 
of recommendations. This implies that a complainant may potentially wait 
interminably for a complaint to be resolved. 
One further observation is that, given the role of the PIC, it seemed more 
judicious to vest such responsibilities on an institution such as a commission or a 
board rather than an individual. In the government’s Explanatory Statement 
accompanying the bill, it is anticipated that the PIC would ensure the observance 
of regional specificity in the area of use of the English language, the practice of 
the common law and the implementation of the English education sub-system. 
For reasons relating to objectivity, wider expertise and time constraints, such 
duties are arguably more effectively discharged by a team. For instance, the 
Bilingualism Commission, which was established in the wake of the Anglophone 
crisis, is composed of a team of personalities rather than an individual. Due to the 
weaknesses described earlier, the ability of the PIC to influence the relationship 
between public authorities and the populations remains questionable. 
IV. Procedural considerations 
The RLA Code, which makes provision for the special status of the North-West 
and South-West regions, as already noted, was a response to recommendations 
from the Major National Dialogue. Besides that consultative phase, there is no 
indication that the law itself was a product of consultation and negotiation be-
tween the government and the populations of the Anglophone regions and their 
elected representatives. As such, their hopes and aspirations for the governance of 
their regions were not directly sought and, arguably, not fully represented in the 
ensuing law. The democratic deficit in the procedure for instituting special au-
tonomy status has resulted in uncertainty and, in some cases, outright rejection. 
When the bill was tabled in parliament, Anglophone MPs were indignant at the 
lack of consultation by the government.129 According to Jean Michel Nitcheu, an 
SDF MP, the law would not resolve the conflict and it was not a product of a 
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dialogue.130 Uncharacteristically, some MPs of the ruling party objected to the 
fact that they could neither make recommendations nor amendments to the 
bill.131 It is unsurprising, therefore, that many Anglophones, even the most 
moderate, regard the special status provision as a ‘derogatory status’132 and insist 
on federation, while the separatist refuse to acknowledge the existence of the 
special status provisions and object to the application of the relevant law in the 
Anglophone regions.133 
This undesirable outcome warrants a brief exploration of some of the factors 
that should guide a successful process for a peaceful resolution of self- 
determination conflicts, which results in the carving out of a special status 
for a conflict ridden region. 
A. NEGOTIATING A SPECIAL STATUS AGREEMENT 
The process of conflict resolution and determination of minority issues is as 
important as the outcome. This observation warrants a reconsideration of the 
traditional approach to political decision making in Cameroon, which is often 
a unilateral process, involving exclusively the government and its close allies. 
In this regard, the process must be underpinned by broad-based participation, 
negotiation and balancing (mutual compromise). The determination of the key 
issues to underpin the special status arrangements must include a process of 
negotiation between the government and the people of the two regions con-
cerned (elected representatives of these regions). In addition, considering the 
rather complex circumstances (armed conflict) in which special status was con-
templated, the armed separatist leaders should have constituted an essential part 
of any negotiation process. Experience elsewhere has demonstrated that failure 
to negotiate with broader sections of the society including armed separatist 
leaders is likely to lead to a rejection of concessions that are made by the gov-
ernment.134 This was the case with the granting of special status for Aceh and 
Papua by the Indonesian government. The government hastily granted con-
cessions to these two provinces without engaging in a systematic process of 
bargaining and negotiating with broad-based elements of the civil society. 
Although the substantive content of the arrangements amounted to significant 
concessions, the process of developing, adopting and enacting these arrange-
ments into law excluded larger elements of the civil society and pro- 
independence leaders in both provinces.135 Instead, provincial elites and the 
national parliament unilaterally adopted these concessions, which lacked a link 
to the main political forces that were advocating for independence in the two 
provinces.136 A key consequence was that autonomy received little public sup-
port in both provinces and the autonomy laws offered few incentives to actually 
persuade pro-independence leaders to abandon their separatist claims.137 
Important parallels were also observed in Sri Lanka where the government’s 
efforts to grant autonomy in the 1980s were not complemented by negotiation 
with the Tamil rebels.138 Despite concessions granted by the government, the 
conflict continued unabated due, in significant part, to the government’s failure 
Managing diversity 195 
to negotiate a broad-based agreement.139 The outcome in Cameroon reflects this 
pattern, indicating that a different approach should have been adopted. 
There is a need for broad-based participation in order to allow the local po-
pulations and pro-independence leaders to claim ownership of both the process 
and the outcome. It provides the space and opportunity to articulate their as-
pirations and how they desire these aspirations to be protected by the autonomy 
arrangements. Additionally, a broad-based process has the advantage of allowing 
room for compromise and balancing in order to pre-empt the domination of the 
process by one segment of the negotiating parties. Balancing ensures that the 
position of the relevant parties is well represented and, therefore, there is po-
tential for greater ownership of the process and outcome. Marc Weller notes that 
balancing self-determination claims ‘overcomes the mutually exclusive positions 
of both sides in a self-determination conflict’.140 It allows both sides to claim 
prevalence and preservation of their views. He concludes that the secret behind 
the success of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland is balancing of 
the self-determination claims.141 
The Cameroon government’s initial ‘negotiation’ with the CACSC in 
December 2016 and the Major National Dialogue had already demonstrated 
that the relevant parties could not be excluded from negotiating the eventual 
framework agreement for the special status. It is unsurprising that the special 
status provisions have struggled to gain legitimacy and indeed to persuade se-
paratist leaders to discontinue their demands for independence. Neither has it 
lessened demands for federalism. A genuine and credible broad-based partici-
pation process should not translate into the inclusion of old Anglophone barons 
of the regime who are not deemed to represent the Anglophones as they have lost 
legitimacy among the population. Moreover, the government should desist from 
usurping the process and allow Anglophone representatives to articulate the 
specific ways in which the minority rights of the Anglophones should be pro-
tected within a special status framework. As part of the negotiated process and to 
reinforce its legitimacy, these regions should be demilitarised or, at minimum, 
there should be a reduction of troops. A free and equitable process of negotiation 
cannot be achieved with one side having the barrel of the gun over the head of 
the other. 
B. NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL STATUS AGREEMENT 
A further weakness embodying the special status of the Anglophone regions is 
that there is no independent document dealing with the special status arrange-
ments. Instead, the relevant provisions appear as part of the general law on 
decentralised regional and local authorities. 
It should be stated at the outset that the foundation document embodying 
any special status arrangement should preferably be incorporated into the 
Constitution or be established by an autonomy statute (act of Parliament).142 
This is the approach adopted by several special status regions such as Aceh and 
Papua, the Åland Islands, Hong Kong, South Tyrol, Quebec and Zanzibar 
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where the arrangements are either embodied in the constitution or a separate 
autonomy statute or both. More importantly, the sanctity of the arrangements 
must be preserved. This has traditionally been done through entrenchment – 
providing special and more stringent mechanisms for their amendment or repeal. 
One important reason for entrenching fundamental principles or foundation 
documents is for their preservation, hence affording them stability and security. 
One can also add that entrenchment is indicative of the relative importance of 
specific constitutional or statutory arrangement and principles. Entrenchment is 
particularly desirable for a fragile democracy characterised by legal instability 
and disregard for the rule of law.143 In such circumstances, entrenchment po-
tentially acts as a barrier to unilateral action by a party seeking to alter foun-
dational agreements to suit their whims and caprices. In the particular case of 
Cameroon, amendment provisions must also ensure that the consent of the 
autonomous regions is imperative. Considering the circumstances preceding 
the adoption of a special status agreement, their entrenchment is a means of 
pre-empting a recession into the violence, insecurity and economic stagnation 
that has been characteristic of the last three years. The country’s constitutional 
development is undermined by an unresponsive government that often acts 
unilaterally, introducing important changes through regulatory instruments and 
its constitutional history is characterised by legal instability (in terms of the 
simplicity of the constitutional amendment procedure). Provisions that can be 
amended with ease may render otherwise progressive arrangements illusory. 
This was exemplified by the amendment to the presidential term limit provision 
in 2008. Article 6(2) of the Constitution, which limited the presidential term to 
two mandates, was adopted at a time when the demand for democratic change in 
Cameroon had led to considerable insecurity and paralysis of governance and 
the economy. It was an important provision to diffuse tensions at the time and 
to indicate the government’s commitment to introducing democratic change. 
The ease with which it was reversed in 2008 lends support to the contention that 
any arrangements arrived at in a bid to secure the special autonomy status of 
the North-West and South-West need special protection in other to provide 
insulation from regressive government action. 
In Hong Kong, for instance, the arrangements that grant significant autonomy 
to the Special Administrative Region are not entrenched.144 Despite the high 
level of autonomy arrangements made for the Special Administrative Region, the 
provisions are enshrined in the Basic Law that was passed by the National 
Peoples’ Congress (NPC) and can be amended unilaterally by the NPC, implying 
that the arrangements are not secure.145 Recent events in Hong Kong demon-
strate how that weakness has provided the opportunity for the government in 
Beijing to intefer with the administration of Hong Kong, thereby undermining its 
autonomy. By contrast, the autonomy of the Åland Islands is embodied in article 
120 of the Finnish Constitution ‘in accordance with what is specifically stipulated 
in the Act on the Autonomy of the Åland Islands’.146 In addition, there is a 
separate procedure for amendment of the Constitution and the Act, which 
provides considerable security for the Åland autonomy arrangements. Thus, the 
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Act can only be amended through a bilateral process resulting from a joint de-
cision of the Finnish Parliament and the Parliament of the Åland Islands. Any 
such decision requires a super majority of the votes cast in the Finnish 
Parliament, (or a 2/3rd majority in the second reading) and 2/3rd majority of 
votes cast in the Åland Parliament.147 The provisions on Åland autonomy can, 
therefore, be said to be entrenched since the procedure for their amendment is 
stringent. It provides security in the sense that the Finnish government or 
Parliament cannot unilaterally abrogate the rights of the Åland populations 
or alter centre and state relationship without the latter’s consent. This was de-
monstrated prior to Finland’s accession to the European Union (EU). In arriving 
at the decision to join the EU, the Helsinki government was obliged to consult 
with the Åland Islands, since their interests would be affected and this involved 
extensive discussions and negotiations with Åland authorities. The agreement 
was sealed in a referendum during which the Åland Islands voted over-
whelmingly in favour of joining the EU, under a separate protocol from that 
which governed the EU/Finnish relations.148 
In Cameroon, the fact that the special status is embodied in a general law on 
regional and local authorities is unsatisfactory. Moreover, it is not specifically 
entrenched and can be amended at any time without the consent of the people of 
those regions or their representatives. 
By and large, the architecture of decentralisation offered by the government 
and its accompanying special status arrangements appear unsuited to the distinct 
nature of the Anglophone problem. As discussed previously, there are elements 
in the current system that can be enhanced in order to more effectively address 
the problem. The Anglophone populations remain unconvinced by the gov-
ernment’s approach as it does not appear to provide meaningful autonomy to 
these regions. That perhaps accounts for the persistence in demands for feder-
alism and secession discussed in the subsequent sections. 
C. Federalism 
In Chapter 1, it was demonstrated that the option of federalism dominated the 
Anglophone struggle for identity even in the late 1990s when some radical 
political groups began to emerge. Renewed calls for federalism often alluded 
to Cameroon’s brief experience with federalism from 1961 to 1972 and its 
potentials in the protection of the Anglophone minority and its cultural, social, 
political and legal heritage. This section will briefly explore some of the legal 
arguments that have been advanced in favour of a return to federalism, some-
thing that has remained unchanged despite the granting of a special status to the 
North-West and South-West regions. 
I. Justifying a return to federalism 
Despite the misgivings about Cameroon’s experience of federalism, discussed in 
Chapter 1, proponents of federalism still see it as the best alternative to resolving 
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the Anglophone crisis in the long and short term.149 At least three major 
arguments are often advanced in support of federalism. The first argument 
hinges on the basis of the establishment of a union in 1961, while the second 
argument is underpinned by the questionable legality of the dissolution of the 
union in 1972.150 The third argument, a more pragmatic one, focuses on the 
values of federalism in providing a reasonable degree of self-determination for 
the Anglophone regions. Notable figures, like emeritus archbishop Cardinal 
Christian Tumi, affirm that federalism is the best option to maintain unity and 
stability in Cameroon.151 
On the first issue, the argument is that the very foundation of the union in 
1961 was on the basis of a federation.152 Although Southern Cameroons was not 
eventually accorded the loose federation that it advocated for, their under-
standing on entering the union was that it would be on the basis of a federation. 
Foncha’s campaign during the prelude to reunification was framed around the 
idea of a federation through which the interest of Southern Cameroons as a 
minority would be protected.153 During Ahidjo’s visit to Buea in 1960, Foncha 
declared that the union with the Republic of Cameroon (The Republic) will not 
be similar to Southern Cameroons’ experience with Nigeria, which was char-
acterised by domination. Instead, he was certain that the union would be on the 
basis of equality (as of two brothers) in a federation.154 That, as we now know, 
was overly optimistic and illusive. Yet, it was a key aspect in determining the 
basis of a union between Southern Cameroons and The Republic. 
The second argument is founded on a literal interpretation of article 47 of the 
Federal Constitution.155 Article 47(1) provides that, 
Any proposal for the revision of the present constitution which impairs the 
unity and integrity of the federation shall be inadmissible.  
This provision has been interpreted to mean that a proposal which entailed an 
alteration or dissolution of the federation was inadmissible.156 In that respect, the 
word federation referred to the form of state – its federal structure.157 In which 
case, article 47(1), in effect, prohibited any change to that form. On that basis, 
it was unlawful for the federal parliament to have admitted Ahidjo’s proposal to 
dissolve the union given that its effect would ‘impair’ the federal structure of the 
state. Carlson Anyangwe states emphatically that article 47(1) ‘declared sacro-
sanct the federal form of the state’, ‘and was meant to prevent the transformation 
of the structure of the State from federal to unitary’, the former of which pro-
vided protection from majority domination.158 According to him, that provision 
was a ‘special’ (inviolable) provision, which had the purpose of preventing a 
change of the very basis upon which a union was negotiated. Relatedly, it has 
been argued that, even if the Constitution had to be amended, a referendum was 
not the valid process for the amendment.159 Article 47(3) provided for a special 
procedure by virtue of which proposals for amendment were to be adopted by a 
majority vote of the members of the Federal National Assembly, provided that 
the said majority included the majority of the representatives of each of the 
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federated states. The referendum bypassed that procedure, therefore, making it 
unlawful. Anyangwe contends that Ahidjo’s resort to a referendum was trea-
cherous in itself because the process that brought about the union (the plebiscite) 
involved only the people of the former Southern Cameroons. They voted to join 
the union on the basis of a federation. In that respect, a genuine decision to 
abrogate the federation should have involved only that part of the country.160 He 
concludes that Ahidjo’s decision to also involve East Cameroonians was a cal-
culated move to ensure that even if the Anglophones rejected the change, they 
would be outnumbered by the Francophone majority.161 The strength of the 
latter assertion is, however, doubtful considering that the results of the refer-
endum seemed predetermined in the context of the authoritarian nature of 
Ahidjo’s regime.162 In that respect, the Anglophone regions were unlikely to have 
determined the outcome of the referendum. 
In brief, those are some of the legal arguments challenging the validity of the 
abrogation of the federation in 1972. Of course, they have not gone un-
challenged.163 Assuming, however, that the federalist views were incon-
trovertible, the question is, what next? How are these arguments to be translated 
into binding recommendations or decisions for the government to return to 
federal arrangements? Referendum complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Council and in such matters, only the President of the Republic, 
the speakers of the two houses of parliament and one-third majority of Senators 
and MPs can make a complaint to the Constitutional Council.164 This leaves out 
the majority of those ordinary persons such as proponents of federalism. In 
addition, we have seen that the Constitutional Council lacks independence and is 
unlikely to declare the 1972 referendum null and void. More importantly, there 
is the issue of whether the Constitutional Council will have jurisdiction taking 
into account the timing of the referendum (ratione temporis). The referendum oc-
curred in 1972, whereas, the Constitutional Council was created in 1996 with its 
first organic law in 2004. Both the Constitution and the organic laws are silent 
on the issue of timing. This is unchartered territory and the possibilities are likely 
to be problematic and unfavourable to proponents of federalism. Moreover, 
considering that the organisation of a referendum is often a domestic affair, 
international jurisdictions would be disinclined to entertain any complaints, even 
those framed in the context of self-determination.165 
Arguably, such matters can realistically be resolved through a political process 
provided that the relevant actors are open to such ideas and perceive federalism 
as a credible solution to addressing the issue of diversity management. The third 
argument advanced by some proponents of federalism is based on the latter 
point. Federal systems are credited for their potential to resolve a number of 
issues including achieving vertical and horizontal political accountability, en-
hancing democratic processes and managing diversity.166 The values of feder-
alism are noted to be focused on celebrating diversity, mutual respect, reciprocity 
and a general determination for cooperation and cohabitation.167 In light of that 
focus, federalism has the potential to offer solutions in countries where territo-
rially concentrated minorities demand greater recognition, autonomy and 
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representation in central institutions.168 Federalism has emerged as a useful tool 
for balancing the competing demands for autonomy and unity and diversity 
management in countries like Nigeria, India, Belgium and Malaysia.169 Thus, 
proponents of federalism in Cameroon, embrace its potentials to resolve the 
current impasse and to provide meaningful autonomy to the North-West and 
South West regions. For instance, reference is made to the fact that federalism 
will entail independent regional executive and legislative organs with specific 
powers to regulate issues affecting these regions and a judiciary that is more 
reflective of the inherited common law tradition in theory and in practice. Such a 
system does not necessarily eliminate the powers of the central government if 
based on self-rule and shared rule, where the powers are clearly defined, pro-
viding sufficient scope for territorial autonomy and joint decision making at the 
centre. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has indicated 
that federalism can be an option for self-determination of the Anglophone re-
gions.170 It remains a colossal mission to convince the government of Cameroon 
to consider that possibility. Moreover, there are also doubts as to the kind of 
federal system that is suited to the Cameroonian context.  
D. Secession 
The secessionist agenda propagated by Gorji Dinka for which he was arrested 
and tried for treason in 1985 remained unobtrusive for some time, although not 
completely unsupported.171 The AAC I did not advocate an overt secessionist 
agenda. That came after the AAC II following the Bamenda Proclamation and 
the resort to a secessionist agenda was prompted by the government’s failure to 
respond to the Anglophones’ demands for meaningful political dialogue. The 
secessionist agenda has gradually gained traction and, since 2016, has become 
widespread. The violence that has engulfed the Anglophone regions since 2016 is 
largely due to the secessionist taking up arms to advance that struggle for 
Anglophone autonomy, due to the high handedness of the government and its 
failure to resort to meaningful dialogue to address the Anglophone grievances. 
This has also been aggravated by the apparently closed international avenues to 
resolve the dispute. 
As far back as 1995, proponents of secession endeavoured to seek peaceful 
means such as diplomatic offensive to garner support for the autonomy of the 
Anglophone regions. In May 1995, the SCNC deployed a nine-man delegation 
(including JN Foncha and ST Muna, the architects of federalism) to the UN 
to make the case for a residual responsibility of the UN to assist with the struggle 
for autonomy.172 Needless to say that did not lead to a UN resolution or 
recommendation for the independence of the Anglophone regions. 
I. Justifying secession 
Proponents of secessionist discourse identify unitarism with the theme of sub-
ordination – a continuity of the colonial sate in the guise of autonomy and unity. 
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There have been attempts at achieving autonomy by secession through judicial 
processes advancing arguments often framed in the context of self-determination. 
Two major cases discussed in this section summarise the legal arguments un-
derpinning the secessionist agenda. Notably, in 2002, twelve Anglophone na-
tionalists, acting on behalf of themselves and the Southern Cameroonian people, 
brought a claim against the Federal government of Nigeria in the Federal High 
Court of Abudja.173 Briefly,174 their claim related to the issue of the margin-
alisation of the Anglophone regions, which they referred to as Southern 
Cameroons and the failure of the government of Cameroon to respect their right 
to self-determination under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
The applicants sort an order for the Federal Government of Nigeria (as party to 
the African Charter) to assist the people of Southern Cameroons in their quest 
for self-determination and independence, by presenting their case before the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the United Nations General Assembly. 
The Attorney General for the Federal Government of Nigeria objected to the 
jurisdiction of the Court to hear the complaint. However, that argument was 
rejected by the Court. In view of that outcome, the parties eventually reached a 
settlement and the proceedings were discontinued. Pursuant to the settlement, 
Nigeria agreed to institute proceedings before the ICJ on terms that were clearly 
outlined in an order issued by the Federal High Court, requiring Nigeria to 
request the ICJ to determine five key issues.175 These were whether the 1961 
plebiscite was conducted in accordance with the relevant UN Resolutions; 
whether the termination of the trusteeship by the United Kingdom without 
ensuring constitutional arrangements between Southern Cameroons and The 
Republic had been effected in regards to their impending union, was in breach of 
Articles 3 and 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Southern Cameroons; 
whether the assumption of sovereign powers over Southern Cameroons by The 
Republic on 1 October 1961 and its continued exercise are legal and valid; 
whether the people of Southern Cameroons are not entitled to self-determination 
separate from The Republic; and finally whether it is the Southern Cameroons and 
not La Republique that shares a maritime boundary with the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria. It must be noted that the last point was prompted by the fact that the 
complaint was made at the time when the case between Nigeria and Cameroon 
over the Bakassi Peninsula was before the ICJ. It has been argued that overall 
that might have influenced the outcome of this case as Nigeria had an interest in 
the determination of the question of sovereignty over Bakassi.176 What must be 
questioned, however, is that although the case was based on Nigeria’s obligations 
under the Africa Charter, the complainants sought an order to compel Nigeria to 
approach the ICJ. The Court itself did not question that but proceeded to make 
the order. The decision was a victory for the complainants although it may be 
argued that their euphoria was short lived. Needless to say, the government of 
Nigeria has not carried out that order, and has also not been pursued by the 
complainants. 
Nevertheless, the quest for secession did not stop in the Federal High Court 
of Nigeria. In 2003, Anglophone nationalists represented by SCNC and SCAPO 
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made an application to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights in Kevin Mgwanga Gunme and 13 ors v Cameroon.177 In their application, they 
rehashed the catalogue of human rights abuses perpetrated on the people 
of Southern Cameroons by the government of Cameroon and the issue of 
self-determination. Of interest here are the arguments advanced in support of 
their bid for autonomy and the response of the Commission. It is worthy to 
note, however, that the Commission found the government of Cameroon in 
breach of a good number of fundamental rights protected by the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, including the rights to equality, life, personal 
liberty, fair trial, education, assembly and freedom from torture.178 
The basis of their claim for self-determination centred on the potent history of 
the reunification of Southern Cameroons with The Republic in 1961. On that 
issue, the complainants argued that the ‘unlawful and forced annexation and 
colonial occupation’ of Southern Cameroons by the government of Cameroon 
constituted a violation of their right to self-determination protected under article 
20 of the African Charter. In support of that claim, they alluded to the fact that 
prior to the reunification of Cameroon, an overwhelming majority of Southern 
Cameroonians preferred independence but the UN failed to give them that 
option insisting instead on Southern Cameroons achieving independence by 
joining Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroon. By failing to give them the option 
they desired for their independence, the UN denied them the right to self- 
determination. They argued that, although Southern Cameroons voted in the 
1961 plebiscite to join The Republic, this was ‘premised on certain conditions, 
including the convening of a conference of equal representative delegations from 
The Republic and Southern Cameroons to work out the conditions for the 
transfer of sovereign powers to the future federation’.179 Moreover, the ar-
rangement should have been agreed by representatives of the parliaments of both 
entities before the transfer of sovereignty to a single entity representing both 
sides. They challenged the validity of the 1961 Federal Constitution on the basis 
that it was never endorsed by the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly, 
which implies that there was never an act of union between the two entities. 
Interestingly, the complainants went further to challenge the 1972 referendum, 
which brought an end to the federation arguing that it was a breach of the 
arrangements under the 1961 Federal Constitution (a constitution that they 
challenged anyway). As a result of the transition to a unitary state, the protections 
for the Southern Cameroonian minority enshrined in the 1961 Constitution were 
no longer available. Consequently, they have been marginalised in all spheres 
and the specificity of the peoples of Southern Cameroons in terms of social life, 
political administration, culture, language, education and legal traditions were 
either being undermined or gradually eroded. 
Despite the ‘unlawful annexation’ and marginalisation, the complainants 
averred that they have attempted to negotiate with the government of Cameroon 
for better arrangements for the protection of the peoples’ of Southern 
Cameroons, particularly through the 1993 Buea Declaration ensuing from the 
AAC I and the 1994 Bamenda Proclamation from the AAC II. However, the 
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government proceeded to adopt a new Constitution in 1996, ignoring 
the Southern Cameroons proposals and their calls for negotiation. According to 
the complainants, the failure of the government to engage in negotiations and the 
adoption of the 1996 Constitution without public debate, ‘meant that the door 
was being finally closed on any future constitutional links between Southern 
Cameroons and La Republique du Cameroun’.180 They noted further that the 
approach of the government prompted the complainants to conduct a signature 
referendum from 1 to 30 September 1995 in which 99% of Southern 
Cameroonians revealed a preference for ‘full independence by peaceful se-
paration’.181 They requested the Commission to determine if the 1961 plebiscite 
was conducted in accordance with the pre-plebiscite UN resolutions182 and to 
determine the right of the Southern Cameroons to self-determination through 
secession as a result of the massive violations of human rights, marginalisation 
and domination by the Cameroonian government in breach of article 20 of the 
African Charter. 
After upholding its jurisdiction to hear the complaint and affirming the status of 
Southern Cameroons as ‘a people’ (two objections raised by the government 
of Cameroon), the Commission proceeded to analyse the claim for self- 
determination. It adopted an avoidance tactic at the outset by declining to 
address the pertinent question on the compliance of the 1961 plebiscite. It stated 
that, in determining the question of self-determination of Southern Cameroons, 
it shall contextualise the question by dealing, not with the 1961 UN 
Plebiscite, or the 1972 Unification, but rather the events of 1993 and 1994 
on the constitutional demands vis-à-vis the claim for the right to self- 
determination of the Southern Cameroonian people.183  
It is not clear why the Commission evaded the thorny issues of 1961 and 
1972. One view is that there was a danger of ‘emboldening’ the government 
of Cameroon by declaring that the 1961 arrangements did not amount to 
an international agreement, a decision which would further antagonise the 
disillusioned Southern Cameroonians.184 Alternatively, it may be that ‘the 
Commission holds that determining whether or not the “union” was effected in 
accordance with UN resolutions, international treaty obligations and indeed 
international law is irrelevant … and that even if the change amounted to a 
breach of international law, it did not cause a prejudice worth redressing’.185 It is 
submitted that the Commission missed an opportunity to possibly lay to rest a 
fundamental question in the determination of the Anglophone problem. 
Presumably, the Commission was careful not to engage in a debate that could 
possibly be interpreted as interfering with the internal political arrangements of 
Cameroon or, worst still, engaging in a debate with the danger of implicitly 
declaring parts of the 1961 or 1972 arrangements challengeable, therefore 
strengthening the claim for self-determination by secession. This would, in fact, 
pose a threat to Cameroon’s territorial integrity. The Commission’s approach to 
the issue of secession in the end bears testimony to these assertions. 
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The Commission confirmed the fact that, as a people, Southern Cameroons 
had the right to self-determination under article 20 of the African Charter and 
secession was not the sole means of exercising that right. Their autonomy could 
be exercised within a sovereign state, in the form of self-government, confederacy 
or federation, while preserving the integrity of the state. To demonstrate its 
commitment to maintaining the territorial integrity of its member states, the 
Commission held that the African Charter could not be invoked to ‘threaten the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State party’.186 It stated further that, 
The Commission is obliged to uphold the territorial integrity of the 
Respondent State. As a consequence, the Commission cannot envisage, 
condone or encourage secession, as a form of self-determination for the 
Southern Cameroons. That will jeopardise the territorial integrity of the 
Republic of Cameroon.187  
The Commission seems emphatically averse to upheaving the territorial in-
tegrity of its member states and in fact has a mandate to the contrary.188 
Individuals such as the complainants have a duty under the African Charter to 
maintain the territorial integrity of their states.189 It is surprising that this duty was 
not alluded to by the Commission. Understandably, this is a difficult duty to ex-
ercise and in the context of the present complaint, it would have been immensely 
provocative to the complainants. The Commission also conflated the issue by 
stating that the matter of self-determination is not only an issue for Southern 
Cameroons. In its view, ‘the various forms of governance or self-determination 
such as federalism, local government, unitarism, confederacy and self-government 
can be exercised only subject to conformity with state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of a State party’ taking ‘into account the popular will of the entire po-
pulation’.190 It fails to acknowledge that the complaint specifically related to the 
self-determination of the people of Southern Cameroons. By making self- 
determination a national agenda, the Commission gave credence to an infamous 
government refrain relating to a common ‘Cameroonian identity’ justifying its 
decentralisation agenda. Decentralisation, as discussed earlier, has failed to resolve 
the key grievances of the Anglophone minority. 
The Commission did not, however, close the door to secession. It alluded to 
standards set in Katangese Peoples’ Congress v Zaire,191 which requires a complainant 
to demonstrate two conditions under article 20(2) – oppression and domination. 
Thus, a right to secession is predicated on a complainant demonstrating that they 
are being dominated and oppressed through the commission of massive violation 
of human rights. Despite the importance of these standards, they were not de-
fined by the Commission. Domination nevertheless relates to foreign domination 
rather than domination within a state. The Commission held that the allegations 
of violations of the rights of the people of Southern Cameroons did not meet that 
threshold of ‘massive violations’. Failing to fulfil the article 20(2) criteria implied 
that the complainants could not engage in secession as secession was not a 
variant of self-determination recognised under the African Charter.192 
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II. What next for the secessionist agenda? 
Understandably, the Commission’s decision dealt a blow to the secessionist, 
who have since sought to advance their cause by peaceful and legal means. 
The approach of the Commission to the right to self-determination finds support 
in international law and resonates with avoidance tactics sometimes adopted 
by international jurisdictions. For instance, in the East Timor case involving 
Portugal and Australia, the ICJ passed an opportunity to create jurisprudence on 
secession by refusing to answer a question on sovereignty over East Timor. A 
response to that issue would have determined whether East Timor had a right to 
self-determination and whether it belonged to Portugal or Indonesia.193 A similar 
approach was adopted by the ICJ in its advisory opinions on Kosovo and 
Western Sahara. In the former, although the ICJ was of the opinion that 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 did not breach in-
ternational law because such a declaration was not prohibited under interna-
tional law, it avoided making a declaration on secession on the basis that it was 
not required to address that issue in the Kosovo advisory opinion.194 More 
significantly, in the latter case, the ICJ declined to rule on the legality of the 
claims by Mauritania and Morocco of sovereignty over Western Sahara but it 
affirmed their right to self-determination and the importance of territorial in-
tegrity. It stated that the principle of territorial integrity could prevail over self- 
determination, in instances where there is solid evidence of the existence of a 
territorial claim over a particular region, irrespective of the wishes of the people of 
that region not to be governed by the entity asserting such a territorial claim.195 
It is clear from the aforementioned discussion that debates on self- 
determination and secession will always be infused with the primacy of territorial 
integrity. Even Principle V of the Friendly Relations Declaration makes clear 
that the principle of self-determination must be balanced with a state’s territorial 
integrity.196 All of these do not herald glad tidings for the secessionist agenda of 
the SCNC, SCAPO and the more recent secessionist groups in the Anglophone 
regions of Cameroon that see this as the only option. The ICJ, which, according 
to the order of the Federal High Court of Nigeria, could have heard their 
complaint, had Nigeria honoured the agreement, seems unlikely to have an-
swered the questions in the affirmative, assuming that it answered the questions 
at all. As with the aforementioned cases (Kosovo and Western Sahara), it is 
unlikely that the ICJ will unequivocally affirm any right of the Southern 
Cameroons to secede. Perhaps the jurisprudence of the ICJ has dissuaded the 
Southern Cameroonians from pursuing the government of Nigeria to honour 
the agreement to present their case before the ICJ. 
Despite the prominence of the principle of territorial integrity, like the African 
Charter, the right to secede has been recognised elsewhere and similarly under very 
limited circumstances. The Supreme Court of Canada in the matter on the seces-
sion of Quebec identified three circumstances.197 These are – where a person are 
governed as part of a colonial empire, or subject to alien subjugation, domination or 
exploitation or where a person are denied the meaningful exercise of their right to 
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self-determination within the state. In the Åland Island Question, it was stated that 
the circumstances that could justify secession included ‘where a state lacks either 
the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantee’.198 In both 
instances, as with the African Charter, there is an emphasis on alien/colonial 
domination rather than domination within a state. With respect to the failure to 
guarantee the meaningful exercise of rights, the threshold would be very high as the 
interpretation of ‘meaningful’ can be very subjective. The threshold would be akin 
to that of ‘sustained massive violations of human rights’ under the African Charter. 
But even in all of these circumstances, including under the African Charter, se-
cession is only exercised as an ultima ratio. Reverting to the decision of the African 
Commission in the Gunme case, could it be worth pursuing another line of arguments 
relating to new evidence of violations of human rights in the Anglophone regions? In 
other words, in the light of the egregious violations of human rights committed by 
security forces since 2016, could the secessionist successfully argue before the 
Commission that the violations are so severe that they call into question the integrity 
of the Cameroonian government and therefore have attained the threshold stipu-
lated in the Katangese case? The answer is probably in the negative, particularly in the 
light of the special status granted to the restive regions. In view of the decision of 
the African Commission, which, in effect, denies that the Anglophone regions are 
not guaranteed any meaningful exercise of their right to internal self-determination, 
it would be a herculean task for the Anglophone secessionist to satisfactorily de-
monstrate in any international jurisdiction that those exceptional circumstances 
apply to the peoples of the Anglophone regions. 
The difficulties for the Southern Cameroonian secessionist organisations in 
establishing the stringent criteria for secession may partly account for the 
current armed struggle between the separatists and the government’s military 
and security forces. The justification may be that some successful stories of 
secession occurred after armed struggle. Two things must be noted here. First, 
not all armed liberation struggles have been successful. An example close to 
home is that of neighbouring Biafra, which failed in its bid to secede from the 
rest of Nigeria. Their liberation struggle received very limited support and was 
instead a subject of international condemnation.199 Second, the few successful 
stories stemmed from decades of protracted armed conflict with overwhelming 
casualties and substantial economic costs. South Sudan, for instance, started its 
armed liberation struggle as far back as 1955 and it was only in July 2011 that 
it gained its independence.200 This came after the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in 2005 in which transitional arrangements for self-rule were 
agreed and followed by a referendum in January 2011 in which almost 99% 
of Southern Sudanese voted for independence from Sudan.201 In the case of 
Eritrea, independence was attained following a protracted armed struggle by 
the Eritrean Liberation Movement that spanned three decades and after an 
ultimate acknowledgement of Eritrea’s right to external self-determination by 
Ethiopia.202 Notwithstanding, the final process had to be sealed by a UN 
sponsored plebiscite in April 1993 in which Eritreans voted 99.8% in favour 
of independence from Ethiopia. These two instances of successful secession 
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demonstrate not only that armed struggle is likely to be protracted and costly, 
but also that the people will ultimately have to decide through a lawful process 
whether they wish to secede. Bearing in mind the current divisions among 
Anglophone Cameroonians between those who favour independence or fed-
eralism and those who favour decentralisation (special autonomy status), it 
cannot be said with absolute certainty that secession is the preferred option of 
the majority. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the main contending views on the governance 
structure best suited to mediating the Anglophone quest for self-determination. 
The government’s decentralisation option has thus far been unsuccessful and 
the practical effects of the new special status arrangements would no doubt 
be discernible in due course. Though imbued with prospects for effectively ac-
commodating diversity, federalism has not appealed to the government. Despite 
its violent resurgence, secession has proved extremely uncertain and costly. Based 
on the analysis in this chapter, the following broad conclusions can be made. 
First, it is clear that, historically, there is a democratic deficit in the mechanisms 
applied by the government to mediate the Anglophone problem. There is need for 
a paradigm shift that will allow genuine participatory processes capable of providing 
platforms for all the relevant parties to articulate the specific ways in which the 
Anglophone problem can be resolved and to mutually agree on common solutions. 
A comprehensive dialogue process should equally be open to various governance 
options, including those not yet explored and opposing parties must be disposed to 
concessions. A genuine and open participatory process will go a long way to create 
ownership and establish legitimacy of both the process and the outcome. 
Second, the normative framework for mediating and institutionalising change 
is currently inadequate. Establishing genuine and effective solutions would re-
quire a new normative framework that is reflective of the new dispensation. The 
constitution currently limits the scope for expansive and innovative autonomy 
arrangements for the Anglophone regions. For instance, legislative and executive 
powers have already been allocated in the Constitution such that any autonomy 
arrangements intended to enhance regional governance cannot entail the 
granting of much desired legislative and executive powers at the regional level. 
This partly accounts for the very circumscribed special autonomy status that has 
to exist within the confines of a flawed decentralised system. Arguably, a new 
constitution is imperative for change, not only with respect to the Anglophone 
problem, but also for governance in general. 
Lastly, there is need for systemic solutions that address the core issues in the 
Anglophone struggle for self-determination. Cosmetic solutions have proven to 
be ineffective. Solutions must necessarily envisage establishing the legal, political 
and institutional framework that guarantees effective governance at the regional 
level to enhance social, cultural and economic development and guarantee the 
protection of minority rights.  
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7 The protection of human 
rights and fundamental 
freedoms   
Introduction 
The protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (human rights) has 
always been on a negative trajectory in Cameroon. As far back as the Ahidjo 
regime, reports of massive violations of human rights, including torture and 
suppression of political freedoms, were not uncommon. Under President Biya, 
some efforts have been made at increasing the scope of human rights available to 
the population and improving on institutional protection mechanisms. This was 
the hallmark of the troubled 1990s when a number of laws, more widely known 
as the Liberty Laws, were promulgated to enhance the exercise of various 
freedoms1 and to regulate the maintenance of law and order and a state of 
emergency.2 The 1990s also witnessed a new addition to the human rights 
protection mechanism, in the institution of the National Commission on Human 
Rights and Freedoms to complement the role of the judiciary in the protection of 
human rights. Other initiatives have included the establishment of a Directorate 
of Human Rights in the Ministry of Justice with responsibilities in the protection 
and promotion of human rights. The state has also been adept at ratifying in-
ternational human rights instruments – thus joining the community of states 
expressing an interest in enhancing human dignity. 
There has, however, been a negative correlation between human rights 
commitments and their actual protection. Various independent international and 
domestic human rights organisations have noted Cameroon’s poor human rights 
record, particularly in the civil and political rights category.3 There are reports of 
pervasive human rights abuses such as extra-judicial executions, enforced dis-
appearances, torture, arbitrary detention and suppression of political freedoms. 
The persecution of political opponents, journalists and human rights activists 
is a cause for concern.4 
That’s not to suggest that socio-economic rights receive more protection. 
In fact, the contrary is more likely the reality. In February 2019, Mr Rodrigo 
Uprimny, the Social and Economic Rights Committee Member and Country 
Rapporteur for Cameroon, noted with dissatisfaction that only 16% of 
public revenue was devoted to the protection of social, economic and cultural 
rights, a position even lower than the average in the African continent.5 
The government’s stated policy, however, is to treat all three generations of 
human rights with equality, reflecting the interdependent and interrelated-
ness of all human rights. 
Against the backdrop of the government’s commitment to human rights, why 
then has the country’s record remained consistently poor? One important 
explanation is the problem of lack of judicial independence and judicial power, 
as we saw in Chapter 4. The judiciary is the main institutional protection 
mechanism and, as already discussed, it is seriously flawed, making it an un-
suitable institution for the effective protection of human rights. That has been 
exacerbated by the limited mechanism for constitutional review and limited 
access to the Constitutional Council, which otherwise has the potential to 
safeguard human rights. In the proceeding sections, the role of the National 
Commission on Human Right and Freedoms and the Directorate for Human 
Rights will be examined to evaluate their contributions to the protection of 
human rights. That will be preceded by an examination of the constitutional 
foundations of human rights. 
Part I. Overview of constitutional provisions 
This section does not attempt to provide a detailed analysis of all the human rights 
provisions in the preamble. Nevertheless, a brief discussion of the justiciability of 
human rights and the substantive features of the constitutional provisions is 
provided in the following sections. 
A. Justiciability of human rights 
The Constitution is clear in its preamble on its attachment to international 
human rights. It states that, the people of Cameroon, 
Affirm our attachment to the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of the United Nations, 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and all duly ratified 
International Conventions relating thereto …  
It states further that Cameroon endorses the principles espoused in those in-
struments and in that respect, enumerates some rights from the three generations of 
human rights, specifying that everyone is entitled to them. Doubts have often been 
expressed as to the justiciability of human rights, given that they appear in the 
preamble rather than the main text of the Constitution? In other words, what is the 
legal status of the preamble? The answer to that question may lie in an evaluation of 
the permutations of the preamble and human rights provisions in the different post- 
independence constitutions of Cameroon. The Federal Constitution of 1961, for 
instance, in its article 1(2), affirmed Cameroon’s attachment to the fundamental 
liberties guaranteed in the Universal Declaration and the United Nations Charter. 
This was in the body of the Constitution, rather than in the preamble, 
The protection of human rights 221 
incontrovertibly indicating that human rights were justiciable. The 1972 Constitution 
on its part listed a number of rights in the preamble, including affirmation of 
Cameroon’s attachment to the United Nations Charter and the Universal 
Declaration. That was a retrogressive move from the perspective that the preamble 
of the 1972 Constitution was unenforceable.6 It is that preamble that was re-enacted 
in the current 1996 Constitution, which now provides unequivocally in article 65 that 
the preamble is an integral part of the Constitution. The implication is that the 
preamble has been accorded an equivalent status to other constitutional provisions 
that are enforceable. 
It has been argued that article 65 does not necessarily indicate that human rights 
in the constitution are justiciable because, on the one hand, there are no effective 
mechanisms to enforce them and, on the other, the preamble generally expresses 
aspirations of a people ‘rather than state strictly enforceable legal rights and ob-
ligations’.7 Having examined earlier the historical developments of the preamble 
and human rights in Cameroon, it is fair to assert that article 65 of the 1996 
Constitution renders the preamble more effective than under the 1972 
Constitution and, therefore, affirms the justiciability of the rights contained therein. 
In addition, the view that preambles merely express aspirations can no longer be 
supported. A more conventional view is that preambles perform various functions, 
depending on their status as provided by the constitution itself and the role ascribed 
to them by the judiciary.8 In France, for instance, the justiciability of fundamental 
rights in the preamble was recognised by the Conseil Constitutionnel9 in 197110 and 
has been affirmed in later decisions.11 Similarly, in a landmark decision, the Indian 
Supreme Court ruled that the preamble was legally enforceable as an integral part 
of the Constitution.12 In Cameroon, not only are human rights frequently referred 
to in court as guaranteed by the Constitution,13 but also the Constitution itself 
makes clear in article 65 that the preamble is an integral part of it. The preamble 
can be considered as a substantive preamble which serves as an independent source 
of rights and obligations. In view of the political context surrounding the adoption 
of the 1996 Constitution, it may be that the constitutional revisions were influenced 
partly by the proposal from the Anglophone delegates to introduce a bill of rights. 
A compromise could have been arrived at by introducing article 65 in order to 
make human rights enforceable, dispensing with the need for a bill of rights. The 
problem with human rights in the Constitution may be more about the effec-
tiveness of the enforcement mechanisms than the status of the preamble. 
B. Substantive features of human rights provisions 
I. Indivisibility of human rights 
Despite the absence of a comprehensive bill of rights, the preamble to the 
Constitution contains a number of rights in the traditional three generations of 
rights. Although no overt statement is made as to their indivisibility, the inclusion 
of the three generations is a reflection of the relevance of the concept of in-
divisibility. Some of the rights in the first category (civil and political rights) include 
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the right to equality, protection of minorities, liberty and security, privacy, fair 
trial, life, freedom of movement, freedom from torture, freedom of religion and 
democratic rights. In the second category (social, economic and cultural rights), the 
rights protected include the right to education, the right to work, social security 
guarantees and the right to property. Further, in terms of the third generation 
(collective-developmental rights), the preamble commendably includes the right to 
a healthy environment and the right to development. In the case of the environ-
ment, both citizens and the state have a duty to protect the environment, with 
the state given the additional obligation to ensure the ‘improvement of the en-
vironment’.14 The commitment to environmental protection is embedded in a 
1996 law, which spells out the government’s duties in that area.15 With respect to 
development, it is the state that has the obligation to ‘provide all its citizens with 
the conditions necessary for their development’. While the inclusion of third- 
generation rights is commendable, as is the case with these rights, enforceability is 
often problematic. Moreover, in Cameroon, there are no further constitutional 
provisions detailing the mechanisms by which these rights can be enforced. It may 
be argued that in view of the state of development in Cameroon and the en-
vironment, these collective-developmental rights may remain aspirational princi-
ples until the state makes specific provisions for their enforcement, especially in 
the area of accountability. It is necessary to establish some minimum standards or 
core obligations for the government to fulfil and a mechanism through which it 
can be held accountable for failure to discharge its obligations. 
In terms of the spectrum of rights provided for in the preamble, there is no 
disaffirming the fact that the list is not comprehensive. Moreover, the rights pro-
visions are very brief, lacking in significant details and sometimes vague. However, 
as we noted in Chapter 5, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR) and other instruments ratified by Cameroon (including the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and the Convention on the Rights of the Child) are directly enforceable 
in Cameroon. They complement domestic provisions on human rights. 
II. The concept of ‘duties’ 
The preamble displays further distinctiveness by adopting the concept of ‘duties’ 
introduced in the ACHPR.16 In addition to the duty to protect the environment, 
paragraphs 22 to 24 impose such duties as the obligation to work, to pay taxes and 
contribute to ‘the defence of the Fatherland’. The essence of these duties is broadly 
captured in the concept of the civic duty of the citizen, which is also aimed at 
promoting the right to development. The government has approached this partly 
by targeting the youths as the basis for developing and entrenching that culture of 
‘civic duty’. In 2005, a law was promulgated to that effect creating the National 
Civic Service for Participation in Development17 with a complementary Agency 
established in 2010.18 This service aims to contribute to harnessing efforts to meet 
the ‘imperatives of the economic and social development of the country’ and to 
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promote in all citizens ‘the national sentiment, a sense of discipline, tolerance, the 
general interest and dignity of work’ and promoting ‘a civic spirit and the culture of 
peace’.19 While the initiative is laudable, at least in terms of its focus on educating 
the youths on environmental protection, development and human rights, one major 
criticism is that the model has been conflated with that of a ‘youth service’ without a 
specific focus on what the programme is meant to achieve.20 
III. ‘Claw-back’ clauses 
It is also worthy to mention the lack of normative clarity in the constitutional 
provisions due, in particular, to the distinctive inclusion of ‘claw-back’ clauses in 
some of the provisions on specific human rights, akin to the approach of the 
ACHPR.21 In human rights, claw-back clauses are obnoxious as they effectively 
permit states to limit the scope of human rights by defining law very narrowly. 
The preamble adopts this approach to defining the scope of human rights. For 
instance, freedom of opinion is guaranteed ‘subject to respect for public policy’ 
and freedom of the press, communication, expression, assembly and association 
are guaranteed ‘subject to respect for public policy’. The right to security is also 
made subject to the interest of other citizens and the ‘the higher interests of the 
State’. The use of vague terms such as public policy in defining the contours 
within which rights should be exercised is problematic. Public policy, or ‘ordre 
public’, is not a concept that is particularly well defined under Cameroonian law. 
In the Anglophone regions where the common law is applied, the concept is 
understood to relate to ‘natural justice, equity and good conscience’.22 These are 
concepts that are supportive of human rights and, therefore, any exercise of 
human rights in that context is likely to be positive. However, the concept ap-
pears to suffer from ambiguity in the Francophone regions where the civil law 
applies. Maurice Kamto asserts that it can be subject to very broad interpreta-
tions and is sometimes conflated with the concept of the ‘higher interest of the 
state’.23 He argues that the two concepts (ordre public and ‘higher interest of 
the state’) are indeterminate, fluid and elusive and potentially obstructive to the 
protection of human rights. He notes further that subjecting the exercise of 
human rights to ‘ordre public’ or public policy puts the exercise of the rights in 
the hands of administrative authorities that can restrict them on the basis of the 
protection of public order, peace and security without judicial oversight.24 In 
fact, it has become routine practice for administrative authorities to restrict the 
rights to freedom of association and assembly on the basis of ‘ordre public’.25 
This is often the case where opposition parties and other critics of the govern-
ment organise public gatherings or demonstrations.26 The authorities often turn 
down request to organise such events on the basis that they constitute a threat to 
public order.27 In other instances where public events (not organised by the 
government or the CPDM) are taking place, security forces tend to disperse 
populations attending the events, for same reasons. The National Commission 
on Human Rights and Freedoms, in its 2017 report on human rights, for 
instance, ‘noted several cases where public demonstrations were prohibited 
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simply on the basis that they threatened public order, but without specifying the 
elements constituting the threat’.28 
IV. Institutional protection mechanisms 
Besides the need for clarity in the normative provisions of human rights, their 
method of enforcement is equally important. The lack of clarity creates further 
difficulties for enforcement. In Chapters 4 and 5, we saw some of these difficulties 
in relation to the lack of independence of the judiciary and the limited scope of 
constitutional review performed by the Constitutional Council. The absence of 
judicial independence implies that the courts cannot often be assertive where the 
executive has infringed human rights. In cases where the courts assert their in-
dependence, as in Nya Henry and Oyebowale,29 they are unable to compel the ex-
ecutive to respect orders from the courts. Moreover, the courts have been accused 
of complicity in perpetrating human rights violations, especially the rights of op-
position political party leaders and human rights activists.30 The Constitutional 
Council on its part has demonstrated weaknesses in protecting democratic rights 
and its limited mechanism for constitutional review restricts access to justice for 
ordinary citizens. In addition, it permits the application of provisions of the law, 
such as those with ‘claw-back’ clauses that implicitly undermine human rights. 
In the following sections, the National Commission on Human Rights and 
Freedoms and the Directorate of Human Rights in the Ministry of Justice will be 
examined to assess their contribution to the protection of human rights. 
Part II. Enforcement mechanisms 
A. The National Commission on Human Rights  
and Freedoms 
I. Background 
Cameroon’s national human rights institution has had a chequered history. It 
was originally created by presidential decree in 199031 and known as the 
National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms (NCHRF). Its creation 
was shrouded in secrecy and did not comply with prevailing international 
standards, which, among other things, recommended that the process of es-
tablishing a national human rights institution should be consultative, inclusive 
and transparent.32 The provisions of the decree were grossly inadequate in 
terms of guaranteeing the independence of the NCHRF and empowering it 
to undertake its responsibilities to protect and promote human rights. The 
Commission was accountable to the President of the Republic; it remained 
silent in the face of human rights violations and was largely unknown to the 
general public. In the light of these inadequacies and with the assistance of 
Cameroon’s International Partners such as the Commonwealth Secretariat, a 
new statute was drafted. This was also to ensure compliance with international 
The protection of human rights 225 
best practices in the establishment of human rights institutions. The Paris 
Principles, for instance, requires that the establishment of human rights in-
stitutions should preferably be incorporated into the constitution or the in-
stitution should be created by an act of parliament rather than an executive 
decree.33 The 1990 decree was thus repealed by Law No. 2004/016 of 22 July 
200434 adopted by parliament. More recently in 2019, parliament adopted a 
new law, which, among other things, repealed the 2004 law and changed the 
name of the institution to the Cameroon Human Rights Commission 
(CHRC).35 As per section 67(1) of the new law, ‘the CHRC shall ipso facto 
replace the NCHRF’. Although the government bill on the new law stated that 
the new law was intended, among other things, to be more compliant with the 
Paris Principles, that has not exactly been the case. The method of drafting the 
bill was again not inclusive of any civil society organisation or any other in-
stitution. It was not a national project eliciting broad-based participation or 
contributions from various sectors of the society. In assessing the structure and 
functioning of the Commission, amendments introduced by the new law will 
be highlighted. 
II. Overview of the institutional structure and composition 
The Commission is composed of a chair and vice chair appointed by presidential 
decree36 and twenty-eight commissioners representing a broad spectrum of the 
professions and organisations in Cameroon and representatives from the ju-
diciary, the legislature and the executive. They are all appointed by presidential 
decree following nominations from their relevant institutions or professional 
bodies.37 The institutional structure also includes a permanent secretariat headed 
by a secretary-general, appointed by presidential decree (on the recommendation 
of the chair), and four working groups to assist the chair in monitoring the daily 
activities of the Commission.38 
The composition of the Commission is comparably broad and has come under 
serious criticism as an unnecessary inflation and over-representation of the 
government.39 The new law has attempted to address that criticism by reducing 
considerably the composition of the institution. Henceforth, it includes a chair 
and a vice-chair appointed by presidential decree and thirteen members (com-
missioners) appointed by presidential decree following nominations from the 
services or organisations they represent.40 The law makes provisions for an 
office of the chairperson, a general assembly of commissioners, a permanent 
secretariat41 headed by a permanent secretary, also appointed by presidential 
decree,42 and three standing working sub-commissions.43 The new law also 
makes progressive innovations to its membership, for instance, by having regard 
to the issue of linguistic, regional and gender balance.44 It is prescriptive in its 
gender requirement provision, which states a mandatory 30% membership in 
favour of women.45 There is also a distinct requirement for two members 
from organisations working on promoting the rights of certain categories of 
persons, one of whom must be a representative of persons with disabilities.46 
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Another welcomed modification is the apparent reduction of the overwhelming 
representation of the government and other administrative services. 
There are nonetheless some shortcomings in the new law, which may per-
petuate inadequacies witnessed under the 2004 law. For instance, even though 
there appears to be a reduction in the number of government representatives, the 
law provides that they shall serve in a permanent capacity, an attribute which 
deviates from the Paris Principles. The Paris Principles require that government 
representatives should only serve in an advisory capacity.47 One of the criticism 
against the Commission is the overwhelming presence of the government and the 
fact that its representatives serve in a permanent capacity. Their presence is 
undesirable because it may inhibit effective participation, as members may feel 
unable to freely express their views on issues that may be sensitive to the gov-
ernment. It may also lead the public to believe that the institution is an extended 
arm of the government. 
Under the 2004 Law, the appointment of the chair and vice-chair is left en-
tirely in the hands of the President of the Republic,48 with no broad participation 
of the civil society or parliament. Ironically, the law states that the chair shall be 
an independent personality but provides no definition of the term. That provi-
sion is too vague and it is unconvincing that the chair would be fully independent 
when their appointment is dependent solely on the President. This fact may 
constitute an inhibiting factor particularly in view of the fact that the tenure of 
the commissioners is fixed for five years and renewable once.49 A life tenure is 
more likely to provide a more conducive context for better exercise of in-
dependence. The new law compounds the situation with uncertainty on the 
nominating authorities. It maintains the requirement that the commissioners, 
including the chair and vice-chair, shall be appointed by presidential decree 
following nominations by ‘the services, associations and socio-professional bodies 
to which they belong’.50 
III. Mandate 
According to section 1(2) of the 2004 Law, the Commission shall be an 
independent institution for consultation, monitoring, evaluation, dialogue 
and concerted action in the promotion and protection of human rights. That 
mandate has been expanded under the new law, which makes the 
Commission also the national mechanism for the prevention of torture.51 In 
essence, the Commission is ‘responsible for the promotion and protection of 
human rights and freedoms’52 and the ‘prevention of torture in all places 
of detention’.53 
As part of its responsibility to protect human rights, the Commission is man-
dated to receive ‘all denunciations’ relating to violations, conduct ‘all enquiries’ 
and carry out ‘all necessary investigations’ into alleged violations of human rights, 
and to study ‘all matters’ relating to the defense and promotion of human rights.54 
Remarkably, the Commission may carry out investigations on its own initiative.55 
It may also refer cases of violations of human rights and freedoms to the 
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competent authorities and, when necessary, inspect penitentiary establishments, 
police stations and gendarmerie brigades, in the presence of the competent state 
counsel or his representative. In the latter case, it may be necessary to produce a 
report of its visits to the places of detention and to submit to the competent 
authorities. Its protection mandate is described in very broad terms with potential 
to permit it to carry out a wide range of activities with a view to protecting human 
rights. This broad approach to its mandate is in fact recommended by the Paris 
Principles56 on the basis that a broad mandate provides scope for a greater 
protection of rights of all categories.57 Nevertheless, the Commission seems re-
stricted in terms of the extent to which it can influence the outcome of some of its 
investigative activities or the complaints received from the public. For instance, 
although it can submit reports to the competent authorities following visits to 
detention sites, it is not clear what the follow-up mechanism is, because the law is 
silent on the point. Moreover, following its inquiries and investigations into al-
leged violations, it is mandated to report to the President of the Republic.58 The 
law is silent on subsequent action by the President. In 2017, when the 
Commission submitted its report of the Anglophone crisis to the President, it is 
not clear what action was taken as a direct response to that report.59 It is worthy 
to note, however, that the new law dispenses with the requirement to report to the 
President. 
With respect to its promotion role, the Commission has the responsibility 
of publicising instruments relating to human rights and to forge a culture of 
human rights through information and the holding of conferences and 
seminars.60 To that end, it is expected to collect and disseminate interna-
tional documentation on human rights61 and liaise with non-governmental 
human rights organisations. Further, the Commission is required to main-
tain (where necessary) cooperation links with the United Nations, interna-
tional organisations and foreign committees or associations that have the 
objective of promoting and protecting human rights in Cameroon and to 
inform the Minister of External Relations about such cooperation links.62 
The Commission has been active in its promotion role by organising sen-
sitisation and education campaigns. For instance, it undertook a successful 
nationwide campaign from October to December 2010, during which public 
authorities and ordinary citizens were provided with basic human rights 
education and the procedures of the Commission.63 It has also maintained 
productive cooperation links with regional and international human rights 
organisations. In 2018, with the assistance of the United Nations Centre for 
Democracy and Human Rights, it elaborated a plan of action comprising 
mainly of education and sensitisation, monitoring and reporting and sup-
port to victims of human rights violations. It was to be implemented as a 
pilot initiative from 2019.64 
The new law goes further in terms of the promotion role by providing the legal 
basis for the Commission to contribute to human rights education in ‘all training 
cycles and socio-professional environment’.65 Further, through advocacy, the 
Commission can also make more useful contributions towards improving the 
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legal and institutional framework for the promotion of human rights.66 In that 
respect, it may advocate for the government and parliament to ‘adhere to, sign 
and ratify’ international and regional human rights instruments.67 This is com-
mendable because it is more focused and more specific in terms of its role in the 
ratification of international instruments. It provides a stronger legal basis than 
the terms used in the 2004 law which required very broadly that the Commission 
should ‘propose to the public authorities, measures to be taken in the area of 
human rights and freedoms’.68 
The Commission’s third mandate, the prevention of torture introduced by the 
new law, is, strictly speaking, a consolidation of part of its duties relating to the 
protection of human rights. Under the 2004 law, the Commission had the duty 
to visit and investigate places of detention. However, as a state party to the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture, Cameroon is required to 
establish a national mechanism for the prevention of torture. It opted to do so by 
specifically extending the competence of the Commission. The Commission is, 
therefore, responsible for conducting regular visits to all places of detention, 
including psychiatric institutions, engaging in constructive dialogue with the 
heads of the relevant institutions and conducting private and confidential in-
terviews in the presence or absence of witnesses.69 It may also make re-
commendations to the relevant authorities to improve on their conditions of 
detention. Additionally, the Commission is tasked with the duty to participate in 
monitoring the implementation of recommendations of the United Nations 
Committee Against Torture (CAT) and, at the request of the government, to 
provide an opinion on draft or existing legislation on torture.70 As a torture- 
prevention mechanism, the remit of the Commission is very limited. Three 
observations are worth noting. 
First, the visits to places of detention are limited to an examination of the 
conditions of detention. This may imply that the Commission is precluded from 
making observations on evidence of torture itself. Although it may assume such 
powers based on its broad protective mandate, that limitation is problematic as 
it may provide a basis for the relevant authorities to conceal information re-
lating to torture. Second, the Commission may only participate in monitoring 
the implementation of recommendations. It is not clear what that means. For 
instance, can it compel the government to implement the recommendations of 
CAT or indeed its own recommendations? Third, the Commission cannot 
comment or make recommendations on existing or draft legislation and, in 
relation to torture, it can only do so on the invitation of the government. As per 
the Paris Principles, a human rights institution, such as the Commission, should 
be able to make such recommendations on its own initiative.71 This should not 
be limited to legislation on torture but should cover all human rights and, in 
that respect, the views of the Commission should be mandatorily submitted.72 
By limiting the Commission in that way, the law prevents it from acting as an 
effective human rights institution and undermines its responsibility to con-
tribute to the enhancement of the legal and institutional framework of human 
rights in the country. 
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IV. Powers 
The Commission has been granted some powers to discharge its mandate 
discussed earlier. Under section 3 of the 2004 law, the Commission can 
summon a party or witness for a hearing, request the competent authority to 
carry out searches and require the production of documents and evidence. 
These provisions are important in that they may facilitate the role of the 
Commission in investigating complaints and acquiring evidence in support of 
allegations of violations. Anyone who fails to respond to the summons of the 
Commission is liable to penalties under section 28 of the Penal Code.73 
Moreover, the Commission can ‘intervene in any case, to participate in up-
holding the interests of victims of human rights violations’. This is particularly 
important where proceedings have been instituted in court. The Commission 
can support a victim and the courts by providing an independent analysis of the 
relevant human rights principles and standards and facts on the state of human 
rights in the country that would be relevant to the case. In that way, it will 
provide an objective view of the human rights principles and statements of fact, 
which would be helpful for the courts to consider in deciding a particular case. 
The Commission may also refer any offence in matters falling within its remit 
to the Minister of Justice and in non-criminal matters, to use mediation and 
conciliation to resolve a dispute. 
In spite of the powers described earlier, it is submitted that the powers to grant 
remedies and the powers of compulsion in particular are inadequate for the 
effective functioning of the Commission. For instance, the law is silent on what 
remedies the Commission may grant to the victim following the findings of an 
investigation. Its powers in that respect seem limited to making non-binding 
recommendations or referring the violation to the competent authority as per 
section 2 of the 2004 Law. This is, in fact, ineffective, as it cannot make any 
binding recommendations to the relevant authorities. In 2019, the Commission 
reported on a visit to a prison in Yoko, Garoua, carried out in 2016, where a 
group of prisoners have had their matter on appeal for thirty-one years.74 In view 
of the serious breaches of human rights, in particular, the excessive and unlawful 
delay in the appeal process, the Commission was only able to report the matter 
to the Presidency of the Republic, the Minister of Justice and the president of the 
divisional High Court. The Commission recommended their immediate release 
as per section 584 of the Penal Code. It could not compel their release despite the 
gross violation of their right to personal liberty. 
In terms of its powers of compulsion, despite the criminal sanctions for non- 
compliance with a summons, there is no sanction for authorities who fail to 
conduct searches or provide requested documentation or evidence. Thus, 
although the Commission can request assistance from the competent authorities, 
they are not under an obligation to cooperate. Section 4(2) also states that the 
Commission may request the competent authorities to conduct a study or draft a 
report on specific human rights issues relating to their duties, but does not 
provide any sanction for non-compliance. Rather, the Commission is required, 
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under section 3, to refer offences falling within its remit to the Minister of Justice. 
This is objectionable in that it by-passes the prosecuting authorities, such as state 
counsels, who are in charge of public prosecution. Moreover, the law does not 
state what the Minister is required to do when offences are brought to his notice. 
It may be assumed that the Minister may use his discretion to instruct the state 
counsel to prosecute or not. This is undesirable because he is not obliged to 
respond to the Commission, and if he decides to act at all, he may instruct 
against prosecution even where a violation has been clearly established. The 
Commission’s powers of compulsion should be complemented by a power to 
hold recalcitrant officials in contempt. The Minister should only be involved in 
so far as that intervention enhances the Commission’s ability to sanction the 
contemptuous official. 
Due in part to these weaknesses the Commission has faced difficulties in 
carrying out its duties, particularly in accessing places of detention. This was very 
problematic during its inaugural years, and an emblematic incident can de-
monstrate these difficulties. In 1992, the Commission attempted to investigate 
allegations of torture of protesters detained in the Yaoundé Central Prison. 
The protesters had been arrested in the North-West region during the National 
Youth Day celebrations. The commissioners were denied access to the prison 
and they were, themselves, detained for an hour and their operating materials 
were confiscated.75 Although such overt hostilities to the Commission have 
lessened, commissioners still do not obtain the full cooperation of administrative 
authorities or security forces. More recently, on a number of occasions 
in 2018, the Commission was denied access to detention facilities.76 Again, it 
encountered difficulties obtaining from judicial authorities, statistics of persons 
arrested in connection with the Anglophone crisis.77 In its 2017 human rights 
report, the Commission explained in detail the obstructive practices of public 
authorities, notably at the level of the penitentiary services, actively preventing 
visits to detention cites or deliberately failing to cooperate.78 Failure of co-
operation is also common with judicial authorities. For instance, in 2017, a state 
counsel in the South-West region declined to join the team of officials who are 
required by law to accompany the Commission to detention sites. The visit 
had particular significance due to the large numbers of arbitrary arrests and 
detention of protesters in connection with the crisis in the Anglophone regions. 
The Commission regretted that the state counsel was uncooperative at a time 
when allegations of torture in the detention sites were rife and the presence of the 
state counsel was crucial to their investigations.79 
The new law of 2019 does very little to address the weak powers of 
the Commission. Section 41 provides that the views and recommendations of the 
Commission contained in its special or thematic reports should be submitted to 
the relevant competent authorities for ‘review and follow-up’. It states nothing 
about implementing the recommendations. Under section 7, the Commission 
may ‘request the competent authorities to put an end to the human rights vio-
lations noted’ and ‘where necessary’ request ‘the assistance of the forces of law 
and order in the discharge of its duties’. There is still no mechanism to ensure 
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compliance. Instead, section 43 ‘requires’ the state, its agencies and any natural 
or legal person to ‘help’ the Commission to carry out its duties. The term ‘help’ is 
a very feeble expression of the obligation of the relevant authorities to assist the 
Commission. Stronger expressions such as ‘compelled’ and ‘assist or cooperate’ 
should be used and should be complemented by provisions forbidding any in-
stitutions or persons from obstructing or unlawfully interfering with the 
Commission in the performance of its duties. 
V. Prospects and challenges 
The Commission is an institution with potential to make significant contributions 
to the protection and promotion of human rights in Cameroon. Its broad 
mandate provides the opportunity to influence the respect for human rights. This 
can be gleaned from a number of areas as already discussed and also from 
its periodic visits to detention centres. The new law vests the Commission with 
powers to carry out regular, impromptu or announced visits to detention cites as 
part of the torture-prevention mechanism. Its visits in the past have registered 
modest successes as, for instance, in 2012 when it carried out a visit to a prison in 
Ebolowa, together with the state counsel. This culminated in the release of some 
persons who had been unlawfully detained, as the state counsel was in a position 
to provide that remedy.80 On December 2016, the Commission was able to 
conduct an impromptu visit to the Secretary of State in Charge of the 
Gendarmerie in Yaoundé, following allegations of unlawful arrests of protesters 
in Bamenda early in December and a suspicion of their incommunicado de-
tention. The Commission was able to locate some of the detainees and to 
communicate the information to their families. These successes could be con-
solidated, in particular where the Commission is given more powers to ensure 
that persons illegally detained are released and generally to instil that culture 
of respect for human rights among public authorities. 
The Commission also makes significant contributions through its pro-
motional activities. Among other things, it campaigns for improved health 
facilities and the provision of basic amenities like portable water, electricity 
and nutritious foods to deprived communities and to detention and edu-
cation centres. Its work is, however, hampered by a number of factors, 
mainly the inability to make binding recommendations to the relevant au-
thorities and the lack of sufficient funding. The Commission has persistently 
decried its lack of sufficient funding, which results in low levels of staffing 
and inevitably compromises its efficiency.81 According to an international 
human rights organisation, the Commission’s work is undermined by the 
lack of sufficient funding.82 A number of international organisations, such as 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Sub-Committee for 
the Prevention of Torture, have recommended an increase in the funding 
of the Commission.83 In its 2017 report, the Commission acknowledged 
a slight increase in its 2017 budget which seemed insufficient as the 
Commission itself deplored the ‘inadequate financial, material and human 
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resources that should ensure the kind of deployment that would exert a 
higher impact on its activities’.84 There was no increase in the budget for 
2018 and the Commission confirmed the potential negative impact on 
certain activities in the crucial year of the highly contentious presidential 
elections.85 The funding of national human rights institutions is pivotal to 
their success. The Paris Principles86 emphasise the importance of adequate 
funding not only for the effectiveness of the institution but also to ensure 
independence from the government. 
In spite of its challenges, the Commission appears to be achieving some 
modest results in the protection of human rights and freedoms. It has come a 
long way from its early days when it remained silent in the face of serious human 
rights abuses. These successes can be galvanised by genuine government support 
in the areas highlighted previously and further cooperation with civil society 
organisations and Cameroon’s international partners. 
B. The Directorate for Human Rights and International 
Cooperation 
The Directorate for Human Rights and International Cooperation (DHRIC) is a 
department in the Ministry of Justice. It was created by a 2005 law87 re-
organising the Ministry of Justice in relation to the role of the Minister of Justice 
in the supervision of human rights enforcement. As discussed in the following 
section, it is vested with some duties in that respect. 
I. Overview of the institutional structure 
The Directorate consists of a Card Index and Filing Office and two sub- 
departments – the Sub-Directorate of Human Rights and the Sub-Directorate 
for International Cooperation, each headed by a sub-director. The overall head 
of department is the director to whom the sub-directors report.88 
II. Mandate and powers 
The Directorate is vested with three main supervisory duties89:  
– To follow up human rights concerns, the prevention of torture and other 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and cooperation with the 
Ministry’s international partners, in collaboration with the relevant 
administrative services  
– The implementation of human rights-related international conventions and 
bilateral agreements and those relating to the prevention of crime, the treatment 
of offenders, genocide and war crimes and all other crimes against humanity, in 
collaboration with the relevant administrative services and institutions  
– To follow up the activities of the International Court of Justice, 
the International Criminal Court and the United Nations High 
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Commissioner for Human Rights in collaboration with the Ministry of 
External Relations  
– To follow up the activities of the National Human Rights Commission 
To discharge these broad duties, the two sub-departments have been as-
signed specific areas of competence. For instance, the Sub-Directorate for 
Human Rights is in charge of all the human rights enforcement-related duties 
outlined earlier.90 Thus, it carries out assessments of the human rights situation 
in Cameroon, produces the Ministry’s annual human rights reports, monitors 
and coordinates the activities of the Ministry on the enforcement of national 
and international standards of human rights and organises and coordinates 
the representation of the state before international jurisdictions. In addition, 
this sub-directorate engages with promotion and sensitisation campaigns on 
human rights at the level of state and non-state institutions and, in that respect, 
it acts in collaboration with the National Commission on Human Rights and 
Freedoms, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and all other na-
tional and international human rights organisations with an interest in human 
rights enforcement in Cameroon. 
The Sub-Directorate for International Cooperation is essentially focused 
on cooperation between the Ministry of Justice and Cameroon’s national 
and international partners in the area of human rights.91 The duties include 
developing Cameroon’s cooperation policy, following up cooperation projects 
and international negotiations and assessing the level of cooperation between 
the government and Cameroon’s partners in human rights enforcement and 
in development. 
III. Assessment of its role in the protection and promotion of human rights 
One major area where the DHRIC has made a significant contribution to 
human rights is through the publication of the annual human rights reports. 
These reports provide the government’s perspective on the state of human 
rights in the country and the measures adopted to address some of the 
human rights concerns. Moreover, the reports give visibility to the situation 
of human rights in the country to the national and international community. 
They also provide the opportunity for international jurisdictions to conduct a 
comparative examination of reports submitted by national and international 
NGOs. This is important because often discrepancies exist in these reports 
making it necessary for clarifications to be obtained through more credible 
processes, for instance, through the oral examination of a country’s official 
reports by the UN Human Rights Committee. State officials are questioned 
on the basis of the reports of the state and other reports submitted by national 
and international institutions. The outcome of these sessions and the reports 
form the basis on which international jurisdictions make recommendations 
to the government of Cameroon on measures to improve on the human 
rights situation in the country. 
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The DHRIC has also contributed significantly to the drafting and adoption of 
the National Action Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
(2015–2019) by the Ministry of Justice.92 This Plan elaborates on the government’s 
objectives in regards to the realisation of human rights of all three generations 
within the specific period and the strategies to achieving the objectives. Some of 
the activities that have been successfully carried out include the training of security 
forces (in collaboration with the National Commission on Human Rights and 
Freedoms) on the implementation of human rights standards in their practices 
especially in the areas of personal liberty (detention) and the respect for prisoner’s 
rights (especially freedom from torture and other inhuman and degrading treat-
ment or punishment). These are principal areas where human rights standards 
have often fallen short and security forces are constantly accused of impunity.93 
The work of the DHRIC is largely complementary and essentially supervisory. 
Due to its limited mandate, it does not make binding recommendations to 
the government on measures to enhance the enforcement of human rights. 
Moreover, it cannot act unilaterally to impose measures or sanctions on perpe-
trators of human rights violations. The independence and impartiality of the 
department is also doubtful, in particular in its assessment of the state of human 
rights in the country. This can be seen in its annual reports where, often, the state 
is not criticised for gross violations of human rights. A notable instance is the 
2017 report, which, among other things, provides an analysis of the state of 
human rights in the North-West and South-West regions, which are in a state 
of crisis. In recounting the chronology of the crisis, the report failed to state 
that violent altercations were initiated by security forces, a fact which has been 
confirmed by multiple independent human rights organisations. According to 
the report, ‘On 21 September 2017, activists attacked students on their way to 
school. The name “Ambazonia” was heard’.94 The synopsis makes no mention 
of the abusive role of the security forces but instead appears apologetic to 
the government’s human rights violations. For instance, it implicitly approves the 
shutting down of the internet and the arrest of the Consortium leaders and 
justifies it as a measure to prevent ‘disinformation campaigns and dissemination 
of hate messages’ against the state. The report states, 
In a bid to address the situation and restore public order, Government 
temporarily suspended the Internet in North West and South West Regions 
on 17 January 2017, dissolved the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society 
Consortium and the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) and 
initiated proceedings against several persons including Fontem Neba, 
Nkongho Agbor Bala, and Mancho Bibixy alias BBC.95  
While derogation from certain human rights obligations may be permissible 
during exceptional periods such as a state of emergency, the situation in Cameroon 
was not officially proclaimed a state of emergency. Moreover, even where dero-
gations may be permissible, certain international human rights standards must be 
adhered to.96 This was not applied in Cameroon. It is submitted that the DHRIC 
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must adopt an objective approach in assessing the state of human rights in its 
annual reports in order to ensure that more objective and credible information is 
provided to both the national and international community. 
Moreover, its supervisory role makes it a feeble institution in terms of 
the protection of human rights. In addition, it should be an institution that 
cooperates with the national human rights institution rather than to ‘follow up’ 
its activities. The expression ‘follow up’ seems to suggest that the Ministry of 
Justice, through the DHRIC, supervises the Commission. That is inconsistent 
with its supposed independent status and is a factor that might serve to 
inhibit its effective performance. Both institutions can cooperate for the better 
protection and promotion of human rights. For instance, the department can 
be an effective mechanism through which the Commission’s recommendations 
are channelled to the Minister for compulsory action. 
Conclusion 
The protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms remains a challenge 
in Cameroon. The constitution purports to respect and provide for these 
rights, indicating a certain commitment to their fulfilment. The mechanisms 
for their protection have limited the extent to which effective protection can 
be achieved. There is a nebulous relationship between legislative provisions on 
human rights on the one hand and their protection mechanisms on the other. 
The main challenge in this regard is to decrease the gap between the con-
stitutional and legislative texts and the actual practice of human rights pro-
tection. This must commence with a genuine government commitment, backed 
by effective protection mechanisms. 
The national human rights institution can make a significant contribution to 
the protection and promotion of human rights. There is need for a system of 
integrating its work into the general protection mechanism of the judiciary such 
that its work actually complements that of the judiciary, rather than being re-
garded as an impediment. The government needs to demonstrate its commit-
ment to human rights by providing the Commission with a broad mandate, 
effective powers and sufficient resources. In addition, the DHRIC must perceive 
its functions not as the government’s advocate but as an institution that reinforces 
the protection mechanism of the state. It needs to be more independent and 
objective in assessing the human rights needs of the country, without which it 
would be incapable of making useful recommendations to the executive.   
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Conclusion   
This book has highlighted the relevance of the institutional structures and me-
chanisms in contemporary governance in Cameroon and the relevance of the 
Constitution and legislative texts in determining the extent of their effectiveness. 
It has also demonstrated the practical difficulties encountered by the institutions 
in carrying out their functions. A major theme that has featured throughout the 
discussion is the power imbalance that exists between the three arms of government. 
Chapter 2 has demonstrated that the Constitution provided for a semi-presidential 
system, which is purportedly intended to mitigate the overconcentration of powers 
in the President. However, that same Constitution undermines the advantage of 
semi-presidentialism by defining prime ministerial powers so narrowly that the 
executive power in effect rests solely with the President. This creates many problems 
because, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, both legislative power and 
judicial power are designed to depend largely on the President. In discussing the 
institutions and their operational mechanisms, it was clear that, to a large extent, 
the source of their authority and independence was the President. That applies to 
the judiciary, the legislature, the Constitutional Council, the National Electoral 
Commission and the National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms. Such 
a system is a challenge to governance. 
As the chapters have demonstrated, the issue of the dependence of the in-
stitutional structures contributes significantly to the difficulties in establishing 
democratic and accountable governance as neither parliament nor the judiciary 
or the Constitutional Council can exercise effective oversight of the government. 
It explains why the government is unresponsive to the disillusioned population, 
why it cannot deal effectively with issues like the Anglophone problem or address 
systematically its persistently poor human rights record. There has been a his-
torical complacency in acknowledging those deficiencies in governance, but re-
cent events demonstrate that there is a certain political awakening that has swept 
through the country. These events have caused the system of governance to be 
questioned. They have necessitated an investigation into the current normative 
framework regulating governance in the country. 
In the preceding chapters, a number of recommendations were made with 
a view to addressing some of the weaknesses identified in the constitutional 
and legislative texts and in the practical operations of the institutions discussed. 
These recommendations, if implemented, have potentials to address those 
weaknesses, at least in the short term. Nevertheless, this book has endeavoured to 
show that the current constitutional framework cannot provide scope for a solid 
foundation for democratic and accountable governance. Crucially, the ideolo-
gical underpinnings of that Constitution limit the extent to which it can embrace 
modern features of democracy and accountability. As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
roots of that Constitution can be traced to the authoritarian Constitution of 
1972, which laid down the foundations of a centralised governance system with 
an authoritarian presidency. The 1996 Constitution did not depart from that 
authoritarian philosophy. Consequently, the new institutions established under 
it did not have scope to develop robust accountability mechanisms. The 
Constitutional Council, for instance, has limited positive influence on democracy 
and constitutional justice because its powers are restricted inter alia, by me-
chanisms that depend to a large extent on the President and other politicians. 
Moreover, amendments made to existing institutions did not provide sufficient 
scope for these institutions to exercise their powers. For instance, although the 
judiciary’s status was elevated to that of a power, it remains excessively depen-
dent on the President. It is therefore, argued here that Cameroon needs a new 
constitution designed to create a new system of governance that can respond 
more effectively to contemporary challenges and represent the will of the people. 
Such a constitution should provide the necessary institutional mechanisms, 
processes and conditions that will make the government more democratic and 
accountable. For instance, if Anglophones demand more respect for their min-
ority rights, how do they get the government to respond? If the electoral system 
disenfranchises a significant section of the population, how do they get parlia-
ment or the Constitutional Council to remedy it? If public authorities violate 
the rights of citizens, how do they get the judiciary to provide effective remedies? 
A new constitution should be able to provide satisfactory answers to these 
questions. The idea is not to paralyse government decision making, but to enable 
the government to function in a responsive and accountable way. 
Some African countries have adopted new constitutions that have set their 
path of governance on a progressive trajectory. Kenya and Ghana are con-
temporary examples of countries where a completely new dispensation was 
engineered by more progressive and popularly adopted constitutions.1 The 
argument is not that a ‘good’ constitution would resolve all the governance 
challenges that Cameroon is facing. There may be other social or economic 
factors that have not been addressed in this book and may well contribute to 
these challenges. Nevertheless, it is contended that the constitution sets the tone 
and the framework to establish the relevant robust governance institutions, 
processes and mechanisms. 
Constitutional engineering 
Pursuant to the preceding argument, a pertinent issue to consider is the method 
of constitutional engineering. The process of making a new constitution has great 
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significance for the outcome.2 Considering the ‘process’ through which the 1996 
Constitution was adopted and the trajectory of governance since then, it may 
be argued that a new dispensation requires a novel approach to constitutional 
engineering. One method advocated here is a participatory approach to con-
stitution making. This requires that the public is included in the process of 
constitution making, such that it would be the people acting as constituent power 
in formulating that foundational document which signifies a new dispensation.3 
Public participation is ubiquitous in recent constitution-making processes and it 
has received wide support.4 That approach is advocated for a number of reasons. 
First, it fosters ownership of the process and the outcome.5 Second, it lends 
legitimacy to the document and the governance system that eventually results 
from it.6 Third, it is seen as an educational exercise in democracy and a means of 
promoting the development of a democratic culture.7 Fourth, it gives a voice to 
those who would be governed by the constitution, to address past grievances and 
inequalities, to define their rights and aspirations and how they wish these rights 
and aspirations to be provided and protected by the government. In Cameroon, 
the public has largely been relegated to the background of political activity. 
The government is very centralised and far removed from the populations. A 
participatory process will allow the populations to contribute to developing a 
progressive governance system. 
Of course, public participation is not a panacea. There is also the possibility 
that a poorly designed process might undermine the positive dimensions of public 
participation and instead perpetuate regressive democratic practices. Moreover, 
the very idea of public participation may indeed be seen as counterproductive 
in some sections of the population. Yet, comparative examples around the world 
demonstrate that it is an approach worth pursuing.8 Recent and ongoing events 
in Cameroon indicate that, like the turbulent 1990s, a constitutional moment has 
arrived and, this time, things need to be done correctly. 
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